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

BY THE
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

Dedicated

TO THE

BLESSED MEMORY

OF

ST. LEO THE GREAT

WHOSE EPISTLE TO FLAVIAN

CALLED "THE TOME" HAS FOR MANY CENTURIES

EXHIBITED THE TRUTH CONCERNING

THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST

PREFACE

THE writer is glad to live in the twentieth century. He is not, indeed, a "modernist," for he is convinced that the Church's primitive faith is permanently valid, and that the Chalcedonian decree of faith, *rightly understood*, correctly defines the determinative elements and premises of sound Christological speculation.

But he is also convinced that modern critical scholarship is throwing much light upon Christological problems; and that when its results have been dissociated, as in due season they will be, from alien postulates and theories, they will be found to fortify and enrich the now widely misinterpreted Christology of the Ecumenical Councils.

The controlling aim of this volume is to set forth the ancient catholic doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, in terms which shall be at once true to that doctrine and in line with the forms of thought and language now prevailing. This aim involves some rather difficult work in translating certain ancient terms into modern equivalents. Its difficulty arises from the fact that modern Christological thought has been controlled in large measure by postulates which make a misinterpretation of traditional terms practically inevitable. It is not a question of scholarship, nor is it one of intellectual discernment. In no

previous age has greater learning and skill been brought to bear on the subjects treated of in this volume. And sincere truth seeking is conspicuously in evidence. The question is one of a changed standpoint; and the new standpoint, so far from being dictated by modern results, is largely part of a provincial tradition, which will have to be modified before these results can be rightly interpreted and correctly utilized in the development of Christology.

There are signs that this is beginning to be realized, and that modern scholarship is ere long to justify itself as a chosen means of the Holy Spirit for the guidance of the Church into a riper understanding of her primitive faith.

The writer's task has seemed to require that he should lay considerable emphasis upon certain truths and principles, because of their bearing on modern misapprehensions of catholic doctrine. And inasmuch as these matters emerge in various connections, it has seemed desirable to resort to some repetition, even at the risk of being tedious. This applies especially to the ethical aspects of the Incarnation.

Undiscriminating adherence to what is ancient, and rejection of everything modern as necessarily erroneous, constitute Bourbonism, and are both indefensible. But there are ancient results as well as modern, and to accept results, whether ancient or modern, is the duty of all who would abide by the truth.

And the central truth of Christianity is that the one historic Person Jesus Christ was, and is, both

God and Man — not less fully God than really Man, and not less completely Man than truly God. Furthermore it is a part of this central verity that through the Incarnation Godhead and Manhood met in Christ in genuine communion; but that this involved neither an obliteration of human limitations by the divine, nor a reduction of the divine by the human. This is the faith to which modern results have to be related; for while they are able to enrich our hold upon it, they are misinterpreted when thought to require its modification.

O Lord Jesus Christ, God of God, and Light of Light, guide us by Thy Holy Spirit to an ever increasing knowledge of Thee. And if in this volume anything has been either mistakenly or irreverently written, pardon and overrule it for the welfare of souls, and for the manifestation of Thy Truth. May Thy Name be glorified above every name forever. AMEN.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

PART I. *Modern Conditions and Problems*

PAGE

§ 1. The task here undertaken 1
§ 2. Factors determining modern attitudes 4
§ 3. Modern demands and our attitude towards them . 7
§ 4. Modern problems, and the peculiar anxiety now felt 11

PART II. *Standpoints and Methods*

§ 5. The traditional standpoint — apostolic and dogmatic 15
§ 6. The modern standpoint — Lutheran and ethico-humanitarian 18
§ 7. The historical method 23
§ 8. Presuppositions in the use of this method by catholic theologians 26

PART III. *The Position Adopted*

§ 9. Modern critical scholarship an instrument of the Holy Spirit 29
§ 10. But its incidental errors must be eliminated. Examples 30
§ 11. Chalcedonian Christology (summarized) is postulated 33
§ 12. Belief in its finality consistent with open-minded investigation 33

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL

PART I. *The Manifestation of Christ*

§ 1. In the Old Covenant 37
§ 2. In His incarnate life on earth 39
§ 3. In His divine claims and resurrection 42
§ 4. By the Holy Spirit's illuminating work 43

PART II. *The Development of Dogma*

§ 5. To protect the truth of our Lord's Godhead . . . 47
§ 6. And of His Manhood 50
§ 7. And of the Unity of His Person 52
§ 8. And of the distinctness of His natures 55

PART III. *Modern Christology*

§ 9. Mediæval elaboration 61
§ 10. Lutheran departure 62
§ 11. Kenoticism and progressive Incarnation 65
§ 12. Recent confusion 68

CHAPTER III

THE TAKING OF OUR NATURE

PART I. *The Fact and its Causation*

§ 1. How described in Creed and Scripture 71
§ 2. Causes and conditions 73
§ 3. Convenience of the Incarnation in relation to divine purpose 76
§ 4. And in relation to immediate aspects 78

PART II. *Mediatorial Purpose*

§ 5. Salvation 81
§ 6. Achievement of human destiny 83
§ 7. Was the Incarnation caused by sin? 85
§ 8. Mediation 88

PART III. *The Virgin-Mother*

§ 9. The fact of virgin-birth 89
§ 10. The brethren of our Lord 94
§ 11. Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin 96
§ 12. Her privilege and honour 98

CHAPTER IV

THE GODHEAD OF CHRIST

PART I. *His Person*

§ 1. The doctrine of hypostatic union 102
§ 2. The reality of self involved 104
§ 3. The substance philosophy 107
§ 4. The Person of Christ eternal and unchanged . . . 108

PART II. *Reasons for Belief*

§ 5. The manner of the Man 110
§ 6. His claims and their naturalness 112
§ 7. His works and resurrection 114
§ 8. Apostolic verification in spiritual experience . . . 116

PART III. *Implicates and Values*

§ 9. Theological 118
§ 10. Mediatorial 120
§ 11. Ethical 124
§ 12. Dispensational and sacramental 128

CHAPTER V

THE MANHOOD OF CHRIST

PART I. *Catholic Doctrine*

§ 1. As against certain errors 131
§ 2. Its Ego the divine Son 134
§ 3. Sinlessness 137
§ 4. Christ's Manhood permanent 140

PART II. *Its Properties*

§ 5. His body real and passible 144
§ 6. His human mind both like ours and unique . . . 147
§ 7. His truly human will and moral experience . . . 150
§ 8. The grace of Christ 153

PART III. *Implicates and Values*

§ 9. In relation to human history 156
§ 10. Mediatorial 159
§ 11. Ethical 162
§ 12. Sacramental 164

CHAPTER VI

THE UNION OF NATURES

PART I. *The Doctrine*

§ 1. Godhead and Manhood meet in one Self 167
§ 2. But are mutually incommensurable 171
§ 3. Each operates in communion with the other . . 173
§ 4. The *communicatio idiomatum* 176

PART II. *Modern Difficulties*

§ 5. The Lutheran departure 179
§ 6. Psychological Christology 182

§ 7. The reality of self implied in Chalcedonian Christology 184
§ 8. Is Chalcedonian Christology dualistic? 188

PART III. *Implications and Values*

§ 9. Effective union between God and man 191
§ 10. Without obliteration of difference 192
§ 11. The unseen Self the clue to the problem of interaction 194
§ 12. All the respective values of Godhead and Manhood are found in Christ, without reduction or confusion 198

CHAPTER VII

THE SELF-EFFACEMENT OF CHRIST

PART I. *Development of the Kenotic Theory*

§ 1. Inconsistent with ancient doctrine 202
§ 2. Alleged patristic support 205
§ 3. Lutheran standpoint raised the problem of compatibility 208
§ 4. The views of Dr. Martensen and certain Anglicans 212

PART II. *Kenotic Arguments*

§ 5. Of mutual incompatibility of the two natures . . 215
§ 6. Of Kenôsis in creation: relative attributes . . . 217
§ 7. Of ethical requirements 221
§ 8. Of juxtaposition of the divine and the human . . 225

PART III. *New Testament Teaching*

§ 9. Non-emergence of the divine within human scrutiny 228
§ 10. St. Paul's phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν 229

§ 11. Effaced Himself 232
§ 12. The doctrine of His humiliation 235

CHAPTER VIII

THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST

PART I. *His Twofold Operations*

§ 1. Divine and human wills 237
§ 2. Divine and human knowledge 239
§ 3. Two modes of self-determination in one self . . . 242
§ 4. His sinlessness explained only by unique resources 246

PART II. *His Temptation*

§ 5. Temptation defined 250
§ 6. Its reality consistent with impeccability 252
§ 7. Christ not exempt from moral effort 254
§ 8. The need that He should be morally invincible . 257

PART III. *The Goal of Christians*

§ 9. Christ exhibits that towards which we are to grow 259
§ 10. The examples of penitent saints needed branches of His example 262
§ 11. He gave a divine example. 263
§ 12. The possibility of our imitating Christ 265

CHAPTER IX

THE OFFICES OF CHRIST

PART I. *His Prophetic Office*

§ 1. His mediatorial function 268
§ 2. The Prophet in all divine dispensations 271
§ 3. In His incarnate earthly life 274
§ 4. In the Church as guided by the Spirit 277

PART II. *His Priestly Office*

§ 5. The transactional element of mediation 281
§ 6. The sacrificial rites of the Old Covenant 284
§ 7. Their fulfilment by Christ 288
§ 8. Our participation and benefit 289

PART III. *His Kingly Office*

§ 9. Eternal, cosmic and moral 293
§ 10. In the Old Covenant 296
§ 11. In His earthly life 297
§ 12. From the day of Pentecost. 301

CHAPTER X

OUR LORD'S EARTHLY LIFE

PART I. *Methods of Treatment*

§ 1. Gospel method 304
§ 2. Mediæval method 308
§ 3. Modern historical method 310
§ 4. Theological method 313

PART II. *Postulates and Principles*

§ 5. Our Lord's earthly life human in form and connection 315
§ 6. But the life of very God-incarnate 318
§ 7. It was supernatural and miraculous 320
§ 8. Conditions to be fulfilled in a "life of Christ". . 326

PART III. *The Mysteries of Christ*

§ 9. A life of signs and fulfilments 332
§ 10. Mysteries previous to His public ministry . . . 335
§ 11. Of His public ministry 342
§ 12. Of His redemptive work 347

THE INCARNATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

I. *Modern Conditions and Problems*

§ 1. The Christological literature of our time is almost wholly either critical, speculative or apologetical. It seems desirable, therefore, to remind the reader that this volume constitutes one of a series of treatises in Dogmatic Theology. It embodies an attempt to give a logically connected exposition of the positive content of our knowledge of Christ — of the taking of our nature by the eternal Son of of God, and of the personal properties and functions which were revealed to His disciples while He walked on earth.[1]

[1] On the history of Christology: J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctrine;* C. J. Hefele, *Hist. of the Christ. Councils* (Transl. 5 vols.); J. Tixeront, *Hist. of Dogmas;* J. H. Newman, *Arians;* W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers;* H. R. Percival, *Seven Ecumen. Councils;* J. A Dorner, *Hist. of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ* (Transl. 5 vols.); A. B. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, Lecs. ii–v; A. Schweitzer, *Quest of the Historical Jesus.*

Patristic and Mediæval: St. Athanasius, *de Incarnatione; Orationes IV contra Arianos; de Incarnatione contra Apollinarium libri II;* etc.; St. Basil, Five Books *contra Eunomium;* etc.; St. Gregory

This is also a catholic treatise, inasmuch as it presupposes the substantial truth of the ancient catholic doctrine concerning the Person of Christ. Being a scientific treatise, however, it is more than a mere exposition of catholic dogmas. It is concerned with whatever can be known concerning the Person of Christ, being designed to exhibit this knowledge in connected order and comprehensive unity.

Naz., *Orationes Theologicæ;* St. Gregory Nyss., *Libri XII contra Eunomium; Antirrheticus adv. Apollinarem;* etc.; St. Sophronius, *Epistola Synodica;* St. John Damasc., *Expositio Fidei Orthodoxæ;* Tertullian, *Adv. Praxeam;* and *de Carne Christi;* St. Hilary of Poitiers, *de Synodis;* and *de Trinitate;* St. Augustine, *de Trinitate;* John Cassian, *de Incarn. Christi;* St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologicæ*, Pars III.

Later, but of traditional type: Richard Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. V; Bishop Andrewes, *Sermons on the Nativity;* Bishop Pearson, *Exposition of the Creed*, arts. ii–iii; Bishop Bull, *Defence of the Nicene Faith;* and *Judgment of the Catholic Church;* Daniel Waterland, *Works;* Archd. Wilberforce, *The Incarnation;* A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 106–209; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord;* P. G. Medd, *One Mediator;* H. V. S. Eck, *The Incarnation;* W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo on the Incarnation* (notes valuable); Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, ch. vi; Suarez, *Summa;* Petavius, *Theol. Dogmat.*, Bk. IV; Franzelin, *de Verbo Incarnato;* Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theology*, Bk. V; Jos. Pohle, *Christology* (transl. by Preuss).

Modern types; Chas. Gore, *The Incarnation;* and *Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation;* R. L. Ottley, *The Incarnation;* W. Sanday, *Christology and Personality;* F. Weston, *The One Christ;* E. D. la Touche, *The Person of Christ;* H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ.* Additional bibliography, esp. German, in *Schaff-Herzog Encycl.*, s. v. "Christology."

Ecumenical documents, in H. R. Percival, *op. cit.;* C. A. Heurtley, *On Faith and the Creed;* and T. H. Bindley, *Œcumenical Documents of the Faith* (both original text and Eng. transl.).

But theology is a progressive science — not less so because, like other sciences, it accepts a limited number of "dogmas" as constituting established "results"; — and a modern theological treatise must reckon with advancing critical inquiry, and with wider scientific knowledge, so far as they pertain to its own subject-matter. But in a constructive exposition of this kind the progressive — that is, the critical and apologetical — aspects of its subject-matter must be relegated to a secondary position. This does not mean that their importance may be ignored, and that we need not reckon with the demand for a reconstruction of positive theology, such as will bring it into line with modern critical knowledge and mental perspectives. It means simply that there must be a division of labor, and that the discussion of modern problems must be kept within severe limits.

The writer appreciates most deeply the importance and value of modern Christological inquiry, and is in full sympathy with the demand that modern knowledge and improved methods of investigation shall be taken advantage of in a fresh scrutiny of the fundamental truths of our religion, in particular of Christological doctrine. It is by means of such scrutiny that unwarranted accretions are eliminated, essential truths are more convincingly established, and theology is made more serviceable as the handmaid of intelligent faith and of true religion.

It is hoped that these remarks will explain why the

writer will often refrain in the following chapters from discussing the critical processes which determine the conclusions adopted by him, and also will justify his devoting this chapter to a rapid survey of the factors, demands and problems of modern Christological thought.

§ 2. That new factors of epoch-making importance have helped to determine modern Christological thought is a patent fact, whatever view we may take of it. These factors have raised new problems, have revolutionized previously prevailing forms of thought and language, and have materially reduced the intelligibility in influential circles of ancient dogmas and of traditional theology. These effects have by no means been confined to rationalistic and sceptical schools. The conceptions, mental perspectives and aptitudes of thinkers in general have been materially altered.

(*a*) The confusing babel of Confessions of Faith which the protestant revolution engendered, the rise of critical philosophy, and the wonderful successes of non-ecclesiastical scholarship, have combined to bring about widespread indifference to catholic dogma — to religious dogma of any type, — and traditional terms have become increasingly liable to misinterpretation. The ancient assertion that novelty is a proof of error [1] has been displaced by the conviction that ecumenical definitions, because of

[1] Tertullian *de Præsc. Haer.*, 31; *adv. Prax.*, 2; *adv. Marcion*, v. 19. Cf. *Authority Eccles. and Biblical*, p. 119, note.

their antiquity, are necessarily immature, and incapable of standing the test of wider knowledge and critical scrutiny. The deference formerly shown to ecclesiastical authority is now given to scholarship — scholarship, that is, which ignores catholic dogma.

(*b*) Yet modern Christianity has not wholly escaped the influence of traditional presuppositions, although some of these date from the sixteenth century, and have been determined to a significant extent by the fact that German protestant theologians have initiated the chief lines of contemporary Christological investigation and speculation. These theologians have inherited and been influenced by the postulate of Martin Luther, that the Incarnation has imparted divine attributes to our Lord's human nature.[1] This postulate has not been scrutinized with sufficient care; and it has determined the Christological views of many who would reject it, if they reckoned with its divergence from the catholic faith and tested its truth by scriptural induction.

(*c*) Biblical criticism has upset the older implicit dependence upon the alleged inerrancy of Gospel narratives, has nullified the appeal to the four Gospels as to so many wholly independent authorities, and has discredited much traditional exegesis by the historical method of interpretation. This method takes account of contemporary conditions and conceptions and of the human limitations of New Testament writers, refusing in its more destructive

[1] See § 6 (*c*), below.

forms to reckon with any supernatural guidance. It is now perceived to be impossible to ascertain in every instance the *ipsissima verba* of Christ, and the supernatural elements of the Gospel narratives are apt to be minimized even when not rejected. The historical value of the fourth Gospel is assailed by various critical schools.[1]

(*d*) The wonderful success of modern physical science has made its influence felt in Christology. In particular, the principle of continuity has received in many quarters an exclusively naturalistic interpretation. The modern mind demands that all history shall be construed in terms of natural evolution. It asks for a historical Christ — a Christ, that is, whose advent and experience can be explained in terms of human experience, and in line with human development. It is required, therefore, that the mind of Christ shall be susceptible of psychological analysis and interpretation, to the exclusion of all other subjective elements.

The influence of these factors is most observable among Protestants, but is by no means confined to them. Ordinary thinkers of today of every type are influenced by new presuppositions, and approach Christological questions in a new way.[2] It is the modern mind to which the Church's theologians must adapt their expositions, if the historic faith is to be

[1] See W. Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, ch. i.

[2] Alfred Loisy's *The Gospel in the Church* affords a notable non-protestant illustration.

accepted — or even understood — by men of modern mental equipment.

§ 3. This requires that apologetical theologians shall sympathetically reckon with what are called modern demands; and that Dogmatic Theology shall adjust itself to the conditions of thought which they reveal. These demands are of unequal value. Some must be rejected, and some require modification; but others exhibit undeniable requirements of a truly progressive catholic theology. They all represent so many conditions of mind which have to be faced, if the catholic faith in Jesus Christ is to be propagated, and if certain defects in traditional expositions of that faith are to be remedied.

(*a*) Moderns demand freedom to return to primitive sources of knowledge concerning Christ, to undertake a fresh examination of His earthly life without reference to ecclesiastical definitions, and to make such theological reconstruction as the results may show to be needed. This demand is often based upon, and accompanied by, misunderstanding and rejection of ecumenical definitions and of the dogmatic office and authority of the Church, but this is not always so. In any case the right and, for competent theologians, the duty of reëxamining from time to time the historic foundations of Christian doctrine ought to be acknowledged in reckoning with this demand. In spite of the rationalistic vagaries which often control and vitiate such reëxamination, it constitutes one of the chief

methods by which the Holy Spirit protects the Church from innovating error. As to the need and limits of theological reconstruction something will be said in a later section.[1]

(*b*) As has already been shown,[2] it is demanded, as a condition of belief in Christ, that He shall be exhibited as really human and historical — subject to the conditions of human experience, and susceptible of interpretation in terms of such experience and of human history at large. So far as this represents the demand for a purely human Christ, it is neither necessitated by any established results of modern science and criticism nor possible to be granted by a sound theologian. But when interpreted sympathetically, as requiring simply that the subjection of Christ to human conditions and limitations shall not be minimized and emptied of reality, and that a rational and credible place in history shall be found for His birth and self-manifestation, we are bound to reckon with and to satisfy the demand.

(*c*) A third demand is that the Person and work of Christ shall be described in ethical terms, as distinguished from those of metaphysical paradox, of inscrutable majesty and of appalling power. Those who make this demand are apt to be under the impression that the definitions set forth by the ecumenical councils are prejudicial to an ethical interpretation of Christ. We hope to show in the

[1] In § 8. [2] In § 2 (d).

proper place that this is a mistake, and that, although the ethical aspects of Christ's Person and work did not constitute the subject-matter with which these councils were concerned, the truths which they defined in the best terms then available are essential to a true understanding of the ethical significance of the Incarnation. The demand for an ethical Christ is obviously justifiable, and we may not exhibit Him as a metaphysical puzzle instead of as a moral Saviour. We have need to make it perfectly clear that the drama of the Incarnation was one of wondrous love, and that Christ was touched with the feeling of our infirmities in order that He might bring divine sympathy to the rescue of weak and sinful humanity. It may not be forgotten, however, that if the love of Christ is to have the divine value which an ethical interpretation of the Incarnation requires, the Christ Who displayed that love must be one with God and truly divine.

(*d*) Finally, it is demanded that the Christ of our faith shall not be one whose life, achievements and claims violate natural law and the continuity of events. The inviolability of natural law, and the subjection of all possible events to the principle of continuity, are necessary postulates of natural science; and a Christ whose manifestation seems to be irreconcilable with these postulates is an incredible Christ. Unless He can be given an intelligible place in relation to cosmical development and to a world wherein natural law prevails, He cannot be

acknowledged as historical, but must be regarded as at least legendary if not wholly mythical.

We might respond shortly and truly that the Christ of catholic dogma violates neither natural law nor the principle of continuity. But the demand in question requires more sympathetic and careful handling. It is based upon the supposition, not always escaped from by Christian apologists, that miracles are violations of natural law. This error can be removed only by a more elaborate treatment of the subject of miracles and of the supernatural in general, than can be here undertaken. We must content ourselves with brief remarks. The inviolable postulate of natural science with which we are concerned is this: that the same unhindered causes shall always bring about the same effects. This postulate is not violated by the coming in of new factors and a consequent modification of the events which previously operating factors would have produced. Nor is it violated by the supposition that the Lord of nature may bring into play other and higher factors than the forces previously resident in the physical order. Whether He will do this depends upon the general plan and purpose for which the physical order was created, and upon whether that order affords all the factors which He employs in fulfilling His plan. The whole question hinges upon the philosophical conception of the world-drama which we adopt. If the naturalistic philosophy is true, the intrusion of supernatural factors is impossible

and the Christ of the Gospels is not a historic Christ. But if the theistic and Christian philosophy of history is true, the coming in of such factors was inevitable — a part of the general continuity of things, — and the Incarnation furnishes the key to all the developments of history. In brief, no conflict has been established between catholic Christology and natural science. The conflict lies wholly between the theistic and naturalistic philosophies. Naturalism is a speculative philosophy. Its scientific livery has been misappropriated.[1] There have been attempts to eliminate miracles from the Gospels on critical grounds, but these attempts have been hopelessly vitiated by the naturalistic postulates by which their results have been predetermined.[2]

§ 4. So stupendous a mystery as the self-manifestation of God-incarnate is necessarily too profound

[1] On naturalism and its denial of the supernatural, see *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 21 *et seq.*; *Creation and Man*, ch. iii. § 12; *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ii; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion;* Jas. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* The subject of the miraculous will be considered again with reference to its evidential bearing on our Lord's Godhead, in ch. iv. § 7; and with reference to the treatment of our Lord's earthly life and the alleged *contra-naturam* quality of certain Gospel miracles, in ch. x. § 7. The terms by which our Lord's miracles are denoted in the Gospels, and their sign-values, will be considered in ch. x. § 11 (c).

[2] See E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, Lecs. i–ii; T. B. Strong, *The Miraculous in Gospels and Creeds;* G. P. Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christ. Belief*, chh. viii–x; A. S. Peake, *Christianity, Its Nature and Its Truth*, chh. ix–xii; J. G. Simpson, *Creative Revelation.*

and complex to be exhaustively explored by human inquirers, and every attempt to define what we know of Christ must suggest problems which our definitions do not answer. Most of the Christological problems which now engage the attention of scholars and thinkers are not peculiarly modern. But the degree of anxiety with which they are regarded by theologians is something new, as is also the immense amount of investigation and thought which is devoted to their solution. The modern temper is impatient in the presence of unsolved questions, and many are apt to regard insoluble problems as conclusive reasons for rejecting propositions which obtrude them. All the graver Christological problems are involved in the question, How can the same Jesus Christ be at once truly God and really human? This problem is insoluble by us because the higher element in it is infinite, and therefore insusceptible of direct human scrutiny. Moderns find it difficult to acquiesce in the conclusion that the baffling mysteries of Christ's Person must not be reduced in order to interpret Him adequately in terms of human experience. Accordingly they are often led to condemn the Chalcedonian definition of what we must believe concerning Christ simply because it places the elements of the problem in antithetic juxtaposition, thus obtruding questions which it does not help us to answer. This difficulty is accentuated by the mistaken impression that the presence of metaphysical terms in ancient definitions

requires us to read into them the metaphysical conceptions with which these terms were originally associated. It is the Christian purpose and context which determines their meaning in conciliar definitions — not their metaphysical origin. The purpose of these definitions is often overlooked. They were designed not to afford a rationale, but to protect Christian believers from abandoning either of the factors in the mystery of Christ's Person in the interests of simpler but onesided, and therefore erroneous, doctrine.[1] We shall have occasion in this volume to define more fully the catholic point of view in relation to the central problem of the union of divine and human attributes in one Person, and to the connected problem of His coincident possession of divine and human intelligence and will — each real, and neither infringing upon the other.

In addition to these deeper problems are others, chiefly of a critical nature, in the solution of which some progress is being made. So far as our very limited space will permit, attention will be paid to some of them in this volume. Among these questions are the following.

(*a*) The synoptic problem, or the sources of the first three Gospels, their comparative historical values, and the questions suggested by the unique peculiarities of the fourth Gospel.

(*b*) The chronological sequence of Christological developments in New Testament days, and the

[1] Cf. *Authority*, ch. iv. § 5.

measure of agreement or divergence between earlier and later apostolic conceptions of Christ's Person.

(*c*) Questions concerned with details of fact and of chronological sequence in our Lord's earthly life, and with the *ipsissima verba* of Christ.

(*d*) The growth of our Lord's human mind, and the question as to its consciousness at given moments of His personal rank in being and of His mission.

(*e*) The significance of His casting out of devils, in particular of His sending devils into swine.

(*f*) Whether the temptation in the wilderness should be interpreted objectively.

(*g*) The relative place in His teaching at large, and the precise meaning, of our Lord's eschatological utterances; also whether Christ supposed that a cataclysmic consummation of things was to take place during the lifetime of His listeners.

Several of these problems depend for such solution as we can reach upon the Christological postulates by which we are controlled in considering them. It is sufficient at this point to say that no solution can be satisfactory which limits the illumination of Christ by purely human conditions and resources. We are dealing with real Man, but with one who was at the same time very God; and the reality of His human limitations should not make us forget the unique and illuminating conditions of His human increase in wisdom.

II. *Standpoints and Methods*

§ 5. There is much truth in the statement sometimes made that doctrinal controversies are largely due to the difference between the standpoints from which the doctrines in question are regarded, and that if controversialists took pains to understand the points of view of their opponents, their supposed divergences would either disappear or be materially reduced. At all events, when standpoints are reckoned with, the real nature and degree of opposition in doctrine is more correctly understood. Some at least of the Christological controversies of to-day are due to mutual misapprehensions, arising from failure to examine and allow for different, but not entirely contradictory, points of view. It seems worth while to describe four standpoints which appear to be most influential in controlling current Christological thought and opinion. Two of them are ancient and two of them modern.

(*a*) The apostolic standpoint was preëminently one of personal discipleship, based upon immediate experience of one whom this experience had led them not only to love as a Friend and Example, but to adore as a living and glorified Christ, their God and Saviour. This standpoint has been retained to this day by countless believers, who, although they have never seen Him in the flesh, have put on Christ, and, through their own spiritual experience of Him, have learned that, when He is accepted and obeyed as

being what the apostolic Church thought Him to be, life gains new value and its problems cease to terrify.

It was this standpoint of personal loyalty, based upon convincing experience, that fired the zeal of St. Athanasius[1] and other ancient champions of orthodoxy, and which moved them with undying ardor, no doubt with imperfectly regulated tempers, to vindicate by turns the divine rank of Christ's Person and the reality of His human self-manifestation. It is a standpoint which no one can consistently forsake who has once become convinced of the truth of apostolic testimony, for that testimony imposes upon those who accept its truth the unescapable obligation of becoming disciples of Christ and defenders of His claims. Orthodoxy thenceforth becomes a personal matter, its protection being perceived to be involved in maintaining, justifying and extending priceless personal relations. The deepest feelings of which men are capable are necessarily enlisted, feelings which among human beings will inevitably at times be attended by fierce demonstrations, when what are deemed to be subversive propagandas threaten, or seem to threaten, loyalty to their truest Friend, their God and their Saviour. However unbalanced and bitter the defenders of orthodoxy may prove to be, behind the personal animus of a true Christian disciple is personal experience of Christ, causing personal loyalty based upon this

[1] W. Bright, *Lessons from the Lives*, etc., pp. 16–19; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 443–445.

experience. Having verified his belief concerning Christ by illuminating and uplifting experience of the effects of such belief when it is employed as the working hypothesis of life and thought, his faith becomes impervious to negative criticism. To him it is not an open question whether Jesus Christ is the eternal and only-begotten Son of God, who has taken our nature so as to become real Man, without thereby ceasing to be full God.

(*b*) A second standpoint, also ancient although not strictly primitive, is the dogmatic. One who assumes this standpoint takes for granted the permanent truth and validity of the interpretations of the apostolic experience of Christ which are embodied in the definitions of the catholic creeds and of the ecumenical councils. These definitions contain terms borrowed from philosophy; but they are used in order to preserve for the faithful the primitive and apostolic interpretation of Christ. Catholic Christians believe that in arriving at this interpretation the apostles were led by the Holy Spirit, and that the Church was guided by the same Spirit in protecting apostolic Christology by defining its determinative elements.

This standpoint does not preclude attempts to translate ecumenical definitions into terms more intelligible to modern minds, nor does it prejudice fresh examinations of the data which these definitions were designed to interpret. Speaking in scientific parlance, it means that the definitions referred to,

when taken in their original or historic sense, are accepted as registering *results* which theological science can safely assume to be established — results which have borne the test of manifold experience and investigation, and which are not believed to be in danger of overthrow by fresh consideration. In brief, they constitute the working hypotheses of catholic Christology.[1]

The two standpoints above described are intimately connected. In fact for many centuries they have been fused into one standpoint, which may be described as the traditional and catholic point of view.

§ 6. In contrast to this point of view is what is vaguely described as the modern standpoint, the causes of which have been already indicated. It is in reality a combination of two standpoints — the Lutheran and the ethico-humanitarian.

(*c*) The Lutheran standpoint, which because of the immense influence of German scholarship and speculation is everywhere to be reckoned with, is practically monophysite, although after a distinctively modern manner. The ancient monophysites conceived of the Manhood of Christ as absorbed into the Godhead, whereas "moderns," beginning with Dr. Martin Luther, conceive of our Lord's Godhead as somehow infused into the Manhood.[2]

[1] Cf. *Introduction to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. i. § 20; *Authority*, chh. ii (§ 8), ix (§ 1).

[2] See ch. ii. § 10, below.

This has indeed raised the problem of compatibility, and kenoticists have sought to meet the difficulty by hypothecating an abandonment by our Lord of certain divine attributes when He became Man.[1] But the current tendency to measure the Person of the Word-incarnate by the content of His Manhood, in particular by the results of analysis of His human consciousness, is historically due to the postulate adopted by Luther and still retained, although with a shifting of emphasis from the divine to the human — the postulate that the Incarnation consisted in some kind or degree of infusion of the divine into our Lord's Manhood.

This can be seen in the habit of looking for the divine wholly in Christ's human self-manifestation, and of refusing to acknowledge in the Incarnate any divine properties and powers which cannot be exhibited in the forms of human life and experience. In particular, it can be seen in the tendency to limit our Lord's knowledge while on earth to His human consciousness, or the refusal to admit that He possessed two knowledges at the same time, the divine omniscience as touching His Godhead and finite human knowledge as touching His Manhood. In brief, whereas catholic theology interprets the earthly life of Christ from the standpoint of His divine Person, and treats the union of natures in His Person as involving no mutual confusion, "moderns" start with the natures, viewed as em-

[1] See ch. vii, below.

braced in one human life and experience, and build up their conception of Christ's Person by induction from the phenomena of His earthly life. In Chalcedonian Christology the Person of Christ is the bond of unity, conceived of as the self-same subject and centre of divine and human functioning. In "modern" Christology the consciousness of Christ is the unifying principle, and His Person is the composite product of the coalescing of Godhead and manhood.

(*d*) The ethico-humanitarian standpoint represents a demand that the life of Christ on earth shall be treated as in the strictest sense a genuinely human life, having place in human history at large. Had it not been this, moderns truly urge, it could not have represented a real Incarnation, nor could it have made an intelligible appeal either to His immediate followers or to those who in subsequent ages have learned to accept Him as ideal Man and sympathetic Example. The ethical and exemplary meaning of the Incarnation as a drama of condescending love and sympathy depends upon His victory over temptation being a really human victory and upon His entire life on earth being capable of description in human terms. No other than a human life could have come within human experience so as to afford inspiration and salvation to human beings. The scientific principle of continuity, now so strongly emphasized, tends, of course, to accentuate these contentions.

That they embody truths to which full justice ought to be done, will be maintained in this volume; but the distinguishing mark of the standpoint with which we are here concerned is the more or less exclusive emphasis which is apt to be placed upon them, and the marked tendency to limit the divine in Christ — at least while on earth — to what is susceptible of direct exhibition in a human life. Catholic theology recognizes that the phenomena which came within apostolic observation of Christ were one and all truly human, and that the divine in Christ was not, and could not be, openly flashed forth to men. Rather it was involved and implied, and thus revealed, in the unique manner in which our Lord lived the human life, and in the claims which He made and which He vindicated by His works and spiritual perfection.

How easily these two standpoints blend in the modern mind can easily be perceived, and the new point of view, once adopted, has gained plausibility and influence partly from repudiation of dogma in the interest of what is supposed to be unbiased investigation, and partly from reaction against a somewhat exclusive, unethical and dehumanizing emphasis upon our Lord's divine attributes, which, it is alleged, characterizes traditional theology.

It would be quite untrue and misleading to say that the catholic and the modern standpoints are in every vital respect mutually exclusive. Some of the more significant of modern postulates can,

and ought to be, welcomed by catholic minds. They will enrich catholic theology; and cannot, when rightly understood, require a surrender or modification of the substance of catholic Christology. Moreover, the more valuable and defensible assumptions of the modern mind, so far from precluding an intelligent acceptance of what is vital to the catholic standpoint, are really valuable aids in acquiring a just and appreciative hold upon the fundamental elements of catholic belief in Jesus Christ.

But unfortunately the so-called modern and traditional standpoints are in practice defended in terms of more or less mutual opposition, and this conflict explains the existence today of what Dr. Sanday describes as a fuller and a reduced Christology.[1] These are distinguishable by the success of the one, and the failure of the other, to do sufficient justice to the evidences discoverable in the Gospels and elsewhere that our Lord was not less truly divine because He condescended to accept in very truth the limitations of a really human life and experience. It will be the writer's task to combine what is true in modern contentions with the fundamental elements of traditional Christology, for the purpose of expounding catholic doctrine in terms intelligible to those who are influenced by the modern standpoint. The task is a delicate one, and the writer cannot hope either to avoid all imperfections of statement or to commend his conclusions to all

[1] In *Christology and Personality*, Lecs. ii–iii, esp. pp. 97 *et seq.*

Christological schools. His language will in some respects, no doubt, be open to adverse criticism even by those theologians who share with him in his acceptance of the divine claim of Jesus Christ and in his acknowledgment that our Lord lived a truly human life, subjecting Himself in His Manhood to the necessary limitations of such a life and experience.

§ 7. Modern critical inquiry almost invariably presupposes that the New Testament documents, interpreted by the historical method, constitute the primary sources of Christological doctrine and its only trustworthy and determinative external basis. This presupposition is not precisely equivalent to the protestant rule, that the Scriptures are the sole source and rule of faith, for moderns are disinclined to accept any external authority, whether ecclesiastical or biblical, as absolute and as foreclosing further inquiry and judgment. It means simply that a sound Christology is necessarily to be based upon the apostolic experience of Christ, and that this experience is to be ascertained by a study of New Testament documents. In such study the interpretations which the apostles made of their experience of Christ must be reckoned with in ascertaining the nature of this experience; but the modern mind feels free to reconsider these interpretations, in view of the human limitations under which they were made.

The historical method is somewhat exclusively employed. The aim of this method is to ascertain

the exact thought and meaning which the several writers of the New Testament documents personally intended to express. That is, it seeks to arrive at an accurate literal and grammatical interpretation of the New Testament, viewed as consisting of human documents, produced under entirely human conditions of a certain age and intellectual atmosphere. To this end the historical conditions of that age are reckoned with, in so far as they account for the forms of thought and for the terminology employed by New Testament writers; the immediate circumstances are investigated, as throwing light upon the general purpose of each document and upon its incidental allusions and arguments; and each writer's mental training and affiliations are allowed for, in order to understand his personal point of view and the bearing of his methods of argument and of illustration. The historical method did not originate in modern days; but modern conditions, including a vastly improved linguistic scholarship, greatly enlarged materials for textual criticism, and an immense widening of knowledge concerning the New Testament age, have so greatly enhanced the skill and fruitfulness of its application that it wears all the appearance of a modern discovery, and its limitations are apt to be overlooked.

Its value is limited by its aim, which is to minister to an exact and literal exegesis of New Testament documents, severally considered, and to improve our knowledge of the development of theology in

the first century. The importance of accomplishing this aim can hardly be overestimated, of course, for every legitimate branch of New Testament exegesis depends for success upon first ascertaining the human writer's thought and upon not disregarding it. But the divine meaning of Holy Scripture, *qua* Scripture, is determined by wider factors than the conscious thought of biblical writers. The sacred context and biblical connections in which God has preserved and given us the New Testament documents impart meanings for Christian readers which literal exegesis alone cannot adequately unfold; and we may not assume that divinely inspired documents are inspired with no fuller purpose than their human writers understood. In brief, while the doctrinal interpretation of the New Testament with which a dogmatic theologian is concerned must begin with historical and literal interpretation, and may not lead to conclusions which are really inconsistent with such interpretation, it must go on to reckon with the Scriptures in their fulness, as revealing purposes and meanings which in many instances transcend the human thoughts exhibited in the several documents, separately and narrowly scrutinized.[1]

This means, among other things, that analytical exegesis of separate documents must be supplemented by an inductive method, by a comparison of Scripture with Scripture. In saying this we

[1] See *Authority*, ch. vii. § 12 (cf. ch. vi. § 13).

assume, as catholic doctrine requires us to assume, that one divine mind and purpose lies behind all the Scriptures, *qua* Scripture, and that an exegesis which disregards this fact is untrue to the meaning with which God has made the Bible as a whole to be His Word. In this induction the progressiveness of the revelations embodied in the Scriptures will be allowed for, but all the several documents will be treated inductively as pertaining to one coherent process of divine revelation. Each biblical writer displays a personal point of view, with its limitations; but his thoughts are so placed in Scripture as to become organic features of a growing exhibition of doctrine which is at unity with itself.[1]

§ 8. The historical method, limited in its aim and result as it is, has fully vindicated its right to stay; and it is proving itself to be an indispensable and increasingly valuable handmaid of Dogmatic Theology. But even within its proper sphere, its value depends upon the soundness of the presuppositions by which its application is influenced and by which its results are conditioned. History shows clearly that the New Testament constitutes an ecclesiastical literature, written from the standpoint of the apostolic Church, and selected from other Christian literature by the post-apostolic Church. Ecclesiastical exigencies explain its production, even on the human side, and the first century traditions of the Church are both drawn upon and

[1] Cf. *Authority*, ch. vii. §§ 2, 7, 11.

crystallized in its documents. Accordingly the historical method is soundly employed only when these ecclesiastical conditions and bearings are faced and allowed for in ascertaining the purpose and meaning of New Testament writers. St. Paul's Epistles afford the most significant illustration of this principle. If they are dealt with as so many independent essays of an individual thinker, as in fact they are apt to be regarded, the results will be somewhat different from what they will be if they are interpreted as episcopal letters, which they really are, called forth by the exigencies of an ecclesiastical ministry, and devoted in large measure to the purpose of fortifying Christians in the traditional doctrine of the apostolic Church of God.

This traditional doctrine grew out of an apostolic experience which antedates the New Testament; and neither its first nor its second century contents were determined by its documents, which were selected, compiled and approved by the Church largely because they agreed with, and bore inspired witness to, the Church's faith, otherwise derived and transmitted. These are historic facts, a consideration of which will make clear the genesis and meaning of the ancient rule of faith. This rule requires, on the one hand, that the Church shall be consulted as the teacher and definer of saving truth, ecclesiastical doctrine being illustrated, tested and verified by an appeal to Scripture. It requires, on the other hand, that in case of doubt concerning

the meaning of Scripture, its ecclesiastical origin shall be borne in mind, and it shall be interpreted in harmony with the Church's fundamental faith.[1]

A catholic expounder of doctrine concerning Christ takes for granted the trustworthiness of this rule of faith. It is true that in so far as he is concerned with scientific theology, he does not stop here. A wider range of data has to be reckoned with in his science than the necessary *credenda* of Christians, and all scientific work requires scientific methods of procedure. Catholic dogmas in scientific theology become working hypotheses, to be verified by scientific methods, or "results" which Christian experience and investigation have sufficiently established, and which may be taken for granted as the premises of further inquiry. The terms in which these premises are ecclesiastically defined may indeed require translation into modern equivalents, but a scientific catholic Christology accepts them as results which are too firmly established to be disregarded.

This assurance does not preclude fresh investigations into their truth; and modern unsettlement makes such investigations imperative. In these investigations the historical method must occupy the first place, being protected from misuse, however, and supplemented, by the presuppositions and lines of inquiry which have been indicated in this and in the previous section. As this volume is expository

[1] *Authority*, ch. viii, where further refs. are given.

rather than investigative, the processes by which the catholic doctrine is verified in Scripture can only be summarily indicated, but it is hoped that this limitation of treatment will not be misunderstood as meaning any disparagement of the part which critical exegesis, as now conducted, must play in defending Christian doctrine and in purging it of unprimitive accretions.

III. *The Position Adopted*

§ 9. The position adopted in this volume includes a firm belief in the value and providential function of modern Christological investigation, and an equally strong conviction that the Chalcedonian Christology is valid. Its terms are indeed not readily understood by the modern mind, but when translated into modern equivalents, they afford the best available working hypothesis of Christological inquiry.

(*a*) The writer believes that the Holy Spirit is employing the labors of modern scholars to purge from the Church's traditional faith all post-apostolic and unwarranted accretions, to bring certain neglected elements of it into clearer light, to enhance its ethical value, and to increase its persuasive power. These things are not yet fully accomplished, and before they can be achieved the valid results of modern investigation will have to be dissociated from the rationalistic vagaries in which they are

sometimes concealed, and their essential harmony with the apostolic faith will have to be more clearly established in the judgment of the Church. But to doubt that this can and will be brought to pass is to doubt both the power of truth to prevail and the permanence of the Holy Spirit's guidance of the Church.

Critical scholarship, even when it is influenced by rationalistic presuppositions and anti-catholic animus, is one of the providential instruments by which the Spirit guides the Church into a riper understanding of her faith. This does not mean that such scholarship can outweigh and displace the judgment of the Church in spiritual things. It means that even an alien scholarship can and does provide data the knowledge of which enlightens the Church's judgment, and emancipates her theologians from the hampering influence of antiquated methods of argument. The Spirit is overruling modern inquiry and speculation for the development of a more mature and persuasive catholic Christology. Such a Christology will be a legitimate development of ancient doctrine, but will exhibit that doctrine in a new perspective — the perspective of the wider and more exact knowledge which modern science and historical criticism have made available.

§ 10. (*b*) With all its advantages, however, the modern mind is not infallible. And the writer's sympathetic optimism with regard to the possibilities of contemporary Christological investigation

does not prevent him from perceiving that, before modern methods can achieve their destined permanent results, they must be dissociated from certain mistaken presuppositions and from widely prevalent misconceptions concerning the Chalcedonian Christology. In this volume an effort will be made to avoid these pitfalls — errors which constitute passing accidents rather than necessary elements of the modern mind.

i. Accordingly, we shall decline to be influenced by the naturalistic philosophy, which we regard as unscientific and untrue to experience. Therefore its rejection of the supernatural will not in the slightest degree alter our dependence upon the Gospel narratives, and our belief that such events as the Virgin-Birth and the resurrection of our Lord in flesh from the dead really took place, and constitute determinative data of a true philosophy of history and of a sound Christology.

ii. While realizing that what is commonly meant by "critical" exegesis affords indispensable aid in the theological use of Scripture, we shall refuse to treat such exegesis as adequate when it interprets biblical documents in mutual isolation, and when it disregards the supernatural factor. Exegesis of this kind cannot ascertain in its fulness the ultimate meaning of a biblical passage, which to an important degree is determined by the providential place of the document in the organic structure of the Bible at large.

iii. We do not admit that Christological speculation can issue in sound results when based upon, or determined in its conclusions by, the assumption, often unreflectively made, that a real Incarnation of the eternal Son involves and signifies some kind of infusion of Godhead into manhood and a communication of divine attributes, idioms, to the manhood. Such a postulate raises problems which are both irrelevant to New Testament teaching and rationally stultifying in their theological basis.

iv. Finally, we feel driven by the facts of history to put aside certain widely current interpretations of Chalcedonian Christology, interpretations which go far to explain the frequent disparagement and neglect of that Christology by contemporary theological writers. We do not, for instance, believe that the use of philosophical terms by the Council of Chalcedon requires us to interpret its decree of faith as importing alien metaphysics into Christian doctrine. Nor can we accept an interpretation which starts with the modern psychological use of the term person, or personality, in determining the meaning and value of the term person in traditional Christology. Important changes in the terminology of thinking men make it necessary to translate Chalcedonian terms into equivalents which shall be more intelligible to modern minds, but they do not require us to read modern and changed meanings of Chalcedonian terms into the Christology of Chalcedon.

§ 11. (*c*) This Christology, taken in what we believe to be its real meaning, is the working hypothesis of our theological science: — that Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, having taken and made His own whatever pertains to a real and perfect manhood, is from the moment of the Incarnation, and forever, true God and true Man. He is both because He is the Subject, Ego or Self of true and full Godhead, on the one hand, and of unmutilated and real manhood, on the other hand. Employing ancient terms, we say that in Him two natures are united inseparably and unconfusedly in one Person. This does not mean that two psychological entities are united in, and make up, one psychological personality in the modern sense of that term, an incredible supposition. It means that one and the same Ego or Self constitutes the Self of both divine and human properties and operations — their centre and subjective meeting point. His Godhead and Manhood are inseparable because they have but one Self. They are unconfused because of their difference — a difference which precludes mutual infringement or the disturbance of the operations of the one by the operations of the other.

§ 12. That this preliminary and condensed description will prove to be free from obscurity to modern minds can hardly be expected, and it will have to be amplified in its various particulars in subsequent chapters.[1] But the doctrine in question

[1] See especially ch. iv. §§ 1–4; ch. v. § 2; ch. vi. §§ 1–4.

constitutes the most central part of the historic faith of catholic Christendom. Because it does constitute this, and is therefore a closed question to catholic believers, the objection is made that to describe it as a working hypothesis of scientific investigation is misleading. A working hypothesis, it is urged, is one which is accepted for practical purposes, but which is acknowledged to be possibly liable to modification, and to abandonment, in the light of wider induction. On the other hand, an article of faith is deemed to be final, and cannot, it is said, so long as it is thus regarded, serve the purpose of a working hypothesis, but must close the mind to any change of conviction which investigation might cause in an open mind.[1]

This objection cannot be made good. It is true that scientific methods require an open mind in one who would employ them fruitfully; but openness of mind is not dependent upon a lack of convictions. Every scientist worthy of the name regards certain of the hypotheses which he employs as embodying completely and finally established results. It is because he regards them in this light that he gives them a central place and determinative value among his working hypotheses. He sees that they work, and that they are likely to prove peculiarly valuable in the interpretation of new data. It is

[1] This argument is pushed by M. M. Pattison Muir, in *Hibbert Journal*, Apr., 1911, "Can Theology Become Scientific," and July, 1912, pp. 824–834.

not uncertainty but the degree of assurance which one possesses that a given hypothesis is substantially true that commends it to him as likely to be a really valuable working hypothesis for scientific purposes. Yet the strongest conviction as to the finality of a scientific dogma leaves a really sincere seeker after fact and truth open to new knowledge and to any change of conviction which such knowledge may demand. Hypotheses which have been thought to be finally established are not less cheerfully abandoned in the light of contrary evidence because those who abandon them were previously convinced of their finality. What commends a conclusion as a working hypothesis is the belief that it will work, and the stronger the conviction is that it is a finally established result the more readily will it be regarded as suitable for employment as a working hypothesis.

The catholic standpoint does not require us to accept Chalcedonian doctrine on the basis of dictation, regardless of truth. Rather it represents a conviction that this doctrine embodies competent and balanced judgment concerning truth, and the truth of the doctrine is what constitutes the final ground of its acceptance. Truth is the determining principle not less with catholic theologians than with other investigators. They are indeed convinced that no new data will require an abandonment of Chalcedonian Christology. But to accuse them in advance of incapacity to estimate the significance of new data, and of unwillingness to accept any modi-

fications of the catholic position which these data may prove to be necessary, is in reality to accuse them of mental stupidity and of insincerity in their professed love of the truth. If the Chalcedonian doctrine were proved to be erroneous, such result would no doubt carry with it some far-reaching implications, and would require catholic theologians to reconsider their general position. But it is not a scientific method of argument to allege beforehand that they would not in such event be guided by the truth, and to deny that the Chalcedonian standpoint permits a fruitful investigation of the data by which its finality can be tested.[1]

[1] Cf. W. Sanday, *Ancient and Modern Christologies*, pp. 234–239; R. C. Moberly, in *Lux Mundi*, pp. 219–220; J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, pp. 6–7; E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 45–46.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL

I. *The Manifestation of Christ*

1. This chapter will be devoted to a rapid survey of the development of Christological doctrine, including its biblical, ecclesiastical and modern critical stages.[1] The Bible constitutes a God-given memorial of the progress of the supernatural manifestation of Christ, a manifestation which has four stages: — (*a*) Messianic prophecy and the messianic hope; (*b*) the incarnate manifestation of Christ to his disciples; (*c*) His resurrection and glorification; (*d*) the illuminating work of the Holy Spirit, whereby the Apostles were enabled to interpret their experience of Christ, and to transmit their interpretation in a body of doctrine which constitutes the authoritative basis of subsequent ecclesiastical teaching.

The Old Testament, when regarded from the New Testament and Christian standpoint, is perceived to have for its determinative subject-matter and principle of continuity the preparation of Israel for a messianic kingdom, in the blessings of which all

[1] For bibliography, see p. 1, above.

nations should participate,[1] and for its King, who should be of the human seed of David,[2] but around whose sacred Person a series of prophetic descriptions gradually accumulated that could only be justified by the revelation of David's son as being also David's Lord, the "Fellow" of Yahveh and "mighty God."[3] This Redeemer of Israel was to be a "Man of Sorrows," on whom the iniquity of all was to be laid, and yet a glorious king in whose hand the pleasure of the Lord should prosper, and of whose kingdom there should be no end.[4]

We may not suppose that the fulness of divine meaning which the Incarnation enables us to perceive in Old Testament prophecy was apparent either to those to whom it was originally published or even to the Old Testament prophets themselves.[5] Israel was being given lessons the full meaning of which could be realized only when the educational process was completed by the open self-manifestation of the God-Man. But a messianic hope was being

[1] Gen. xxii. 18; Psa. lxxii. 8–11; Isa. ii. 2–3; lvi. 6–7; lx; etc.

[2] 2 Sam. vii. 12–16.

[3] Psa. cx. 1 (cf. St. Matt. xxii. 42–45, etc.); Zech. xiii. 7; Isa. ix. 6.

[4] Isa. liii. On Messianic prophecies, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. vv. "Messiah" and "Prophecy and Prophets"; C. A. Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy;* A. B. Davidson, *Old Test. Prophecy;* E. W. Hengstenberg, *Christology of the Old Test.*; F. Delitzsch, *Messianic Prophecies;* H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 74–94; Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 81–92. Cf. *The Trinity*, ch. iv. § 7; *Creation and Man*, ch. x. §§ 3–5.

[5] 1 St. Peter, i. 10–12. Thus the pre-Christian Jews did not look for a suffering Messiah. See T. J. Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ*, ch. i.

developed,[1] and a basis of conjecture was afforded which, in the period between the end of Old Testament prophecy and the advent of Christ, brought to birth what may reasonably be regarded as a providentially induced Logos speculation.[2] This speculation was indeed somewhat vague and incoherent. In no sense did it really anticipate Christian revelation. But it was, especially in its Palestinian form, a continuation of Old Testament development; and, although wanting in determinate results, it afforded a form of thought and a terminology which proved to be serviceable in the subsequent interpretation of the apostolic experience of Christ.

In brief, when Christ came an atmosphere of messianic expectation had been created among the Jews, and ideas had been developed among them, which enabled the more spiritually-minded to recognize in Him the Redeemer for whom Israel had been waiting, and to perceive in His combination of humility and divine claim the solution of all the enigmas of prophecy.

§ 2. The open manifestation of Christ was given wholly in human terms, because, if for no other

[1] Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. vv. "Jesus Christ" (pp. 608–609, by W. Sanday), and "Messiah," I (by V. H. Stanton); J. Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah.*

[2] W. Fairweather, in Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, extra vol., s. v. "Development of Doctrine," ii, v; and s. v. "Trinity," p. 308 (by H. M. Scott); Jas. Drummond, *Philo Judæus;* C. Bigg, *Christ. Platonists of Alexandria*, pp. 7–26; *Dic. of Christ, Biog.*, s. v. "Philo," vii (by A. Edersheim).

reason, these are the only terms which are intelligible to human beings. The disciples of Christ neither did nor could *observe* anything in Him that was not human.[1] Even the miracles which they saw Him perform, in spite of their proving the presence of superhuman power, laid bare to their observation nothing in Christ which was not properly human. They knew that He was of human descent; and, so far as they could observe, He was subject in the manner of His life to human conditions. He grew up like a human being, increasing both in wisdom and stature,[2] and exhibiting the limitations which pertain to human nature and experience — not less truly, because within these natural limitations He exhibited a combination of human perfections, and a sinlessness, which had never before been displayed by man. If they discovered anything superhuman in Him, it was not by direct observation, but by inference from the truly human actions and words which made up the subject-matter of their experience of Him. If He was divine, His Godhead, and its functioning, neither was nor could be laid open to observation.

Yet His self-manifestation, human though it was, contained elements which revealed His possession of a higher nature and of higher powers and functions than they could directly experience. Indisputably sincere and humble, He practised a self-assertion and made claims which no one lower than the Al-

[1] Cf. ch. iv. § 5. [2] St. Luke ii. 52.

mighty can practise and make without utterly discrediting his character and sanity.[1] Nor is the evidence of this confined to the fourth Gospel, which merely gives prominence to what is undeniably present in our synoptic Gospels. Only by an *à priori* criticism which begs the question, and assumes that the higher Christological elements in these Gospels are interpolations, can this contention be disputed.[2]

The Gospel narratives show that the self-manifestation of Christ was all of a piece. The apostolic experience of Him was coherent, and His stupendous claims did not disturb the naturalness and consistency of what the apostles saw of His human life and conversation. On the contrary, they constituted a clarifying background to the unfailing and transcendent wisdom with which He spoke, to His general teaching, to His avowed mission as Revealer and Redeemer, to the method of His works and to their spiritual sign-values. No doubt the apostles failed at first to realize the meaning of their experience, it was so stupendous, transcending all their previous habits of thought. The glorious fact of the resurrection was needed to complete the revelation and to clarify their understandings. But when regarded from the standpoint afforded by that crowning experience, they could see that the

[1] See ch. iv. §§ 5–6, below.

[2] H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 247–258; C. F. Nolloth, *Person of our Lord*, pp. 306 *et seq.*; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 234–235.

Manhood and human life of Christ was a revelation to them of one who was no other than their Lord and their God.[1]

§ 3. That Christ claimed to be fully divine is hardly open to serious dispute by those who accept the Gospels as containing a substantially true account of apostolic experience of Him. It is true that He never made the unqualified assertion, "I am God," which by Jewish minds would have been taken to mean either an identification of His Person with that of the Father (Sabellianism) or the proclamation of a second God (polytheism). He described Himself in terms of divine sonship — a sonship that was sharply distinguished from any in which His listeners could participate, and one that involved internal relations to the Father which cannot be enjoyed by created persons.[2]

From this frequently reiterated standpoint Christ advanced claims which justified the impression of His hearers that He made Himself equal with God,[3] and which, as has frequently been noted, obtrude the dilemma that He was either God or not good, *si non Deus, non bonus*. His disciples had overwhelming evidence of His goodness and wisdom, and their experience of Him therefore pointed to the validity of His claims.[4]

[1] The confession of the at first incredulous Thomas, St. John xx. 27–29, was a true inference from his experience. Cf. Rom. i. 4.

[2] The Trinity, pp. 139–140. [3] St. John v. 18.

[4] *The Trinity*, pp. 125–126; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*,

§ 4. This conviction, in which the apostolic interpretation of Christ is summarized, from the nature of things, could not be immediately grasped in all of its necessary implications. These implications emerged gradually as time and circumstances gave the apostles opportunities and occasions for considering them under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The development of apostolic Christology is usually described as passing through the Petrine, Pauline and Johannine stages.[1] The Petrine stage is represented by the predications concerning Christ which St. Luke tells us were made by St. Peter on the day of the descent of the Holy Spirit. Christ was then described by St. Peter as "a man approved of God," who could not be holden of death, God's "Holy One," whom "God hath made . . . both Lord and Christ." [2] On another occasion St. Peter describes Him as "the Prince of Life." [3] The Christology which these descriptions embody is obviously primitive and to a degree unreflective, but it plainly implies that Christ is at once human and superhuman, to whom the divine name of Lord can be applied without hesitation. And one who can be described

Lec. iv; H. B. Ottley, *The Great Dilemma.* Cf. ch. iv. § 6, for a description of these claims.

[1] On these Christologies, see E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 325–343; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, Lecs. v–vi; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ*, Bk. I; Jas. Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel;* W. Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, Lec. vii; A. M. Fairbairn, *Place of Christ in Modern Theol.*, Bk. II. Div. i; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Christology."

[2] Acts ii. 22, 24, 36. [3] Acts iii. 15.

truly as the "Prince of Life" cannot be given a lower personal rank in being than that which pertains to Deity. In brief, the more explicit Christology of the Pauline and Johannine stages is implicitly involved in that of the Petrine stage.

St. Paul's experience of Christ declared Him to be glorified Lord,[1] and this fact determined his method of Christological thought. The conceptions at which he arrived were realized and formulated gradually, but his final thoughts plainly constitute nothing more than an explicit unfolding of the Christology which controlled his mind from the moment of his acceptance of Christ as his Lord and Saviour. The Pauline Christ is the unique Son of the Father's love, the image of the invisible God,[2] Himself "over all God blessed forever."[3] He is the First-born in relation to all creation, in whom, through whom and unto whom all things have been created, and in whom they cohere.[4] The Mediator between God and men,[5] He took on Him the form of a servant and was made in the likeness of men.[6] "Born of a woman, born under the law, that He might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons,"[7] "He effaced Himself" and "became obedient even unto death," and was therefore "highly exalted," His human name Jesus being placed above every name.[8] "And He is the Head

[1] Acts ix. 5. [2] Col. i. 13, 15. Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 4; Heb. i. 3.
[3] Rom. ix. 5. [4] Col. i. 15–17. [5] 1 Tim. ii. 5.
[6] Phil. ii. 7. [7] Gal. iv. 5–6. [8] Phil. ii. 8–11.

of the Body, the Church, . . . the Firstborn from the dead."[1] Raised from the dead, He is "the First-fruits of them that are asleep."[2] "For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross."[3] In brief, "in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," and Christ in us is "the hope of glory."[4] Such a Christology, while it bears witness to the genuineness of our Lord's humanity and submission to human conditions, assigns to the Person of Christ a rank in being which clearly identifies Him with the Supreme God.[5]

The Johannine Christology neither did nor could go further; but, appropriating the Logos terminology then generally current, it describes and interprets Christ's earthly life in the fourth Gospel as it had come to appear when sufficient time had elapsed for the apostolic mind to mature in its understanding of that life, under the illuminating guidance of the Spirit. We cannot in every instance accurately distinguish between what is description of the author's experience of Christ and what is his interpretation of it; nor can we prove that his narrative is always minutely accurate. But that the fourth Gospel has historical value, and that there is no

[1] Col. i. 18. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 20. [3] Col. i. 19–20. [4] Col. ii. 9; i. 27.
[5] S. N. Rostron, *Christol. of St. Paul;* A. M. Fairbairn, *Place of Christ*, Bk. II. Div. i. ch. i.

lack of fundamental harmony between its Christology and that of the synoptic Gospels, has been abundantly established by critical and theological scholars. The Christ of the four Gospels is plainly one and the same.[1]

This Christ is described by the fourth Gospel [2] as not less truly divine than really human, and as not less fully human than genuinely divine. He is eternal Logos, for He was in the beginning. He is distinct from God the Father, for He was with Him, and is His only begotten Son; and He is God. Through Him all things were made, and in Him was life. And He "became flesh and dwelt among us," manifesting Himself as "the Only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth." [3] He came to do the Father's will,[4] but is conscious of internal relations with the Father which justify His saying, "I and the Father are one." [5] In brief, He is true God and real Man, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world,[6] having life in Himself,[7] and communicating it to us in His flesh and blood,[8] the Way, the Truth and the Life, through whom alone men are able to come to the Father.[9]

Such is the Christ of history, as interpreted by those who enjoyed direct experience of Him, and

[1] W. Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel* (gives a survey of literature and opinion in Lec. i).

[2] H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, Lec. v, is still the best on this subject. [3] St. John i. 1–14.

[4] St. John iv. 34; v. 30; vi. 38. [5] Ch. x. 30.

[6] Ch. i. 29. [7] Ch. v. 26. [8] Ch. vi. 48–58. [9] Ch. xiv. 6.

who were sent forth in His name to bear witness of Him under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.[1]

II. *The Development of Dogma*

§ 5. The dogmatic definition of apostolic teaching concerning the Person of Christ [2] was not voluntarily undertaken by the Church. It was wholly due to the necessity of protecting the faithful from erroneous conceptions, which threatened to banish the truth from common Christian knowledge. These errors were the outcome of an alien metaphysic, and could not be shut out except by resort to metaphysical terms. But these terms are determined in their dogmatic meaning not by their implications in ancient philosophy, but by the use to which they were put, the use, that is, of reaffirming apostolic belief. According to this belief Jesus Christ is both very God and very Man, whole in what is God's and whole in what is man's, one Lord Jesus Christ, but without obliteration in Him of the difference between

[1] Their interpretation of Him is better evidence of His Person than the synoptic Gospels, which contain only broken memoirs. See H. L. Goudge, *Moral Perfection of our Lord Jesus Christ*, pp. 10–12, who quotes Harnack as saying (in *What is Christianity?* p. 10), "The more powerful the personality which a man possesses, and the more he takes hold of the inner life of others, the less can the sum total of what he is be known only by what he himself says and does. We must look at the reflection and the effects which he produced in those whose leader and master he became."

[2] Bibliography of the history of Christological developments in the Church is given on p. 1, note, above.

the Godhead and the Manhood and between His divine and His human properties and operations.

For three centuries the Church battled with error without resort to dogma, and her experience during this period furnished her with part of the needed terminology for her dogmatic work. It remained that during the period of the Ecumenical Councils she should appropriate suitable terms, and by incorporating them into a new context crystallize them in meanings calculated to define and protect her primitive faith.

It was the Godhead of Christ which first required to be asserted in this manner. Arius was willing to acknowledge that the Son is the first of creatures, and was even willing to worship Him as representing God in creation and redemption. But arguing sophistically, after human analogies and from the fact of His sonship, he maintained that the Logos was a creature, once non-existent, and subject like other creatures to change.[1] This was really a repudiation of the claims of Christ, and to worship a creature, however exalted, was a reversion to paganism.[2]

[1] On Arianism and the issues involved, see *The Trinity*, ch. iii. §§ 10–11; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Doctrine*, ch. xii; W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, chh. v *et seq.*; J. Tixeront, *Hist. of Dogmas*, Vol. II. ch. ii; J. H. Newman, *Arians;* H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism.*

[2] W. Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, pp. 16–25. St. Athanasius pointed this out: *Orat. c. Ar.* i. 8; ii. 23; iii. 16; *Ep. ad Aegyp.*, 13. Cf. *The Trinity*, pp. 80–81.

At Nicea the one problem was to declare the very Godhead of Christ in terms which Arian shiftiness could not evade. The meaning of scriptural language being obscured by alien philosophy, non-biblical terms had to be utilized, and no available phrase served the purpose of unambiguous assertion of the truth which was at issue except ὁμοούσιον, of the same essence with the Father.[1] The majority of those present at Nicea were not alive to the need of such a term, and were soon easily persuaded by Arian leaders that a Sabellian confusion of the Persons of the Father and of the Son was involved in its adoption. Fifty years of controversy were required before all who believed in the doctrine which it symbolized could be brought to perceive its value and to accept it. During that period the term ὑπόστασις, used in the Nicene anathema as equivalent to οὐσία, was given the meaning of Person or subsisting Self,[2] and the growing habit of declaring that there are three hypostases in the one οὐσία of God — the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, — removed any possible justification of a Sabellian interpretation of the orthodox use of ὁμοούσιον.[3]

[1] On the meaning of ὁμοούσιον, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 193–194; and *Texts and Studies*, Vol. VII. No. 1; J. H. Newman, *op. cit.*, II. iv. 3; III. i. 3; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 438–447. Cf. *The Trinity*, pp. 81–82, where other refs. are given.

[2] More strictly, mode of subsistence; but the idea of three subjects, distinguishable by personal pronouns, was clearly present. Cf. § 8, *fin.*, below.

[3] *The Trinity*, pp. 68–69; W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, Vol. I. pp. 323–328; C. J. Hefele, *Hist. of Christ. Councils*, Vol. II. pp.

This term, as used in the Nicene Creed, signifies that the Son shares to the full in the one indivisible essence and being of the Father, so that although the Father and the Son are two mutually distinct Persons or hypostases, they are Subjects of one and the same God. The Son is not temporally but eternally begotten of the Father, so that these two are co-eternal together and co-equal. It is a serious mistake to treat the use of the term ὁμοούσιον as giving dogmatic authority to a substance philosophy, and to the notion that in God there is a substance which is prior to and separable from the divine Persons. Οὐσία stands in trinitarian theology for the total reality of God, whatever that may be;[1] and "Persons" signifies mutually inseparable but distinct Subjects of that reality.[2] Each Person is self of whole God, and therefore truly divine. "The Father's essence is the Being of the Son."[3]

§ 6. Before the Arian conflict was wholly past, the truth that Jesus Christ is very Man was obscured by Apollinaris, who in his effort to combat Arianism sought to find a place in the Manhood for the eternal

276–278; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christian Doctr.*, pp. 235–238. Classic passages are St. Basil, *Epis.* xxxviii; St. Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, xxi. 35.

[1] *The Trinity*, pp. 67–70, 202–203; R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II. pp. 255–256; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. iii. 5; *Cath. Encyc. s. v.* "Essence and Existence."

[2] *The Trinity*, chh. iii (§ 15), vi (§§ 6, 10, 12); *Kenotic Theory*, pp. 49–51; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xxix.

[3] St. Athanasius, *Orat. c. Arian.*, iii. 3. Cf. iii. 6; *ad Adelph.*, 8 near the end.

Logos by excluding its higher part or rational soul. Its place, he maintained, is taken by the Logos. This was the first of a long series of efforts to solve what in ultimate issue is an insoluble problem for finite understandings — the problem of the manner in which Godhead and Manhood are united in one Jesus Christ. His explanation sacrificed the human in the interests of the divine, and those who supported his theory not only denied our Lord's possession of the human νοῦς, but appear to have revived ante-Nicene docetism, and to have reduced our Lord's human sufferings and limitations to unreality.[1]

St. Athanasius and the Cappadocians combated these errors,[2] and the arguments by which they were supported, appealing to the Gospel narratives, and maintaining with convincing force that unless the Word took all parts of our nature, whatever He did not assume He did not redeem. Apollinaris believed that two complete natures necessarily involved two Persons in Christ, and the term φύσις had yet to be fixed in meaning. He also supposed that if our Lord's Manhood possessed its controlling part, and a human will, it would necessarily sin. St.

[1] On Apollinarianism, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, ch. xiv; W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, *passim*; Robert Rainy, *The Ancient Cath. Church*, pp. 358–364; *Cath. Encyc.*, *q. v.*; J. Tixeront, *Hist. of Dogmas*, Vol. II. ch. iv.

[2] St. Athanasius, *de Incarn. c. Apollinarium* (authorship disputed); St. Basil the Great, *Ep.* 265; St. Gregory Naz., *Epp.* ci–ciii; St. Gregory Nyss., *Antirhet.*

Athanasius pointed out that sinfulness is not of the essence of human nature, as God made it and as the Son assumed it, and maintained the power of the divine Word to fortify His Manhood against the temptations to which it was subjected.

The second Ecumenical Council condemned Apollinarianism, and its direct influence was short-lived. But the recoil from it gave birth to Nestorianism, and led many orthodox Bishops of the fifth century to view with captious suspicion, and to misinterpret, every adequate assertion of the oneness of Christ's Person. Such misunderstandings were made the more difficult to avoid because of the ambiguity which still clung to the term nature, φύσις, and — as employed in connection with the Incarnation — the term ὑπόστασις.

§ 7. The Nestorian controversy[1] was caused by the denial that the Blessed Virgin may truly be called "Bearer of God," Θεοτόκος,[2] the plea being that what she bore was a man who became the vesture of the Logos, and not the eternal Logos Himself. Whatever may have been the actual meaning of Nestorius, the error which his language was with some reason understood to declare — the Nestorianism of history — was a separation between the Son

[1] On Nestorianism, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, ch. xv; C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, Vol. III. Bk. IX; R. Rainy, *op. cit.* pp. 376–392; W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, Vol. II. chh. xxxvi–xli; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s. v.* "Nestorius and Nestorianism."

[2] On this term and its proper use, see ch. iii. § 12 and ch. vi. § 4, below.

of God and the Son of Man in Christ, these being treated as two persons.[1] This error is discoverable in the writings of Nestorius' teacher, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and represents an attempt to vindicate the human side of Christ (obscured by Apollinarianism), this being done at the expense of any acknowledgment of a true union, ἕνωσιν, between the Godhead and the Manhood in Him.

The chief vindicator of the union was St. Cyril of Alexandria; but his work was embarrassed partly by faults of temper and partly by the as yet uncrystallized usage of certain terms. Although ὑπόστασις had come to mean "person" in trinitarian application, it still retained in some quarters the meaning of "substance" in Christological discussions; and Nestorius interpreted St. Cyril's assertion of an hypostatic union, τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν, as meahing a union in one substance. The term nature, φύσις, was also still ambiguous, partly through the authority of a phrase mistakenly attributed to St. Athanasius, and for this reason employed by St. Cyril — μία φύσις τοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη. His subsequent explanation shows that, in using the phrase, St. Cyril was

[1] A work of Nestorius, written after his condemnation, entitled the *Bazaar of Heraclides*, has recently come to light. J. F. Bethune-Baker, in *Nestorius and His Teaching*, finds evidence in this that Nestorius was not a Nestorian. *Per contra*, A. J. Mason, in *The Chalcedonian Doctrine of the Incarn.*, finds from the same data "that Nestorius was more of a Nestorian than of late years we have been led to think."

treating φύσις practically as equivalent to "person." [1]

In spite of the occasional ambiguities of his language, St. Cyril was the chief agent in fixing the use of these two terms, although the critical attitude of the Antiochene school towards his phraseology played an important part. The acceptance of his *Second Letter to Nestorius* by the Council of Ephesus, and the *Formulary of Reunion* between him and John of Antioch (embodied in his *Letter to John* and subsequently accepted by the Council of Chalcedon), determined the catholic use of ὑπόστασις, as signifying that which is one in Christ (the self, αὐτός), and of φύσις, as signifying what is twofold in Christ (the Godhead and the Manhood), and as comprehending the mutually distinct properties and functions of these two. In the philosophy of that time φύσις, as thus employed, no doubt connoted an underlying οὐσία or "substantia." But this connotation is not, strictly speaking, contained in the *meaning* of φύσις, as crystallized in catholic formularies.[2]

The Nestorian conflict served to fix two doctrines: (*a*) that the Godhead and Manhood of Christ are inseparably united in one self — the hypostatic

[1] See W. Bright, *Later Treatises of St. Athanasius*, pp. 174-175.

[2] On φύσις and its Latin equivalent *natura*, see *The Trinity*, chh. iii. 15; vi. 7, 12 (iv); R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II. pp. 258–270; Suicer, *Thesauras*, *s. v.* φύσις; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Nestorius and His Teaching*, pp. 48–49. Cf. p. 60, below.

union;[1] (*b*) that the idioms or properties of either the Godhead or the Manhood may be predicated of the one subject, Jesus Christ, regardless of the personal title by which He is named — *communicatio idiomatum*, ἀντίδοσις.[2] Thus God was borne by the Blessed Virgin, and the second Man is the Lord from heaven. To call the Blessed Virgin Θεοτόκος did not mean, as Nestorius thought, that she bore the Godhead, but that He whom she bore, as touching the Manhood which He took from her, is no other than He who, as touching His eternal nature, is truly God.

§ 8. The death of St. Cyril in 444 A.D. removed a needed restraint of the onesidedness of many of the opponents of Nestorianism; and his successor in Alexandria, Dioscorus, a violent partisan, became the supporter of the opposite error — a denial of the existence of two natures in Christ, monophysitism. This error came before the Church in the form of Eutychianism,[3] maintained by Eutyches, the archimandrite of a monastery near Constantinople. His view was that the Manhood of Christ was absorbed by the Godhead in Christ; and his formula was, "Before the Incarnation I acknowledge two natures, but after the Incarnation I confess one nature." He fell back upon St. Cyril's famous

[1] Cf. chh. iv. § 1; vi. § 1, below. [2] Cf. ch. vi. § 4, below.

[3] On the Eutychian controversy, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, ch. xvi; C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, Vol. III. Bks. x–xi; R. Rainy, *op. cit.*, pp. 392–404; W. Bright, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. chh. xliii–xlix.

phrase, "one nature of the Word which was incarnate," but left out the qualifying phrase "which was incarnate," and thus fell into a genuine monophysitism — regarding our Lord's Manhood as deified. Eutyches was not an accurate thinker, and his assertion of two natures before the Incarnation was obviously one which could not be entertained seriously. But his monophysitism represented an important and somewhat widely prevalent error which had to be faced, if the reality of our Lord's human nature and passion was to be maintained.

Eutyches was condemned by a local synod under Flavian in 448; and on his appeal to Pope Leo I, that prelate issued the famous *Tome*, or *Epistle to Flavian*, a splendid and well-balanced exposition of the two natures in Christ, their inseparable but unconfused union and operation in Him. "Very God," he wrote, " was born in the entire and perfect nature of very man, whole in His own, whole in ours." [1] "For each nature (*forma*) in communion with the other performs the actions which are proper to it." "For although in the Lord Jesus Christ there is one Person of God and Man, that from which there is of both a common contumely is one, that from which a common glory another." [2]

The Tome exhibits the difference of natures by a series of antitheses, wherein the manifestations of the divine and human factors in our Lord's earthly life are contrasted. Certain modern writers have

[1] Ch. iii. [2] Ch. iv.

referred to these as illustrating an alleged view among the ancients that the Godhead and the Manhood operated *by turns*, the human giving way while almightiness was exercised, and *vice versa*.[1] This interpretation is certainly unwarranted. It is true that the *Tome* in speaking of the lowliness of man and the loftiness of God says, *invicem sunt*, but this admits of being rendered "mutually penetrate" as well as "are by turns." The statement which almost immediately follows, that each nature performs what is proper to it "in communion with the other," *cum alterius communione*, forbids the supposition that St. Leo considered the natures to take mutually exclusive turns in the actions of Christ. Moreover, we have no evidence that that writer would have repudiated the thought that our Lord's earthly life was genuinely human throughout. His point was that in that life both divine and human factors concurred, and that the one factor revealed its presence in this and the other in that phase of the coherent and human drama — these two being distinct in the midst of their concurrence.[2]

After a momentary triumph of the Eutychian faction at Ephesus in 449, the monophysite error was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon, 451

[1] *E.g.* B. F. Westcott, *Epis. to the Hebrews*, p. 66; A. J. Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 84–85.

[2] The mode of the functioning of the Godhead is such that it cannot emerge as a disturbing factor in human consciousness and operation. Cf. chh. vi. 2–3; vii. 8.

A.D. At this Council the *Tome* of Leo was given ecumenical sanction, along with St. Cyril's *Second Letter to Nestorius* and his *Letter to John*. A decree of faith was also set forth, in which it was declared that, "we confess . . . one and the same Son . . . at once complete in Godhead and complete in Manhood, truly God and truly Man, . . . of one essence with the Father as touching His Godhead, and at the same time of one essence with us as touching His Manhood, in all respects like us, apart from sin; as touching His Godhead begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as touching His Manhood . . . begotten in the last days of Mary the Virgin, bearer of God; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, manifested in two natures, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the difference of the natures being in no way destroyed on account of the union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved and concurring in one person and one hypostasis, εἰς ἕν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης, not as though parted and divided into two persons, but one and the same Son," etc.

Apart from unnecessary subtleties, it is clear that the phrase "in two natures" was designed merely to affirm what St. Leo had declared in his *Tome*, that the Incarnate is whole in what is His (i.e. in Godhead) and whole in what is ours (i.e. in Manhood), so that we may neither deny His being full God in order

to maintain His being really human, nor repudiate His being full Man in order to acknowledge His being truly divine. And this obvious purpose of the decree determines the meaning of "nature," φύσις, in Chalcedonian Christology — a meaning which was still further accentuated and determined in the range of its application by the subsequent condemnation of monothelitism by the sixth Ecumenical Council.[1]

Monothelitism[2] was a species of monophysitism which in the interest of the personal unity of Christ, and His sinlessness, denied His possession of a human will as distinguished from His divine will.[3] To-day the tendency is to sacrifice belief in His possession, while on earth, of the divine will, in the interest of the reality of His temptation and human victory over sin. But if Christ remained whole in what was His, that is, if He remained God, He must have retained the divine will, and if He took all that was ours and became really human, He must have acquired also a genuinely human will.[4] The sixth Council accordingly declared that in Christ "there are two natural θελήσεις or θελήματα and two

[1] Cf. p. 54 and the refs. there given.

[2] On Monothelitism, see C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, Vol. V. Bk. XVI; *Cath. Encyc.*, *q. v.*; H. R. Percival, *Seven Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 325–352; Jas. Orr, *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 199–205.

[3] This denial had been made by Apollinaris. See § 6, above.

[4] Operating, however, after the divine and eternal manner, the divine will could not emerge within His human consciousness so as to disturb His human willing. See ch. viii. § 1, below.

natural ἐνεργείας, . . . And the two natural wills are not opposed to each other, . . . but His human will followed, and it does not resist and oppose, but rather is subject to the divine and almighty will." The decree bases this declaration on the truth that there are "two natures in one hypostasis, of which each in communion with the other wills and works what is proper to itself."

It requires no great trouble to see that the distinction between person, ὑπόστασις, and nature, φύσις, which is postulated in the conciliar decrees of faith from which we have quoted, makes δύο φύσεις signify the totality of idioms, properties and functions which may properly be attributed respectively to God as divine and to man as human. Will and intelligence are such properties in each case, and are therefore comprehended within the application of the term "nature," φύσις, in the Church's dogmatic terminology. On the other hand the self (ego, αὐτός), to whom the properties and functions comprehended in the meaning of the term "nature" are ascribed, is what is meant by the Chalcedonian ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον. To say that in Christ there is an inseparable and unconfused union of two natures in one hypostasis means, therefore, that we may ascribe to the one self of Jesus Christ all the properties and functions of God, on the one hand, and all those of man, on the other hand, — these respective properties and functions mutually concurring, but neither interfering with, nor being essentially modi-

fied by, the other. In brief, Jesus Christ is full God and full man, neither affirmation being reduced in meaning by the other, and no division into two sons and selfs being either meant or involved.[1]

III. *Modern Christology*

§ 9. The development of Christology during the middle ages was based upon the teaching of the Ecumenical Councils, and consisted of a scientific elaboration of that teaching, in terms adjusted to the philosophy of the age, especially Aristotelic or moderate realism. This development reached its climax in Part III of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas (died 1274 A.D.), perhaps the greatest masterpiece in Christological literature. To some extent, however, emphasis upon the Godhead of Christ tended to drive into the background the reality of His Manhood, and of His subjection while on earth to human limitations, but moderns have overstated this. The passion was much emphasized, and the necessity of acknowledging the reality and completeness of the Manhood in general was plainly set forth; but the requirements of a truly human life were not adequately faced. The speculative question as to whether the Incarnation would have taken place if man had not sinned was fully discussed, the Thomists giving a negative and the

[1] For the doctrine of the hypostatic union, see chh. iv. § 1 and vi. § 1, below.

Scotists an affirmative reply.[1] Not until the reformation period did there occur any departure from Chalcedonian Christology of sufficient influence to require consideration in a treatise like this.

The breach with ecclesiastical authority which then took place had immediate effect in giving determinative influence to speculative attempts to solve the really insoluble problem of the manner in which the Godhead and the Manhood are united in one Person. A radically new Christological development was initiated in Germany, the influence of which now permeates the protestant world and immensely complicates the task of intelligibly expounding catholic doctrine concerning the Person of Christ. In many minds of to-day a confident faith in the God-man has been displaced by an unnecessarily disturbing problem, which has reduced the divine Revealer to the most baffling enigma of history. The time is coming when those who retain a genuine belief in the union without confusion of the Godhead and the Manhood in Christ will be brought to perceive that the modern form of the problem of the union is based upon an erroneous conception of the Incarnation, and that a removal of this error will also remove those aspects of the problem which hinder the development of an undisturbed and clarifying faith in the God-man.

§ 10. Modern Christological developments have their genesis in the Lutheran semi-monophysite

[1] Discussed in ch. iii. § 7, below.

modification of the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. Martin Luther appears from the outset to have looked for the Godhead of Christ in His Manhood, even while retaining *pro forma* the ancient doctrine that the two natures in Christ are distinct. He held that during His earthly life the Godhead of Christ was concealed, but "Out of the infinite God has been made a finite and definable man," so that "Whatsoever I behold in Christ is at the same time both human and divine." His position was crystallized by his Eucharistic controversy with Zwingli, in which he based the real presence upon the contention that the glorified Manhood of Christ is ubiquitous by virtue of its union with the Godhead and its participation in the properties of that nature. He did not actually merge the lower nature into the higher one, but he regarded the Manhood as the organ and bearer of the Godhead, and this in practical effect meant a certain deification of the Manhood.

The *communicatio idiomatum* became with Luther a transfer of properties from one nature to the other nature, the emphasis being confined, however, to the communication of divine properties to the human nature. This is clearly an innovation on catholic doctrine, according to which the properties of both natures can be ascribed to the one Person or Self in whom they meet, and this regardless of the personal title by which He happens to be named, but the properties of one nature are not communicated, and may not be attributed, to the other

nature. Each nature remains what it is, and performs what is proper to it in communion, but not in commixture, with the other.[1]

Luther's novel doctrine determined the whole course of subsequent German Christological speculation,[2] for although his Christology has not been consistently adhered to, the broad assumption that our Lord's entrance into human history involved a certain coalescing of Godhead with His human nature has controlled German speculation to the present day. The problem of the union has accordingly assumed an entirely new form. In its older and catholic form it was concerned with the manner in which the Godhead and the Manhood, each remaining distinct, can be centred in one self, that is, in the eternal Logos. In modern German thought it has come to be concerned with the capacity of a finite human nature to receive infinite Godhead without ceasing to be really human. As thus regarded the problem has proved to be distinctly disturbing; but from the catholic standpoint this form of it does not need to be considered, because

[1] On this doctrine cf. ch. vi. § 4, below. On Luther's position, see J. A. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, div. II. Vol. II. pp. 72 *et seq.*; and *Hist. of Protestant Theol.*, Vol. II. pp. 147–149; A. B. Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, Lec. iii. *init.* K. R. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Christ. Doctrines*, § 266 (2); H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, Bk. II, ch. vii. Cf. ch. i. § 6 (*c*), above; and chh. vi. 5 and vii. 3, below.

[2] H. R. Mackintosh says, *op. cit.*, p. 237, that "to this hour the Church is occupied with the problem as it was stated by Martin Luther."

it is neither involved in, nor suggested by, the New Testament account of the Incarnation, as interpreted by the Church.

Luther's emphasis was on the Godhead, and he regarded our Lord's human life as the direct manifestation of God. The emphasis of his successors is on the Manhood, the divine in Christ being acknowledged in so far, and only in so far, as capable of immediate exhibition in terms of human experience. This change has obviously left the original and misleading postulate of Luther in full control, and the unifying principle of Christology continues to be looked for in our Lord's Manhood and human life, instead of in His eternal ego or self.

§ 11. Our purpose does not require us to exhibit in detail the developments of German Christological speculation.[1] In the main they represent efforts to bring within the range of rational credibility a mystery which, thanks to the modern postulate above described, is understood to involve among other things the combination of psychological incompatibles — e.g. omniscience and nescience — in one earthly experience. Naturally enough one or other of the incompatibles has had to be disregarded for the sake of coherence; and the

[1] See J. A. Dorner, *Hist. of the Doctr. of the Person of Christ*, Div. II. Vols. II and III; A. B. Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, Lecs. iii–v, H. C. Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, Bk. II. ch. iii; A. Schweitzer; *Quest of the Historical Jesus;* Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, Vol. II. pp. 860–876; W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, III–VI.

ethico-humanitarian standpoint of recent days has led many to minimize, and even to exclude, the divine factor of the Christological mystery in the interest of a really human Christ.

This tendency appears in the kenotic theories of the nineteenth century, an account and adverse criticisms of which have been given by the writer in a monograph on the subject.[1] It is enough at this point to say that these theories are primarily based upon *à priori* considerations, growing out of the mistaken notion above described, that the Incarnation involves a coalescing of the divine with the human, of which the phrase *Logos non extra carnem* truly describes the result. This point of view, along with one sided emphasis upon the limitations of our Lord's earthly experiences, led to an interpretation of St. Paul's phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν in his Epistle to the Philippians, which neither his use elsewhere of the verb κενόω, his general teaching concerning Christ, nor the immediate context of the phrase, permits. St. Paul is here concerned with self-disregarding concern for the things of others, not with reduction of personal resource in helping others. Kenoticism also raises more formidable difficulties than those which it is thought to meet, and this is coming to be realized by an increasing number of modern Christological thinkers.

[1] *The Kenotic Theory.* The subject is considered again in ch. vii, below.

Dr. Dorner sought to solve the problem by the theory of a progressive Incarnation. He said, "The Logos put a limit on His self-communication" (not on His Godhead) "till human susceptibility had attained more complete development." The process, he held, was completed with the glorification of Christ.[1] This theory has no basis in New Testament teaching, and derives what plausibility it is supposed to have from the same *à priori* method of argument to which we have referred. Dorner mistakenly assumes that the Incarnation is an imparting of the infinite to the finite; and realizing that finite manhood cannot receive the infinite and preserve the conditions to which our Lord submitted while on earth, *finitum non capax infiniti*, he disguises from himself the radical nature of the difficulty by hypothecating growth of receptive capacity in the Manhood of Christ.

This suggests a difficulty which neither Dorner nor the advocates of kenotic theories properly faced. If our Lord still possesses a real manhood, it is still finite and *finitum non capax est infiniti*. The supposition that it has become capable of receiving infinite properties is equivalent to the notion that the glorified Christ no longer possesses a real and finite Manhood. A Manhood which is at once finite and infinite is a self-contradictory illusion. That He does possess a finite Manhood, the Manhood

[1] J. A. Dorner, *op. cit.*, Div. II. Vol. III. pp. 248 *et seq.* Cf. H. C. Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 332–334; Chas. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 193–195.

which He assumed in the Blessed Virgin's womb, is a vital factor in His being still the Mediator between God and men, and the Priest who can be touched with the feeling of our infirmities.

§ 12. A Christ whose personality — using the term in its modern and comprehensive meaning — is the result of a fusion of the divine and the human in one human consciousness is widely felt to be a baffling enigma, one which no theoretical explanation can relieve of the appearance of self-contradiction. A return to Chalcedonian Christology would remove this difficulty; and while the problem of the union would not be solved by such a return, it would be freed from unreal difficulties — from elements of obvious inconsistency. But moderns have read into the doctrine of Chalcedon a dualism which it does not contain,[1] and are therefore driven by their recoil from "orthodox" Christology to adopt very radical positions indeed.

Modern radicals start with the true premise that Christ must be really human in any case; but they infer that this requires them to dismiss as stultifying the belief that Christ is really God. Some, indeed, influenced by Hegelianism, conceive of Christ as the climax of God's self-realization in human development — a pantheistic conception.[2] Others maintain

[1] *E.g.* H. R. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 294–295.

[2] See A. S. Martin, in Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, Vol. II. p. 870; E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 205 *et seq.*; H. R. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–264.

the impossibility that a historical drama can be rightly interpreted as revealing the Absolute.[1] Still others find refuge in the judgment that Christ has the value of God for our religious consciousness, while denying our capacity to determine ontological questions concerning His origin and rank in being.[2] While many who reject the claims of Christ are content to regard Him as an ideal man,[3] and are ready to accept His ethical teaching and His filial standpoint towards the heavenly Father, others devote themselves to a thorough-going negative criticism of the Gospel narratives, regarding them as containing legendary elements, or even as mythical.[4] The climax is reached in a denial that Jesus Christ ever lived.[5]

That all this confusion accentuates the modern demand for reinvestigation of the fundamental data of Christological doctrine, and for a restatement

[1] So Lessing. Spinoza and Fichte took this or similar ground. H. R. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 305–310, helpfully discusses the subject. Cf. F. R. Tennant, in *Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1909, pp. 166–186; A. E. Garvie in *Jesus or Christ* (*Hibbert Journal Supplement* for 1909), pp. 165–179.

[2] The Ritschlian view. See A. S. Martin, in *op. cit.*, pp. 871–873; H. R. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 278–281; E. D. la Touche, *op. cit.*, pp. 372–380.

[3] The Socinian position, held to-day by many unitarians.

[4] Strauss' first *Life of Jesus*.

[5] Examples, J. M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology*, 1900; *Pagan Christs*, 1903; W. B. Smith, *The Pre-Christian Jesus* (Eng. Transl.), 1906; A. Drews, *The Christ Myth* (Eng. Transl.), 3rd Ed. 1910. Answers are given by T. J. Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ: Historical or Mythical?* and S. J. Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*.

of apostolic teaching in more intelligible terms, is evident. But such reinvestigation will be unnecessarily laborious, and probably abortive, so long as scholars fail to understand, and refuse to employ, the only working hypothesis that has been able to hold its own among the bulk of Christian believers —the Chalcedonian hypothesis. And restatements which disregard the whole course of Christological development in the ecumenical sphere can end only in more confusion. Theological science must undergo development in every age, but to attempt to reconstruct its most central part *de novo*, and without regard to what has been heretofore achieved, is to violate scientific principles.

CHAPTER III

THE TAKING OF OUR NATURE

I. *The Fact and Its Causation*

§ 1. The word "Incarnation," in its strictest sense, applies exclusively to the single event by which our Lord's earthly life was initiated, and it is with this event that we are now immediately concerned — what it signifies, its purpose and its historical method of virgin-birth.

The Nicene Creed describes the event by saying that "the only-begotten Son of God, . . . very God of very God; begotten not made; being of one substance, ὁμοούσιον, with the Father; . . . was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made Man." That this was not a mere association of two persons — one dwelling in the other — is declared by the Athanasian Symbol, when it says that the Incarnate, "although He be God and Man, is not two but one Christ. One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person." As St. Cyril says, "He was not first born an ordinary man of the holy Virgin, and then the Word descended upon Him, but having been united,

ἐνωθείς, with the flesh in the very womb itself, He is said to have submitted to a birth according to the flesh, as appropriating and making His own the birth in the flesh." [1] The word flesh is here a symbol for our entire nature. He "personally united to Himself flesh instinct with a living soul." [2]

The New Testament describes the Incarnation in two principal aspects, as a taking and as a submitting. In relation to the first of these, it is declared that He who was in the form of God took "the form of a servant" and "the seed of Abraham." [3] In relation to the second aspect, it is said that "He emptied Himself," that, "though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor," [4] that He was "made of a woman, made under the law" [5] and that "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us," [6] submitting "in all things . . . to be made like unto His brethren." [7] He did not, indeed, submit to sin,[8] but none the less, He accepted the conditions of human experience, really "increasing in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and man," [9] being "in all points tempted like as we are," and learning obedience "by the things which He suffered." [10]

[1] *Second Epis. to Nestorius.* [2] *Idem.*
[3] Phil. ii. 7; Heb. ii. 16.
[4] Phil. ii. 7; 2 Cor. viii. 9.
[5] Gal. iv. 4. [6] St. John i. 14.
[7] Heb. ii. 17.
[8] Heb. iv. 15; ix. 28; 1 St. Pet. ii. 22; 1 St. John iii. 5.
[9] St. Luke ii. 52. Cf. ii. 40.
[10] Heb. iv. 15; v. 8.

Neither of these aspects involves any essential change in the eternal Logos. As the ancient fathers were fond of repeating, "Remaining what He was, He became what He was not." [1] In Him "dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead bodily," [2] and even in His humiliation He could say, "All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine." [3] His possession of them did not, indeed, pertain to the nature which He assumed; but His acceptance in that nature of its laws and limitations was an accretion of human experience, not a reduction of His eternal fulness. It was "a stooping down of compassion, not a defect of power," for "very God was born in the entire and perfect nature of very man, whole in His, whole in ours." [4] The laws of the human held their own in His case,[5] because His taking our nature did not mix His Godhead with it, but caused His divine Ego to be its Ego as well.

§ 2. The goodness and love of God, in particular of the Father, was the sole moving cause of the Incarnation. It could not have been any pre-existing merit in the individual Manhood which was assumed, because that Manhood did not pre-exist.[6] Its origin and its assumption by the

[1] Instances given in *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 5–6. *E.g.* St. Athanasius, *c. Apollin.* ii. 7; St. Hilary, *de Trin.*, iii. 16; etc.

[2] Col. ii. 9. [3] St. John xvi. 15. [4] St. Leo, *Tome*, ch. iii.

[5] St. Cyril Alex., *Quod unus sit Christus*, Migne, *P. G.* Vol. lxxv. 1332. See note on a recent mistranslation of this passage, in *The Kenotic Theory*, p. 4.

[6] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. ii. 11.

Word constituted the same event. Its merit was an effect of the grace with which it was endowed through union with the Word, not a causal antecedent. That mankind at large deserved no such benefits as the Incarnation brings within human reach is obvious.

In some quarters there has been a tendency — now happily disappearing — to treat the Father's love as the effect, rather than as the moving cause, of the Incarnation and redemption. This view is, of course, quite erroneous. There can be no such antithesis as it presupposes between the motives and operations of the divine Persons, who possess one mind and act indivisibly in all things. It was by the Father's will that the Son came into the world.[1]

The efficient operating cause was the Holy Spirit. The Word was born not of blood simply, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.[2] Assuming for argument's sake that God could have taken a Manhood conceived in the normal manner of human conception, it is certain that neither such nor any human conception, apart from divine interven-

[1] St. John iii. 16–17; Rom. v. 8; viii. 32; St. James i. 17–18; 1 St. John iv. 9–10; etc. Cf. A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. vi. §§ 7–10.

[2] We are not maintaining that St. John i. 13 refers to Christ's birth. But it is applicable. The reading "Who was born" instead of "Who were born" is found in certain Fathers and is preferred by Prof. Blass. See Jas. Orr, *Virgin-Birth*, pp. 111–112; and esp. T. J. Thorburn, *Doctr. of the Virgin-Birth*, App. C.

tion, could have issued in the birth of the eternal Word. Therefore the Holy Ghost came upon the Blessed Virgin, and the power of the Highest overshadowed her, in order that she should conceive and bring forth the Son of God.[1]

The manner of the Incarnation — its physical cause or condition — was, in fact and by divine choice, a virgin's conception and child-bearing. The moment of that conception was the moment of the Incarnation, and in that instant the eternal Word began His temporal and human life, experience and functioning. The Manhood which He assumed had to grow, and the glorified state which the Incarnation made possible and proper for it was to be attained through humiliation and death, but the Incarnation itself — the union of our nature with the Godhead in the Person of the Lord of Glory — was achieved once for all in the Virgin's womb. Reverence forbids us to scrutinize over minutely the physical aspects of this mystery, but the *datum* that the Blessed Virgin conceived, as well as brought forth, the Word-incarnate cannot be disregarded in correctly interpreting at large the humiliation of the Son of God.

The Blessed Virgin was given the amazing privilege of acting as concurring cause of the Incarnation.

[1] St. Luke i. 35. On the question of fact as to the Virgin-Birth, see § 9, below, and the refs. there given. On the doctrine, see St. Thomas, III. xxviii. 1–2; xxxii; Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 164–181.

This does not mean that unwillingness on her part could have defeated the divine purpose. If she had refused the privilege, this purpose would undoubtedly have been fulfilled by the selection of another maiden. The point is that unwilling motherhood in such a case as this appears so utterly foreign to the moral fitness of things that we are driven to perceive in the Blessed Virgin's consent a real and needed factor in the Incarnation.[1]

§ 3. The convenience of the Incarnation,[2] as God's chosen method of consummating His self-manifestation and of saving mankind, is not difficult to perceive, and requires no elaborate exposition. No more perfect revelation of God to human minds can be imagined than His acceptance of our nature and His visible submission to our conditions. Godhead cannot be flashed openly before our vision, but God's Manhood can, and because it is His, the manner of it is His manner, the most effectual revelation of Him that we can receive. Furthermore, the purpose of God was to save sin-stricken humanity by taking humanity on Himself, by Himself bearing the consequences of our sins, and by carrying our nature victoriously through death, the death to which it must submit because of sin, and from which it can be raised only by the power of such a resur-

[1] See A. C. A. Hall, *The Virgin Mother*, pp. 49–57.

[2] On the convenience of the Incarnation, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. i–iii; xvi. 6–7; T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, ch. i; A. J. Mason, *op. cit.*, ch. vi. 3; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 165–172.

rection as was made possible by the taking of our nature by the Son of God.

This method was fitting in relation not only to revelation and redemption abstractly considered, but also to various incidental effects which help to make the Gospel-drama the source of inspiration that it is. The Incarnation furnishes an absolute and divine personal background and value to all that Jesus Christ was, taught and achieved, while on earth. His sympathy was God's sympathy. His example was final because consisting of a truly human life which was determined and lived by a divine Person. His teaching is the teaching of God, and in Him our sorrows are the sorrows of God.[1]

The Incarnation constitutes the climax of that method which we are able imperfectly to trace in cosmic evolution.[2] All evolution is made possible and determined by involution. Nothing can be evolved which God has not involved; and the successive involutions of higher factors, such as life, mind and rational will, alone explain the emergence of these superphysical elements in the organic realm. The Incarnation is the final involution.[3] It is the entrance into a freshly formed Manhood of the very source of life and immortality. And the sacramental communication of this Manhood to others becomes

[1] Cf. ch. iv. § 10 *init.* and § 11 *fin.*, below.

[2] On which see *Creation and Man*, ch. iii. §§ 6–8 (cf. ch. vi. § 2); *Evolution and the Fall*, Lecs. i–iii.

[3] Cf. *Creation and Man*, ch. iii. § 3.

the potential factor and basis of the development in them of the fullgrown man that is to be — according to "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." [1] The Incarnation, along with the resurrection, which is its interpretative sequel, so far from being an unrelated and therefore incredible event, is the most central and rationally significant crisis in history. Upon its meaning depends the meaning of all else.

And it consecrates and utilizes for the highest purpose of the Holy Spirit the sacramental principle by which nature is governed, and which controls all human functioning, whether active or passive. Since human nature is essentially composite, and can neither express itself nor receive anything — cannot even think and aspire, — except by use of the physical organism and of its material environment, God adapts His method to the nature which He has created, and uses what we have to use — the human body — as the instrument of His self-manifestation, of redemption, and of sanctifying grace.

§ 4. The convenience of the Incarnation is apparent in its immediate aspects as well as in its remoter purpose and effects. It was in the first place the meeting of full Godhead and complete Manhood in one indivisible Self, and therefore it constituted Jesus Christ a true Mediator, who makes God accessible in our plane, and who at the same time affords an acceptable standing for man before

[1] Ephes. iv. 13.

God. God-incarnate is the longed-for Daysman,[1] who can lay His hands on both, and can satisfy both God and man. It seems clear that such a Mediator was needed, and that no more convenient method of constituting Him can be imagined.

It was also fitting that God should meet this need. The nature of God is goodness, and what belongs to the essence of goodness is befitting to God. But goodness is essentially self-communicative, and to be self-communicative is characteristic of God. In so far, therefore, as the Incarnation had for its purpose God's communication of Himself to men, it was befitting to Him.

It is not an insuperable difficulty that human nature is finite, and that *finitum non capax est infiniti*. The Godhead and the Manhood are indeed essentially different in rank of being, in the matter of physical composition, and in mode of functioning. But man is created in the image of God, and his nature, in spite of these differences, has an affinity for the divine. In so far as it is rational, it can and must pertain to a true self; and so far as we can discover, a Self of the Godhead is not subverted by also becoming the self of a manhood. It is true that even under such conditions a real manhood is incapable of receiving the infinite Godhead. It cannot, while remaining human, be endowed with infinite properties. But, as is shown elsewhere, the Incarnation does not involve such an impossibility. It is

[1] Job, ix. 32–33.

not an imparting of Godhead to the Manhood, but an appropriation of the Manhood by a divine Self.[1] Since man's nature is rational, and he is created for divine fellowship, it is convenient that to this end a divine Person should become the Person or Self of human nature. Moreover, the difference in mode of functioning which characterizes the Godhead and the Manhood seems to justify the belief that the meeting of these two natures in one personal Self need not involve any mutual infringement between them — any nullification of the limitations of the human by the divine.[2]

The physical method of the Incarnation — the Virgin-Birth — also seems fitting. That this was in fact the method is indeed a matter of evidence, concerning which something will be said later on.[3] We are here concerned with the fitness of the Virgin-Birth. This fitness lies in its being a proper sign of the coming of God into human life and experience.[4] Had there been no sign whatever, if Jesus Christ had been born like any human child, the inference would have been inevitable that He was no more than a human child. It appears, indeed, that the Apostles came to a realization of Christ's Person before the Virgin-Birth was made known to them,

[1] In chh. ii. 10; vi. 2; etc. Cf. ch. vii. §§ 3, 5.

[2] Cf. ch. vi. § 10 and elsewhere. [3] In § 9, below.

[4] Cf. J. A. Robinson, *Some Thoughts on the Incarn.*, pp. 16–30; Jas. Orr, *The Virgin-Birth of Christ*, Lecs. vii–viii; B. W. Randolph, *The Virgin-Birth of our Lord*, pp. 47–57.

but their direct experience of Christ, and the fulness of the evidence by which they were convinced of Christ's divine rank in being, stand alone. To subsequent generations acceptance of the Virgin-Birth has been an invariable concomitant, and apparently a necessary condition, of full belief in the mystery of the Incarnation. Those who reject the one are found to fall short of a complete acceptance of the other.[1]

II. *Mediatorial Purpose*

§ 5. The immediate purpose for which the Son of God became incarnate — the purpose which receives primary emphasis in the New Testament — is the salvation of men from sin and death and from the devil. It is this purpose which had to be fulfilled as the *sine qua non* of any further purpose, and which now, as well as then, needs to be emphasized in proclaiming the Gospel to our sinful race. Purgation is the very formidable prerequisite of the wider and higher blessings which the Incarnation brings to men.[2]

It is the salvation of men that the Saviour Himself declares to be the purpose of His coming. "The Son of Man came ... to give His life a ransom for many," and "to seek and to save that which was

[1] Chas. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 63–67.

[2] St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. i. 4; A. J. Mason, *op. cit.*, ch. vii. 3; T. P. Norris, *Rudiments of Theol.*, pp. 53–58.

lost." "God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish but have eternal life. For God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through Him." "Father, save Me from this hour," He prays on the eve of His Passion, adding, "But for this cause came I into the world." [1]

The New Testament writers rarely give a direct and formal answer to the question, "Why did the Son become incarnate?" But the connection in which their allusions to the Incarnation are made is almost invariably that of His death for the salvation of mankind; [2] and the subject of Christ's saving mission is dwelt upon with a frequency and emphasis which quite overshadows the comparatively rare allusions in the New Testament to the wider purpose which the Word-incarnate fulfils. The primary importance which primitive Christians attached to the saving aspects of Christ's work also appears in the large share of attention which the Gospel narratives give to His passion and death. Even the resurrection, vital as it was considered to be, receives briefer attention.

The same emphasis upon salvation has characterized the preaching of the Gospel in every age; and it is noteworthy that whenever, and wherever, this

[1] St. Matt. xx. 28; St. Luke xix. 10; St. John iii. 16–17; xii. 27.

[2] Cf. Gal. iv. 4–5; 1 Tim. i. 15; Heb. ii. 9, 14–15, 17; ix. 26; 1 St. John iii. 8; iv. 10.

emphasis is neglected, the sense of sin is apt to be wanting, and the very doctrine of the Incarnation itself tends to be explained away, with disastrous effect upon men's conceptions of the Person and divine claims of Christ. The Scotist emphasis upon other purposes of the Incarnation, true and inspiring as these purposes are, has often had the effect of lowering the level of Christological belief, and of depriving the Gospel message of much of its power.

§ 6. But the reasons here given for emphasizing the saving aspect of the Incarnation — that that mystery was designed for the restoration of man to the state of grace from which sin has caused him to fall, — need not, and should not, deter us from perceiving that the Incarnation has wider and more positive ends than recovery from sin. Moreover, even though it be maintained that human sin caused the method of achieving these ends to be what it has been,[1] we are still bound to acknowledge that the Incarnation has a richer theology than that of mere salvation. Salvation recovers us to the potentialities of man's primitive state, but these potentialities cannot be actualized, even by a sinless humanity, without supernatural aid.[2] Therefore it is reasonable that the means of man's recovery

[1] Thomist view. See next section.

[2] Being made for God, man is also made naturally insufficient apart from dependence on God. See *Creation and Man*, pp. 217–218, 252–253.

should serve also as the means of his advance toward the destiny for which he was originally created — of his development after the divine likeness, ending in divine communion and fellowship, wherein eternal life consists.

Furthermore, man is the appointed representative and recapitulation of creation at large, being intended to have dominion over it, and to actualize the eternal purpose that all things should be summed up in the Son of God.[1] This headship of man, and this purpose of it, seem to point to some sort of identification of mankind with the Son, "the Image of the invisible God"; for He is declared to be "the Firstborn in relation to all creation, for in Him were all things created . . . through Him and unto Him, . . . and in Him all things consist. . . . For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell." [2] And this purpose is not a consequent will of God, due to sin, but the antecedent purpose of creation itself.

But whether the Incarnation is to be referred to the "antecedent" will of God or to His "consequent" will,[3] in the latter case deriving its eternal aspects from God's fore-knowledge of sin, it obviously constitutes a convenient method of achieving the wider purpose of creation and the ultimate end of man. Man is created in the image of God and recapitulates the whole series of evolving finite life. The

[1] Ephes. i. 9–10. [2] Col. i. 15–19. Cf. Rom. viii. 21–23.
[3] *Creation and Man*, ch. i. § 4.

likeness according to which he was intended to develop is found in the eternal Son, Who is the Image which contains the eternal idea of creation.[1] What could be more fitting, therefore, than that the Son should make our nature His own, and by this condescension should meet the upward movement of creaturely evolution and bring it to its eternally intended consummation by making Himself the centre and quickening principle of all.

The mediatorial principle does not derive its controlling place in the dispensations of God from the accident of sin. That accident has added to mediation the mystery of the Cross; but the finitude of man, and the mysterious relations within the Trinity itself, seem alike to require that the Father should be invisible to, and unattainable by, creatures, except through the Son,[2] the Image of the invisible God. Apparently it is only through some kind of identification with the Son that we can gain access to the Father, and to the life with God for which we were originally destined. Under the conditions of history, it is through the Incarnation that this identification is being actualized, and the ultimate purpose of God for our benefit is being wrought out in the Church — in the Church, because it "is His Body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all." [3]

§ 7. We may not go further without directly facing the question to which we have several times

[1] *Idem*, pp. 66–67. Cf. J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 137–140. [2] St. John. i. 18; xiv. 6. [3] Ephes. i. 23.

alluded, Would the Incarnation have taken place if man had not sinned?[1] It is a question which hypothecates a situation contrary to fact — if man had not sinned — so that its answer is purely speculative and academic. No dogmatic certainty is attainable, and no article of the faith is contingent in form and meaning upon the conclusion at which we arrive. Yet the question represents one of the lines of thought which have embodied, and to a degree determined, the relative emphasis placed upon the teleological aspects of the Incarnation which we have been discussing. It is this that gives it the importance in speculative theology which it has had since the thirteenth century.

That the Incarnation would not have taken place if man had not sinned is the answer given by the Thomist school,[2] an answer which is congenial to all who emphasize the doctrine of salvation. That it would have taken place in any case is the Scotist contention;[3] and this answer is congenial to those who emphasize the place of the Incarnation in cosmic development, and who cherish an optimistic view

[1] On the history of the Scotist question, as it is called, see B. F. Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, pp. 285–317.

[2] See St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. i. 3. Cf. W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 134; D. W. Forrest, *Authority of Christ*, pp. 340–345.

[3] Dun Scotus, *Summa*, III. i. 3. Supported by B. F. Westcott, *op. cit.*, pp. 317–328; P. G. Medd, *One Mediator*, §§ 58–63; A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. vi. 5; and by Suarez, F. X. Schouppe and numerous recent writers.

of human nature and its possibilities. The opposing conclusions thus arrived at represent temperamental differences which always exist in the Church. The position here taken is neither Thomist nor Scotist, although it includes perception of the dangers of an over emphatic Scotism. It consists in a refusal to determine the question — a repudiation of both answers above given, so far as reckoned to have any established validity. The question is hopelessly speculative. We are not sufficiently equipped with knowledge of the resources, and of the mind, of God to determine what He would have done under other circumstances than those which in fact constitute the conditions of His working in human history.[1]

The more important arguments for the Scotist view, and the answers to them, can be very briefly indicated. They require no elaboration for our purpose.

(*a*) In addition to the remedy of sin, the Incarnation appears to have been designed to fulfil purposes which would have been needful for man's advance even if he had not sinned. To this the reply is made that, granting the certainty that these wider purposes would in any case have been somehow fulfilled, we cannot know that the Incarnation would have been the only means available.

(*b*) The Incarnation was ordained from eternity, and was therefore part of the original plan of God. The answer is that God's knowledge of sin, and of

[1] Cf. Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 54–56, 286–288.

the need of redemption was also eternal, so that the Incarnation may have been ordained in view of sin, eternally fore-known.

(*c*) The Incarnation constitutes the most effective display of love for man that we can imagine, and it seems unreasonable that such a display should have depended for its actualization upon human sin.[1] The reply is that our imagination is quite too inadequate to determine the resources of divine love. The most that can be acknowledged is that we know of no method so convenient for its purpose as is the Incarnation.

Other considerations have been advanced, but they are either reducible to the heads we have given, or unimportant. We leave the subject as a problem of the schools, which Dogmatic Theology neither needs, nor is able, to solve.

§ 8. The purpose of the Incarnation may be summarily described as mediatorial. The eternal mode of divine subsistence, and the finitude of man, alike require that, if man is to gain genuine access to the invisible God, this must be achieved through a personal Mediator — one who shall be able at once fully to represent God to us, and to be a proper representative in our behalf to God; — and the eternal Son of God we have seen to be the proper Person to fulfil this office. If man had not sinned

[1] Bearing on this, a Latin hymn used at the blessing of the Easter candle says, "O felix culpa quae tantum ac talem meruit habere redemptorem." Given in Daniel, *Thesaurus Hymnol.* l. c. 303.

this necessity would none the less have existed; and since man was made for communion and fellowship with God, the fact of his creation became a pledge that such mediation would be afforded. The incident of sin added the mystery of redemptive suffering to the Son's mediatorial office. It accentuated, but did not cause, the love wherewith He persisted in His gracious purpose.

The Incarnation has been the means by which the Son of God has equipped Himself for the historical part of His mediatorial work. Possessing in Himself the fulness of the Godhead, and thus able to bring God within our reach by manifesting Himself to us, He has also taken for His own a truly human nature. By this condescension He has not only achieved an effectual manifestation of Himself to men, but also has constituted Himself a true recapitulation and representative of our race before God the Father. In Him the Creator and the creature meet in one indivisible and personal centre; and our union in Him by sacramental means constitutes the appointed and effectual method whereby, under the conditions of faith and repentance, we are enabled to obtain the intended benefits of His gracious intervention and redemptive suffering.

III. *The Virgin-Mother*

§ 9. The method of the Incarnation on its physical side, according to two Gospel narratives, was that of a virgin-birth, and something has already

been said as to the fitness of this method, regarded as the method and sign of the entrance of very God into human history.[1] But the fact of the Virgin-Birth is disputed by certain modern writers[2]— ostensibly on critical, really on *à priori*, grounds. It is the *à priori* standpoint which these writers assume — that of naturalism — which gives to their negative criticism what plausibility it possesses.

That the two narratives to which we refer[3] are later interpolations, or at least have been altered in the interest of later belief in a virgin-birth, is a contention for which no evidence worthy of the name has been discovered. And no proof appears that these narratives were regarded, when they appeared, as inconsistent with existing Christian knowledge. Whatever may be the precise dates of the Gospels in which they appear, they were written and gained circulation, within the life-time of persons who could, and undoubtedly would, have corrected them, if they were as radically false as a denial of the

[1] In § 4, above.

[2] *E.g.* by Paul Lobstein, *The Virgin-Birth of Christ* — a complete thesaurus of the negative argument. The fact is defended by Chas. Gore, *Dissertations*, I; Jas. Orr, *The Virgin-Birth of Christ;* R. J. Knowling, *Our Lord's Virgin-Birth;* T. J. Thorburn, *Crit. Exam. of the Evidence of the Doctr. of the Virgin-Birth; Ch. Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1904, art. IX; W. Sanday, in *Critical Questions*, 2d ed., pp. 123 *et seq.* (written before he assumed a negative attitude in *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*); G. Streatfield, *Incarnation*, ch. x; E. H. Day, "The Doctr. of the Virgin-Birth," in *Eng. Ch. Review*, commencing Jan., 1913.

[3] St. Matt. i. 18–25; St. Luke i. 26–38.

Virgin-Birth necessarily assumes them to be. The ultimate sources of information on the subject must have been Joseph and Mary, and the narrative of the first Gospel reflects the standpoint of Joseph, while that of the third reflects Mary's point of view. In both cases the narratives, when examined as to their literary peculiarities, seem to consist to an important extent of borrowed documents, and not to be wholly composed by the Gospel writers themselves. To those who believe in the possibility of miracles, and who approach the question from the standpoint afforded by the apostolic conception of our Lord's Person, the evidence which these narratives afford that He became incarnate by a virgin-birth seems sufficient, — especially in the absence of contrary evidence, and in view of the strength of what appears to be independent tradition found in sub-apostolic literature.[1]

Much is made of the silence of all other New Testament writers,[2] and it is sweepingly assumed that this silence proves ignorance. It of course proves nothing of the kind, unless found in documents purporting to describe our Lord's human birth; and no other such documents or passages occur in the New Testament. It is indeed quite possible that the earlier portions of the New Testa-

[1] See on this, H. B. Swete, *Apostles' Creed*, pp. 42–55, in reply to A. Harnack.

[2] A possible exception in St. John i. 13 has been referred to in § 2, above.

ment were written before the fact of the Virgin-Birth was publicly made known. But this affords no difficulty. Premature publication would have invited scandal, and the Virgin-Mother — Joseph would seem to have died before the pentecostal period — may well have continued to ponder the mystery secretly in her heart until the realization among Christian circles of the significance of her Son's submission to *any* form of human birth had sufficiently developed to make her story credible and edifying. It is reasonable to think that, when she did speak, she was able to produce Joseph's account as well — an account which was perhaps furnished by Joseph for her protection from scandal. We do not, of course, know that the narratives emerged precisely in this manner; but it is one of several possible ways in which both the characteristics of the two Gospel narratives and the postponement of their publication might reasonably be explained.

It has been urged, however, that in the genealogies our Lord is described as the son of Joseph, and that the general impression of the Jews that He was the carpenter's son emerges several times in the Gospel narratives without being corrected by the Gospel writers. The latter circumstance is but one of many evidences of the general faithfulness with which these writers adhered to the purpose of exhibiting Christ as He appeared to those who saw Him, abstaining as a rule from unnecessary comment.

As to the genealogies, the fact that they are given by the very writers who tell us of the Virgin-Birth shows that they at least did not perceive the discrepancy which modern objectors allege. Our only knowledge of these genealogies is in their Gospel forms, which appear to be controlled by belief in the Virgin-Birth, in spite of their tracing the line of descent through Joseph. That they did trace it through him appears to be dictated by the fact that they give the putative descent, which was in any case through Joseph. But in both genealogies the Gospel writers avoid describing Jesus Christ as begotten of Joseph.[1]

Finally it is objected that the story of the Virgin-Birth has parallels in ancient pagan myths, which may well explain the manner in which it was developed, and may perhaps betray its source. But the whole attitude of the first generation of Christian believers towards paganism forbids the supposition that the story of the Virgin-Birth was genetically related to pagan myths, as does also the manifold, especially the spiritual, contrast between them and the Gospel narratives. The Jews of that time were not myth-makers, and the interval between our Lord's birth and the publication of the Gospels was too brief for the development of mythical accounts of that event.

[1] The child of a man's wife, even if a *mamzer* — i.e. adulterous,— would be reckoned putatively as his son in any case. See *Jewish Encyc., s. v.* "Adultery," p. 218.

But, it is urged, why attach so much importance to the Virgin-Birth? Can we not, as the earliest Christians did, accept the divine claim of Christ, and acknowledge His eternal pre-existence with the Father, independently of questions concerning the manner of His human birth? The answer is not difficult to make. The conditions under which we accept our Lord's claims are significantly different from those of pentecostal days. The fact of the Virgin-Birth has been proclaimed, and ages of reflection and criticism have elapsed. Once published, the story of the Virgin-Birth came quickly to be recognized as an important and fitting sign of the entrance of God into human history. It has rightly been felt that to reject such a sign is to weaken our faith in the Incarnation, and this is borne out by the fact that those who have rejected it have also fallen short of full acknowledgment of the mystery with which it is connected.[1]

§ 10. Closely associated in Christian imagination with our Lord's Virgin-Birth, although not to be regarded as being an article of the faith, is the ancient and very widespread opinion that the Blessed Virgin bore no other children after giving birth to Jesus Christ — her perpetual virginity.[2]

[1] See. Chas. Gore, Dissertations, pp. 63–67.

[2] The most weighty argument against her continued virginity is given by J. B. Mayor, *Epis. of St. James*, pp. v.–xxxvi. J. B. Lightfoot, *Dissertations on the Apostolic Age*, pp. 1–45, defends the traditional veiw here taken, and gives a full survey of patristic opinion. Cf. Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Brethren of our Lord."

Three views have been held: (*a*) That the "brethren" of our Lord were His cousins — the view of St. Jerome, but having too many difficulties to be considered seriously: (*b*) The Helvidian view, that these "brethren" were younger children of Joseph and Mary; (*c*) The common or Epiphanian view, that they were children of Joseph by a previous marriage — legal brethren of our Lord and, in view of the contemporary belief that He too was begotten of Joseph, commonly but mistakenly thought to be His "brethren" as begotten of the same father.

The issue lies between the second and the third views, either of which gives a credible explanation of the use of the descriptive term "brethren." To those who believe in the Virgin-Birth of our Lord the reasons which explain His being called the son of Joseph can be advanced with equal force to explain the fact that Joseph's children were known as the "brethren" of Christ, without resorting to the supposition that they were also Mary's children. The statement that Joseph knew not his wife "till she brought forth a son," [1] as parallels show,[2] does not prove that he knew her afterwards. And the fact that Jesus is called a "firstborn" son can be explained as having reference to the Jewish law which consecrated to God every child that opened the womb rather than to the subsequent birth of

[1] St. Matt. i. 25.

[2] Gen. xxviii. 15; Deut. xxxiv. 6; 1 Sam. xv. 35; 2 Sam. vi. 23; St. Matt. xxviii. 20.

other children.[1] No New Testament evidence exists which can be regarded as really determinative of the question; but attempts to account for our Lord committing His mother to the care of St. John instead of His "brethren," on the supposition that they were the children of Mary, seem unsuccessful.

The fact of general tradition, in spite of the explanations of it which supporters of the Helvidian view advance, determines the state of the question; and until contrary evidence is forthcoming, it seems most reasonable to adhere to the traditional view, that the Blessed Virgin had but one child — Jesus Christ. The widespread feeling that the Helvidian supposition is contrary to the spiritual fitness of things cannot be reckoned as having evidential value for the traditional view. But it may represent a true instinct none the less, and the writer believes, that this is the case.[2]

§ 11. The mother of Jesus Christ was a virgin mother, and her virginity has been regarded by pious minds not only as the divinely appointed sign of the taking of our nature by the eternal Son, but also as a suitable symbol of her own sanctification for such a sacred function and privilege. The announcement to her of the part which she was to fulfil was attended by witness to the fact that she was "endued

[1] See Bishop Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 173–177.

[2] On the perpetual virginity, see also St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* III. xxviii; xxix. 2; A. T. Wirgman, *The Blessed Virgin, etc.*, pp. 150–165; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 9.

with grace."[1] Governed by a deep spiritual instinct the Church has ever abhorred the thought that the Holy One should have been born of a sinful mother. It has therefore been held with catholic consent that somehow, and before the conception of her divine Son took place, she was by virtue of His merits, anticipatively applied, purified from sin. This is not susceptible of formal proof, but is a matter of spiritual perception of the fitness of things — a perception so general as to have all the practical value of demonstration.

The question as to when she was thus sanctified, whether immediately before the Incarnation, from her mother's womb, or in her very conception, so as never to have inherited a sinful nature, does not admit of so confident a solution. Provided the truth be guarded that her sanctification, whenever it occurred, was dependent upon, and constituted an anticipative effect of, her Son's redeeming work, either one of the opinions indicated may be cherished without violation of any article of the faith.

The opinion that the Blessed Virgin was immaculately conceived is asserted by papal authority[2] in terms that bear explicit witness to her dependence for sanctification, like the rest of us, upon the merits of her divine Son. In its papal form it may therefore be recognized as an allowable pious opinion. Beyond this we cannot go. The doctrine is com-

[1] St. Luke, i. 28 (R. V. Margin).

[2] Pius IX, in his Bull *Ineffabilis*, Dec. 8, 1854.

paratively modern, has never had catholic consent, and is confirmed by no biblical evidence. To the writer it seems to disagree with the law of parsimony which governs divine operations, so far as we know them. God apparently does not work greater miracles than the circumstances in each case demand, and the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin at any time before she had unfitted herself for her privilege by formal sin would seem to constitute an adequate preparation on her side for the vocation to which she was called.[1]

§ 12. Inasmuch as He who condescended to be born of the Blessed Virgin is no other than He whom we acknowledge to be God of God, the Church has, for the protection of this truth, declared her to be Θεοτόκος, Bearer of God. The Latin and English phrases, *Mater Dei* and "Mother of God," are not exactly equivalent, but cannot logically be repudiated without the implication that the child of Mary was not truly divine. No doubt the unqualified address "Mother of God" is subject to misconstruction; but in view of the humanitarian tendencies of our time, it seems wiser to expound the true use and implications of the phrase, rather than to discourage its employment. Abuse need not preclude use,

[1] See Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 57–61, 287–290; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxvii. 2; E. B. Pusey, *First Letter to Newman*. In behalf of the immaculate conception, Abp. Ullathorne, *The Immac. Concep. of the Mother of God;* Geo. F. Lee, *The Sinless Conception of the Mother of God.*

especially when repudiation is liable to have erroneous implications of a dangerous kind.[1]

The truth which especially needs to be safeguarded in calling the Blessed Virgin "Mother of God" is the fact that she is a *human* mother — not less human and creaturely because by the power of the Highest one who is very God condescended to take our nature of her and to become her Child. Reasonably interpreted, the word "mother" implies that one thus called is human, both in her own nature and in her motherhood. This will appear when we remember that such a notion as divine maternity is contrary to the Christian's idea of God, and appears only in pagan mythology. The Mother of God was human, although her Child, being also more than her Child, was divine. And this truth determines her present relationship to her Child. She is evermore His mother because He is evermore the one she bore. But this is a human relationship, and is subject to the limitations of human motherhood. The authority and the prerogatives of a mother expire with the attainment by her child of adult years. If any authority is subsequently retained, it is based upon special conditions which in any case cease to have either force or meaning after death.

The maternal authority, therefore, to which Christ submitted had validity only in earthly connections and for a brief period. The fact that He was her

[1] Cf. on this subject ch. ii. § 7, above, and ch. vi. § 4, below.

Maker and Redeemer as well as her Child, cannot reasonably be treated as enlarging and perpetuating her prerogatives as mother. These prerogatives necessarily obey the laws of human motherhood, and have long ceased to exist. That the relations between Christ in glory and His human mother are coloured, and made peculiarly tender, by His having been her Child may freely be acknowledged, although the manner of their enjoyment is quite beyond our ken. But there is no warrant whatever for supposing that her being His mother gives to the Blessed Virgin the slightest "prerogative" in the counsels of our heavenly Mediator. She is a mediatrix in no other than the purely metaphorical sense in which any feminine saint can thus be called. We rejoice to think of the Blessed Virgin as interceding for us, and to believe that her prayers have much availing power; but this power is derived from her sanctity. "The effectual and fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much,"[1] and the power in prayer of holy souls must be greater when they have become perfect, and have been admitted to such participation in heavenly visions as can be given them before the resurrection. And if this is so, the Mother of God may well be regarded as pre-eminent in her power in prayer. But after all is said, her power in heaven is that of saintly prayer, neither that of maternal prerogative nor that of mediatorial function.

[1] St. James v. 16.

As pre-eminent among human saints we honour her, and are not afraid of conceding to her too reverent a regard, so long as we do not give her the honour which is exclusively due to her Son. And in honouring her under this limitation we are honouring her Son, whose grace has made her what she is, next among creatures to His perfection.[1]

[1] See Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 177–179; A. T. Wirgman, *The Blessed Virgin*, pp. 103–107 (where quotations are given from T. T. Carter, E. B. Pusey and A. P. Forbes).

CHAPTER IV

THE GODHEAD OF CHRIST

I. *His Person*

§ 1. Conceiving of personality as a comprehensive symbol for the totality of a rational and self-determining individual's psychical functioning, moderns are apt to describe Christ's Person as a complex of divine and human elements — a product of the Incarnation and of His earthly development. So it is that the modern method is to start with the manifold elements of our Lord's earthly life, and by combining them to attain a conception of His personality.

Catholic theology begins at the other end. Acknowledging that it is through apostolic experience of Christ's earthly life and conversation that the Church learned what she knows of His Person, the ancients made the conclusion thus reached — that Christ is the eternal Son of God — the starting point and determinative premise of their final and abiding interpretation of apostolic experience. They came to distinguish person or ὑπόστασις from nature, φύσις, and to denote by that term the ego or self, αὐτός, of Christ, as distinguished, although not as separable, from His volitional, emotional and

intellectual functioning. That this is so can be seen from two of their frequently expressed beliefs: — that the Person of Christ is divine; and that this one Person possesses two distinct wills and two natural energies.[1] It is obvious that if the Person of Christ is described as one and divine, while His wills are said to be two — divine and human — the will is not in such terminology reckoned as part of personality, even though it has to be acknowledged that the ancients never imagined such a thing as a Person who does not possess a will.

They distinguished, then, between person, as the self or subject who functions, and nature, as the functioning which is proper to the person in a given order of operation, whether divine or human. And a careful regard for this distinction is necessary in order to understand and do justice to the ancient doctrine of the hypostatic union, *καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν*.[2]

According to this doctrine, there is but one Person or self in Jesus Christ — an eternal or divine self, the Son of God. In Him two natures or modes of functioning are united so as to have a common

[1] Cf. ch. ii. § 8, above, on the monothelite controversy, and ch. viii. § 1, below, on the two wills.

[2] On the hypostatic union, see St. Cyril, *Second Letter to Nestorius;* Council of Chalcedon, *Decree of Faith* (quoted in ch. ii. § 8, above); St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. ii. 1–3; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, V. lii; liv. 10; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 259–267; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, ch. vi; Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 73–86.

centre or subject — one of them being truly, ἀληθώς, divine, and the other completely, τελέως, human. And these two natures are united inseparably, ἀδιαιρέτως, so as never to be divided, yet unconfusedly, ἀσυγχύτως, so as never to infringe upon each other. The limitations of the human are not swallowed up in the divine, nor are the properties of the divine reduced by the human; but "each form fulfils what is proper to it in communion with the other," [1] the integrity of each being preserved by reason of the mutual difference in modes of their functioning. Because of this difference the divine operations of the Son do not emerge or come within observation as nullifying factors in His human consciousness and life, and His human nature remains subject to its laws without interrupting the eternal operations of the Word, whereby all things consist and persist in being and function.

§ 2. We are confronted at this point by the doubts of contemporary psychologists as to the existence of self as distinguished from psychical functioning, and by objections related to the substance-philosophy which is said to be postulated in Chalcedonian Christology.

The denial of self as a distinct reality finds its classical form in Hume, who inferred from his inability to detect his own self, except in some form of perception, that self is "nothing but a bundle or

[1] St. Leo, *Tome*, ch. iv.

collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." [1] It is not, however, by such a philosophy that human life is or can be practically guided. A stream of consciousness, having no self, cannot be a subject of real moral responsibility; and what is called self-consciousness cannot be described in harmony with common experience as consciousness of mere consciousness. The laws which determine the practically invariable interpretation of terms in common speech are laws of human thought which cannot ordinarily be impugned except upon the basis of scepticism. A pertinent example is to be seen in the interpretation which men give to terms by which persons are denoted, such as personal names and pronouns. They are not understood to signify bundles of perceptions, feelings and the like — streams of consciousness — but always selves, to whom the phenomena of consciousness are to be

[1] *Treatise on Human Nature*, Bk. I. Pt. IV. § 6. Supported by J. S. Mill, *Exam. of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philos.*, ch. xii. Replies by T. H. Green, in Ed. of Hume, Vol. I, Introd., § 342; W. G. Ward, in *Encyc. Brit.* (9th Ed.), *s. v.* "Psychology," p. 39. Cf. H. Calderwood, *Moral Philos.*, pp. 12, 102–108, 118–122; C. F. D'Arcy, *Christianity and the Supernatural*, pp. 53–55; W. Sanday, *Personality*, pp. 12–26; W. L. Walker, *Christ. Theism*, pp. 219–222, 227, 425–427; R. T. Smith, *Man's Knowledge of Man and God.* The bearing of this subject on the meaning and reasonableness of Chalcedonian Christology is considered in ch. vi. §§ 7–8; and its relation to recent discussions of our Lord's "subliminal consciousness" in § 11 of the same chapter.

referred. And a real distinction between these selves and their psychical functionings, whether the distinction is reflected on or not, is taken for granted. If this distinction is an illusory trick of fancy, it is one from which none escape in ordinary practice — not even those who theoretically deny its validity. Unless there be an abiding self, which functions in, but is distinct from, consciousness, there is no bridge to connect, in personal identity and continuity, consciousness *before* and consciousness *after* dreamless sleep.

It is urged, however, that the most searching psychological scrutiny fails to bring within our subjective observation any such object as a self other than the phenomena of consciousness. This is, of course, perfectly true. What is called self-consciousness is not perception of self as a distinct object of observation, but perception that what are observed, the phenomena of consciousness, are to be interpreted as functionings of a self which we do not see. The reason why self cannot be made a distinct object of observation is clear. From the nature of the case the only subjective realities which consciousness can scrutinize consist of the phenomena of consciousness. In interpreting these phenomena we postulate a self as their centre and agent; but just because this self is distinct from the phenomena of consciousness, it forever escapes our scrutiny. It is invisible spirit. The theory which denies distinct reality to self because it escapes psychological

objectification is analogous to, and as fallacious as, the theory which denies distinct reality to mind because it escapes physiological objectification.

The sum of the matter is that we ought not to be blamed when we describe Jesus Christ in terms which the necessities of common experience suggest and justify. In any case we are safe in saying that all the functioning of Jesus Christ, whether divine or human, is to be referred to a common personal centre, and He Who was eternally begotten of the Father is no other than He who submitted in the manhood to experience our natural limitations.

§ 3. As to the substance-philosophy, we may say that there is no sign that the term substance in Chalcedonian Christology carried with it any metaphysical theory. The term was current coin, as it still continues to be, and signified the underlying reality of things,[1] regardless of particular metaphysical conceptions as to the nature of this reality. When Christ is declared to be consubstantial with the Father as touching His Godhead, the meaning is that the reality denoted by His Godhead is one and the same with the reality of the Father's Godhead. And when He is said to be consubstantial with us as touching the Manhood, the reality of His Manhood is asserted to be generically the same

[1] J. F. Bethune-Baker, in *Texts and Studies*, Vol. VII. No. 1, pp. 21–23.

with the reality of ours. In brief, the term consubstantial is used to affirm that Jesus Christ is at once real God and real Man — an affirmation which leaves us free either to accept or to reject any particular substance-philosophy, whether it be ancient or modern.

At this point it may be well to notice that, in so far as the Christological use of the term substance is concerned, its connotation of anything separable from person is necessarily confined to the human side of the mystery. The Godhead is incomposite and contains no such thing as a body, and the reality in God denoted by the term referred to subsists in each of the divine Persons. Each of them is full God, and full God constitutes the indivisible centre of Jesus Christ. It is only the Manhood in Him which can rightly be described in terms of circumference — of extension and parts. Accordingly, the relation of the Godhead to His Manhood, like that of His Person to His Manhood, is analogous to that of the centre of a circle to its circumference, rather than to that of one of two concentric circles to the other. And just as a centre cannot be a disturbing element in a circumference, so the Godhead of Jesus Christ cannot be a confusing part and aspect of His Manhood and human life, which in any case is completely human.

§ 4. The Person of Jesus Christ, the Self, considered *in se*, is eternal, unchangeable and divine. In the language of the Church, He is "one Lord

Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God; begotten of His Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God; begotten, not made; being of one substance with the Father; by whom all things were made." [1]

He declared Himself to His disciples in terms of a unique divine sonship, in which they neither had nor could have share; [2] as existing in the Father, and the Father in Him;[3] and as being one through whom alone men can approach the Father.[4] He is declared by the fourth Gospel also to be the Word of God, existing in the beginning, co-existing with God, and being God. All things were made by Him; [5] and, as St. Paul declares, in Him "all things consist." [6] He is "the image of the invisible God" [7] and "the express image of His Person," [8] and therefore is fittingly designated as the Mediator between God and men.[9] The Spirit of the Father is also His Spirit,[10] and as second in the eternal order of divine Persons He subsists with Them in an indivisible Trinity, in which there is no essential inequality,

[1] On the true Godhead of Christ, see *The Trinity*, chh. iv. 7, 10–12; v. 2–5, 11–13; viii. 6; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord;* Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 105–144; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 126–153; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, ch. v; E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, Lec. iii; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ*, Bk. III. chh. iv–v, vii, xii.

[2] St. John xx. 17; iii. 16, 18. Cf. St. John i. 14; 1 St. John iv. 9.

[3] St. John xiv. 10. [4] St. John xiv. 6.

[5] St. John i. 1–3. [6] Col. i. 17. [7] Col. i. 15.

[8] Heb. i. 3 (written by a disciple of St. Paul). [9] 1 Tim. ii. 5.

[10] Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6; Phil. i. 19; 1 St. Pet. i. 11.

but one common Godhead. It is true that, unlike the Father, He is God by derivation, but this derivation is eternal, and He is full God.

The Incarnation was not a conversion of His Person into something else, but was His submission in the nature which He assumed to the conditions and experiences of our race. He therefore remained very God while on earth, and His human experiences and sufferings were the experiences and sufferings of very God as touching His own flesh.

II. *Reasons for Belief*

§ 5. It was not through observation of His Godhead, however, or of its functioning, that the apostles came to believe that Jesus Christ was divine. Neither the divine essence nor Christ's divine operations — these being infinite in mode — could come within their contemplation. They could see only what was human, and, as has been shown in a previous chapter, the self-manifestation of the Lord was given wholly in terms of human action, conversation and experience. It was the perfect manner in which Jesus lived His human life, the spiritual wisdom that He displayed, the claims that He made, and their perfectly sane naturalness, that converted His miracles into signs which needed only His victory over death to assure them that their friend and master was their Lord and God.[1]

[1] Cf. ch. ii. § 2, above.

The manner of the Man, entirely true to human conditions though it was, revealed perfections which cannot be explained on exclusively human grounds. There was His sinlessness, a phenomenon never before or since observed in human life. It is true that a universal negative cannot be demonstrated, and the claim that He wholly avoided even the most venial fault does not admit of formal proof. But such proof is not necessary in His case. What men saw of Him convinced those who had spiritual capacity and readiness to give fair judgment that His utter lack of sense of sin was due to its entire absence from His life.

But even more convincing than His sinlessness was the amazing splendour and harmony of the positive graces and virtues which were combined in His character. The most opposite virtues were united in perfect proportions, without the slightest unnaturalness betraying itself in His conduct and conversation. Humility, filial obedience and loving sympathy were combined with majestic self-assertion, absolute authority and judicial sternness, in a manner which would be impossible and self-contradictory in any purely human saint, but which revealed no discord and no trace of unreality in Him.[1]

[1] H. L. Goudge, *The Moral Perfection of our Lord* (Modern Oxford Tracts); C. H. Robinson, *Studies in the Character of Christ*, chh. i–ii; Émile Bougaud, *Divinity of Christ*, ch. iv; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 9–12, 35–38; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, Bk. II. Pt. I. ch. iii.

§ 6. It was such an one who is described as making a series of claims which would have been to the last degree sacrilegious if they were false, but which in no wise reduce the impression of spiritual perfection that the Gospel protrayal of Him has always made upon unprejudiced readers. These claims emerge most clearly in the fourth Gospel, but are sufficiently apparent in the synoptic Gospels.

It is certainly not characteristic of a merely human saint to claim freedom from sin, and to offer himself without reserve as an example for all to follow,[1] as Jesus did. Nor may a creature rightly claim from others a deeper love and a more exclusive allegiance than they owe to father and mother and to their nearest kindred.[2] Not even a prophet, unless he be more, is entitled to describe himself as the Way, the Truth and the Life, and as present wherever two or three gather together in his name.[3] To judge all men at the last day is certainly a divine prerogative,[4] and only His possession of inherent divine authority could justify Christ in displacing Old Testament requirements with a mere, "But I say unto you."[5] He declared Himself to be greater than Jonas and greater than Solomon, greater than the Temple of God.[6]

Such claims inevitably raised in His listeners'

[1] St. John viii. 46; St. Matt. xi. 29. [2] St. Matt. x. 37–38.
[3] St. John xiv. 6; St. Matt. xviii. 19–20.
[4] St. Matt. xvi. 27; xxv. 31 *et seq.* [5] St. Matt. v. 27–28.
[6] St. Matt. xii. 41–42; St. Luke xi. 31–32; St. Matt. xii. 6.

minds the question as to His personal rank in being, and He was understood to make Himself equal with God.[1] He did not indeed say in bald terms, "I am God," for this would have conveyed a meaning inconsistent with divine unity.[2] He therefore described Himself in terms of His relation to the Father, as the Son, employing these terms in connections which distinguish His sonship sharply from any in which His listeners could have share. Thus He frequently said "My Father" and "your Father," [3] but never "our Father" except when dictating a prayer to be used by others than Himself.[4] In the parable of the wicked husbandmen, given by all the synoptic Gospels,[5] Christ clearly separates Himself as beloved Son from the servants of God. He declared Himself, indeed, to be one with the Father,[6] and was rightly understood to be making Himself God — one who is in the Father and the Father in Him.[7] So close was the identity with God of which He was conscious that He could say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father," [8] although the context shows that He is not claiming to be the same Person with the Father.[9] He taught that men were to

[1] St. John v. 18.

[2] Cf. *The Trinity*, pp. 139–140. This has already been pointed out in ch. ii. § 3, above.

[3] In St. John xx. 17 the two phrases occur together.

[4] As in St. Matt. vi. 9. Cf. St. Luke xi. 2.

[5] St. Matt. xxi. 33–44; St. Mark xii. 1–12; St. Luke xx. 9–18.

[6] St. John x. 30. [7] St. John x. 31–38.

[8] St. John xiv. 9. [9] Cf. verse 10.

honour the Son even as they honoured the Father;[1] and that no one could come to the Father except by Him.[2] He claimed a unique knowledge of the Father, likening it to the knowledge which the Father had of Him,[3] and claiming to be the only revealer of the Father to men.[4] Such relations to the Father obviously pertain to an eternal sphere of being, and Christ did not hesitate to say, "Before Abraham was, I am."[5] "All things whatsoever the Father hath," He said, "are Mine."[6] And among the possessions of the Father which He claimed to have received was to have "life in Himself."[7] The only sense, in fact, in which He ranked Himself as inferior to the Father — that is, apart from His submission to the limitations of the nature which He assumed — was this: that what He was He was *as Son*, and derivatively from the Father.[8]

§ 7. Our Lord's miracles derived the evidential value which was perceived in them by His followers from the circumstances and connections under which they were performed, from their lofty spiritual quality and significance, and from the perfection of their worker. There have been such things as lying wonders, but those who came to know Jesus Christ intimately could not thus estimate His works. In the light of a unique but obvious harmony in

[1] St. John v. 23. [2] St. John xiv. 6. [3] St. John x. 14.
[4] St. Matt. xi. 27. Cf. St. Luke x. 22.
[5] St. John viii. 56–58. [6] St. John xvi. 15.
[7] St. John v. 26. [8] Cf. ch. ii. §§ 2–3, above.

His case between perfection of character and divine self-assertion, and in that of His avowed mission, and of His manner of working, they discovered a congruity between what He asserted Himself to be and His miracles which justified His appeal to them as signs and evidences of the validity of His claims,[1] and of His right to be heard and believed as the Way, the Truth and the Life.

Many attempts have been made to reduce the Gospel miracles to the natural level; and, as we have seen in a previous chapter, the position has been taken that a supernatural event — an event which can never be explained by the factors and forces resident in the existing order of nature — is incredible because unrelated to history at large and constituting a breach of continuity. The philosophical postulate of naturalism alone can justify such dogmatism, and the Christian view of history enables us to perceive a rational place in the continuity of all things for the miraculous birth, the works and the resurrection in flesh of Jesus Christ. It does more than this, for it enables us to perceive that these events are the most significant, and therefore the most credible, of all history — the most helpful in explaining its otherwise stultifying enigmas. And it is this illuminating value of the supernatural elements in the Gospel narratives which completes for us their evidential value, con-

[1] Clear instances of such appeal occur in St. Matt. xi. 3–5; St. Mark ii. 9–12; St. John v. 36; x. 37–38; xi. 4, 42.

sidered as signs of the coming of very God into human history.[1]

These narratives plainly declare that Jesus Christ was not holden of death, but that at a definite moment He resumed "flesh and bones" [2] and, after appearing in them during forty days to chosen witnesses, visibly ascended in flesh into the clouds of heaven, no more to be seen of them until His predicted coming at the end of the world to judge mankind. The subject of the resurrection and of the problems connected with it will have to be considered in our next volume. But that He did rise in flesh from the dead, as distinguished from living on in an invisible sphere as disembodied spirit, is the testimony for the truth of which the apostles faced martyrdom. And their belief in its truth became the mainspring of their courage and of their notable triumph over carnal limitations. The resurrection verified itself to them, as it has also done to multitudes in subsequent ages, by their experience of its spiritual effects upon themselves; and it became an illuminating fact, in the light of which both they and their spiritual successors to the present time have become finally assured that Jesus Christ is Lord and God.

§ 8. This spiritual effect of belief in the apostolic

[1] Cf. ch. i. § 3, above (where refs. on Naturalism are given), and ch. x. §§ 7, 11 (*c*), below.

[2] St. Luke xxiv. 39. Not flesh in its previous state, but obviously exhibited as being the same that hung on the Cross.

witness to Christ, and to the truth of His divine claim, constitutes the crowning evidence to individual believers that He is indeed very God, the only begotten Son of God, co-eternal and co-equal with the Father. This evidence appeals to men in general only in an indirect way, through their observation of the effect of belief upon the lives of those who sincerely strive to govern their conduct by their faith. Accordingly, the inconsistencies of the lives of multitudes of professing Christians constitute formidable hindrances to the success of Christian preaching.

But these difficulties fall away in the case of those who sincerely adopt the belief in Christ as Lord and God for their working hypothesis, and put it to the test of earnest application to their daily conduct and spiritual culture. By living the life they come to know the doctrine, that it is true, and the mists of doubt disappear before the joyous sunlight of assured conviction.

This process of personal verification has scientific validity. Truth is objective, and is more than its value for us; but the working value of a truth is undoubtedly a scientific and convincing test of its validity. The experience of Christ in us "the hope of glory"[1] affords evidence of this kind, against which no manner of critical attack can avail. And it enables us to discover in the Gospel narratives verisimilitudes of truth which forever escape the

[1] Col. i. 27.

notice of those who, in the supposed interests of freedom from bias, disqualify themselves to perceive the coherent and spiritual clarity of the self-manifestation of the eternal Word-made-flesh.[1]

III. *Implicates and Values*

§ 9. The implicates and values of the doctrine that Jesus Christ was and is truly divine — the eternal Son of God — may be summarized under four heads: viz. theological, mediatorial, ethical and dispensational.

Under the theological head we notice, in the first place, that inasmuch as Christ revealed Himself as other in person than God the Father, His being truly divine implies a plurality of persons, αὐτοί, in God. And this revelation was completed by the promise of the Holy Spirit, who is distinguished by Christ from both the Father and Himself, without being given an inferior or creaturely rank. In brief, the doctrine of the Trinity is implied in, and depends upon, the truth that Jesus Christ is very God; and this doctrine determines our idea of God in its most radical and significant aspects.

Those who misapprehend the meaning of trinitarian terms declare them to be tritheistic, and tendencies of a tritheistic nature sometimes infect

[1] H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 127–152; Émile Bougaud, *Divinity of Christ*, chh. ix–x; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 408–412.

the minds of unthinking Christians. But the general effect of trinitarian doctrine has been to fortify monotheism, and to give it a moral value and self-propagating power which no form of unitarian theism has been able to display. In our own age it is proving to be a solvent of the difficulties which are thought to invalidate the conception of divine personality;[1] and is fortifying thoughtful minds against pantheistic tendencies, tendencies against which unitarianism is making no effectual resistance.

But belief in the Godhead of Jesus Christ is also effective in protecting the idea of God against the opposite error of deism, without in the slightest degree imperiling the truth of divine transcendence. Such a God as is revealed in Christ is one who cannot be isolated from His universe. He both can enter and has entered into human history, and in His only begotten Son, the eternal Word who became Man, all things consist.[2]

The immanent God in Jesus Christ is also transcendent, infinitely exalted in His eternal nature above humanity. But the very fact that He who has taken our nature upon Himself is very God, displays the value and dignity of the nature thus assumed. An affinity between the divine and human is made apparent, which the unalterable difference

[1] *The Trinity*, ch. ix. § 6 (cf. chh. vi. 11 and vii. 2); W. J. S. Simpson, *Christ. Doctr. of God*, Lec. iv.

[2] Col. i. 17. On the relation of Christ's Godhead to deism and pantheism, see H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 452–459.

between the infinite and the finite, between the Creator and the creature, does not destroy. Godhead and manhood can be made to have one centre and self, without alteration of the laws which determine the respective operations of the one and of the other, and without any mutual infringement. A nature which can thus become the property of very God ennobles all who share in it, and the honour to which it is raised in Jesus Christ vindicates the inspiring doctrine that man is made for God — for divine communion and fellowship.[1]

§ 10. Upon the truth that Jesus Christ was, and never ceased to be, full God depends the reality and value of His mediation between God and man. Only one who shares equally in the nature of both can "lay His hands on both," and truly represent each to the other. A God-man alone can be the daysman for whose sympathetic intervention Job prayed.[2] Even on the human side, if Christ had been no more than a man, however unique in His sinless perfection, He would have been simply one among many individuals, and His very uniqueness would have tended to isolate Him from His race. The fact, that while sharing to the full in our nature and its conditions, sin excepted, and while experiencing our natural limitations, His Person or Self, being divine, transcended the limitations of human selfhood, this fact it is that imparts to what He experienced and did as man the fullest representa-

[1] H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 459–461. [2] Job ix. 33.

tive value for mankind. Just because His Manhood is the Manhood of a divine Person, the barriers of human individuality do not isolate it, and it can be imparted to us so as to become the means by which we can make our own all that He has done and suffered for us.[1]

The mediatorial functions of Christ are those of prophet, priest and king; and His being divine is an essential and significant factor in each of these offices. The teaching of a purely human prophet is limited in authoritative range and finality by the purpose and degree of the inspiration which he enjoys, because his mind is not only human itself, but is the mind of a person who enjoys no other security of judgment than his human mind and necessarily limited inspiration afford to him. Our Lord had a really human mind, one that was subject to human limitations, but it's being not less really the mind of very God must have had this effect, that it never could have been permitted through its limitations to become the cause of erroneous teaching on His part. We do not have to determine and define the manner in which divine infallibility protected Christ in His prophetic office to be assured that the divine Revealer could not become a teacher of error under any mental conditions to which His loving purpose moved Him to submit. A human mind, when left to its own resources is liable to err, and is not wholly exempted

[1] H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 480–487.

from this liability by extrinsic inspiration. But the human mind of Christ was not left to itself, and its inspiration was from within His Person. It was God who was thinking humanly in Christ, and this fact makes the formal expressions of His thinking, i.e. His teaching, the immediate and direct teaching of God — the infallibility and finality of which no believer in the Godhead of Jesus Christ can consistently doubt. From the known teaching of a divine Christ there can be no appeal, whereas all other teaching, however highly inspired, must be tested by its harmony with His words.

The functions of a priest are twofold: viz. to offer sacrifice to God in men's behalf and to bestow gifts of grace from God upon men. Both of these functions require a divine priest to make them really effectual. Human priesthoods are either symbolical only or, if effective, are derivative. That is, they presuppose that a divine priest has enabled human agents to participate ministerially in an office to which He alone can give validity in the divine sphere. And this is true independently of the fact of sin and of the need of redemption. In no case can a mere creature fulfil the functions of mediator between God and man. Priesthood and mediation go together, and mediation between God and man requires full participation by the Mediator in the nature of both. His being full God is as essential as His being really human.

It is especially obvious when we reckon with

human sin and with its consequences, that priesthood must include, and be consecrated by, redemptive death and victory over death. Even if a sinless man could have been found to die for others, his death could not have had adequate value for the redemption of the race, nor could such a redeemer have vanquished death and have become the source of immortality to the redeemed. It is vital to this argument that Christ should have been full God while redeeming the world, that is, in His humiliation.[1]

Finally, it is the Godhead of Christ which enables Him to be the messianic King to whom Old Testament prophecy pointed. The Kingdom of God necessarily has God for its Sovereign; and not even in a derivative sense can a mere creature be given, and appropriate to himself, the status and functions which pertain to the mediatorial reign and judicial authority which the Father has committed to Jesus Christ. To be given "all authority in heaven and earth" [2] can never be the privilege of one who is not properly entitled to occupy the very throne of God. The Christian dispensation exalts human nature in the Person of Christ to that throne; but only because He wears it, and has won the highest place for it by carrying it through obedient suffering,

[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xlvi. 12; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 213–214; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, pp. 156–166; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, nn. 6, 30.

[2] St. Matt. xxviii. 18.

death and resurrection from the dead. By virtue of the Incarnation Christ has gained a human Name at which every knee should bend;[1] but the honour which it receives would be idolatrous, if the Person whom it signifies were other than very God.

§ 11. The ethical value which the Godhead of Jesus Christ imparts to His Incarnation, to His human victory over temptation, to His humiliation at large and to His meritorious death is great beyond computing. This is not always realized, and many moderns have thought to enhance the ethical power of our Lord's example by driving the thought of His Godhead into the background. Some have meant to serve ethical interests by denying that the tempted Saviour had higher than human resources within His Person for the struggle. Such a line of thought is fatal to the very interests which it is supposed to serve. All experience shows that human beings are incapable, even with the advantages of the Christian dispensation, of living a sinless life from childhood up. With the single exception of Jesus Christ, human sinlessness has invariably been the goal of long practice in the use of divine grace; and if we are to believe that He possessed in Himself no higher resources than we receive by grace from without, we must find it well nigh impossible to believe that He never sinned. The sinlessness of one who depends upon extraneous supplies of grace for power to resist temptation must afford a doubt-

[1] Phil. ii. 9–10.

suggesting puzzle rather than a convincing drama of divinely afforded example.

Moreover the assumption that Christ must have been on equal terms with us in His moral struggle requires us to ascribe to Him the disadvantage to which men in general are subject, of having to contend with sinful passions within. Our progress is invariably from a sinful starting point, and in order to place Christ on equal terms with ourselves we must suppose that the eternal Son became sinful man. In other words, whatever He subsequently became, He was not, in the inception of His moral struggle, the pattern Child that Christians believe Him to have been. It seems needless to emphasize the ethical preciousness of the conviction that, for each stage of human growth from babyhood to mature age, Jesus Christ affords an example of flawless human character and conduct appropriate to that stage.

But the notion that our Lord's possession of divine impeccability reduces the ethical value of His example is based upon an erroneous conception of the place and meaning of that example. Christ did not come in order to exemplify what His disciples can achieve in this world. If this was His purpose it was not fulfilled, for no Christian disciple has been able to repeat the sinless perfection of His life. The necessity of repentance which attends our struggle upwards clearly differentiates what was possible for Him from what is possible for us. The pattern

which He exhibited is that of the heavenly man into which we are required to grow. He reveals the goal rather than the process by which sinful men are enabled to reach that goal. If we are to find examples of the moral and spiritual progress which is ours to pursue we must look not to Christ but to His saints — to men who, like ourselves, began as sinners, and advanced to sainthood and union with God along the purgative way of repentance and penitential self-discipline.

The example of Christ was given in terms of human resistance to temptation, but unless it was God Himself who came within the range of human temptation, thus revealing how such an one as He bears Himself under human conditions, a needed ethical bond between God and ourselves is wanting. We are made for communion and fellowship with God, and the only possible basis of common pleasure in such fellowship is mutual congeniality of character — ethical affinity. The ultimate example for men is God, because there is no other road to the joy in God with which we are intended to be blessed except that of growth in divine perfection — that is, the copy thereof which can be exhibited in human nature. Christ came to display such a copy by revealing His divine righteousness in the terms of successful battle with human temptations. If it was not the all-righteous God who won that battle, God did not really make the ethical manifestation of Himself which we need for our ultimate guidance.

The well-worn objection that if Christ was impeccable He was not really tempted, will be more fully reckoned with in a later chapter.[1] Only a brief statement can be given at this point. The objection rests upon confusion of thought. Temptation is moral testing, and affords to natural and blameless human impulses occasions for gratification of which it is not lawful under the given circumstances to take advantage. Whether the person tempted will yield or not depends upon deeper factors than the temptation, and if among these factors is a divine and therefore impeccable Self, the reality of the temptation or testing is not destroyed. Where human nature is concerned, as it was in Christ, we know that temptations offer inducements which cannot be resisted without effort. We also know that the moral effort in Christ's case was the greatest ever made by our nature. It cost Him the extremest agony of which our nature is capable. But the question at issue is, Could very God, wearing our nature, have failed to make the effort and to bear the agony involved in resisting the temptations that assailed His Manhood? To say that He could not does not reduce the mightiness of the struggle which His moral inflexibility brought on Him, nor does it nullify the reality of the moral test to which He became subject.

[1] See ch. ix. §§ 6–8. The whole chapter bears on this section, and further references are there given. Cf. also *The Kenotic Theory*, chh. v–vi.

The drama of the Incarnation owes its value to the fact that it exhibits God submitting to the laws and conditions which He imposes upon us, and revealing Himself ethically in the manner of His submitting to them. Every consideration that reduces the truth that God continued to be unalterably righteous in thus condescending reduces the ethical significance of the drama. He willed to be touched with the *feeling* of our infirmities, and this has given us a sympathetic Intercessor and Judge.[1] But if He had willed to be *reduced* to moral infirmity, He would have belied His claim to manifest the Eternal. It is His being God that gives infinite meritorious value to His obedience; and it is this self-same mystery which makes His example effective. A unique saint, if he were really human in his sanctity, might be wondered at, but his uniqueness would punctuate our natural weakness rather than enable us to grow like him. Being very God, and carrying our nature victoriously through all its perils, including death itself, our Lord has constituted His Manhood to be the source of power whereby we can grow after His likeness. In short, the power whereby He was impeccable *ab initio* has been placed within our reach, so that, when we have learned by self-discipline to use it, we can ultimately attain to the impeccability of established righteousness.

§ 12. It is the Godhead of Jesus Christ which gives to the Christian dispensation and to its sacramental

[1] Heb. iv. 15. Cf. St. Matt. viii. 17.

institutions the divine value and ever-prevailing power which they have historically displayed. Unless the great Head of the Church were God as well as Man, to call it the Body of Christ would be to use a purely figurative phrase and to transfer its allegiance from God to a creature. But just because He is divine, He is able by His Holy Spirit to bring men into organic relations with His Manhood in glory, whereby they become His mystical Body. By baptismal entrance into this Body, the Church of Christ, they become participators in His resurrection life and sharers in all the graces which flow forth from His Body. The sacraments of the Church are charged with the grace which they signify because they renew, in a manner suited to our composite nature and earthly conditions, the flow of grace into humanity which was initiated when God took our nature upon Himself.[1]

This can be illustrated most effectively by the Holy Eucharist. In this sacrament we feed in a spiritual mystery on the flesh and blood of Christ; and because Christ is God we feed on the bread of God, which by virtue of its being this is the food of immortality.[2] In the same sacrament we approach the heavenly throne through the veil of Christ's flesh and by the pleading power of His blood;[3] and since Christ is God, in approaching through this veil we truly gain access to God. Moreover, the

[1] H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 487–493.
[2] St. John vi. 32–58. [3] Heb. x. 19–20.

divided symbols of bread and wine which we offer, and whereby we proclaim the Lord's death till He come,[1] are made by His Spirit to be more than symbols. They become means of an effective participation in offering the prevailing sacrifice of Christ's Body and Blood which He made on the Cross and evermore exhibits above. The effectiveness of the mystery, and it is the primary function of our religion, hinges on the truth that the power of Jesus Christ which is postulated and taken advantage of therein is the power of God.[2]

[1] 1 Cor. xi. 26.

[2] The eucharistic mystery will be considered in Vol. VIII.

CHAPTER V

THE MANHOOD OF CHRIST

I. *Catholic Doctrine*

§ 1. That the Christ of apostolic experience was really human is not in our age seriously disputed.[1] Nor is there any likelihood of this truth suffering obscuration in the near future. It is more and more realized that if Christ had revealed Himself in other than human terms, He would not have been an intelligible Christ. The medium of Christ's self-manifestation was a life, a conversation, and a series of deeds and sufferings, which are proper to the sons of men. Moreover, neither the Gospel narratives nor any apparent possibilities justify belief that our Lord's subjection to human conditions was at any moment interrupted and displaced by methods of functioning proper to the Godhead. Whatever may be said as to His possession while on earth of the fulness of divine attributes and functions, these attributes and functions neither did nor could come within

[1] On our Lord's Manhood, see Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, chh. i–iv, xv; D. Stone, *Outlines*, etc., pp. 67–73, 292–293; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. iv–v; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ*, Bk. III. ch. vi; C. F. Nolloth, *Person of our Lord*, ch. xiii.

human observation and obtrude themselves in manners inconsistent with a genuinely human life.[1] Our knowledge of His divine properties is based upon inferences from his human conversation and life, as interpreted by the spiritually guided understandings of His chosen disciples and witnesses. Even His miracles were humanly wrought, not less so because the circumstances and the unique manner of their performance constrain us to regard them as confirmations of His claims, and as evidences that His personal resources were greater than could be openly exhibited to human observation.

In other ages tendencies have appeared within the Church to neglect the human side of Christ, and these tendencies have reached the climax of denial that Christ was really and fully human. Before the close of the first century docetism denied the reality of His flesh and of His physical sufferings, and in the fourth century Apollinaris denied His possession of a rational human soul.[2] In later ages a widespread tendency appeared to evade the evidences contained in the Gospel narratives that, as St. Cyril of Alexandria declared, the eternal Son suffered "the measures of our manhood to prevail in His own case." That is, that He really submitted as touching the Manhood to the limitations of human nature, condescending in that nature to increase both in wisdom and stature, and to share in human ignorance. Even

[1] Cf. chh. vi. 2–3, 6, 10–12; vii. 5; viii. 1–3.

[2] See ch. ii. § 6, above.

now, theologians can be found who fail to do justice to the self-abandon with which the Son of God accepted the natural consequences of taking the form of a servant and being made in the likeness of men.[1]

But these tendencies and errors, so far from having ecumenical sanction, are hopelessly inconsistent with any full, intelligent and sincere acceptance of catholic dogma. When the ancient Church declared in creedal terms that the Son of God "was incarnate . . . . and was made man," she used language to which full justice cannot be done by those who cherish either of the errors described above. The decree of faith of Chalcedon [2] places the same emphasis upon our Lord's being human as upon His being divine, declaring Him to be "perfect in Manhood, very God and very Man, the same consisting of a reasonable soul and a body . . . . of one substance with us as touching the Manhood, like us in all things, except sin . . . . the distinction of natures being in no wise done away because of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved, and concurring into one Person," etc. Obviously "the characteristic property" of our nature could not have been "preserved" in Him, if His human mind escaped the necessary limitations of human experience and knowledge. It is to be maintained, therefore, that the tendency to disregard

[1] Ch. ii. § 9, above.
[2] Ch. ii. § 8, above.

and to deny our Lord's human limitations, in the interests of His divine Person and Godhead, obtains no support from the terms of Chalcedonian dogma.

§ 2. In two significant respects, however, our Lord's Manhood, according to catholic doctrine, is unique. It never had a personal ego other than that of the eternal Son of God, and it was sinless.

With reference to the first of these pecularities it is often said, and with misleading effect, that the human nature of Christ was impersonal. Such a description, taken without the explanations which catholic theology adds, is equivalent to a denial of its reality. Rational functioning, such as characterizes human nature, is personal functioning, but unless it can be ascribed to a person, it is neither rational nor human. That this is so is too obvious to require argument. Human functioning is also moral or responsible functioning, and this plainly implies that it must pertain to a responsible — that is, a personal — ego. If, therefore, our Lord assumed a real Manhood, one which was capable of normal human functioning, that Manhood must have been personal. Its functions must have been those of a real self, the self of Christ's human nature, action and experience.[1]

The impersonality, *ἀνυποστασία*, ascribed to the Manhood of Christ by catholic writers had reference

[1] On the distinct reality of self, see ch. iv. § 2, above. Essential as self is to the existence of a personal nature, it is not a part of the nature which thus depends upon it. Cf. ch. ii. § 8 *fin.*

to that Manhood considered apart from the divine Person who assumed it, and gave it being by assuming it. It is truly personal, but its personality is that of the Eternal Word — not a separate ego, other than His. Its personality — and, as has been acknowledged, its existence depends upon its being personal — is explained by its relation to Him who created it, and made it His own in creating it. The Manhood of Christ never had any other personal subject or self than God the Son;[1] and this interior relation of the Manhood to the second Person of the Godhead is called *ἐνυποστασία*. The two terms *ἀνυποστασία* and *ἐνυποστασία* require to be taken together, if we would avoid misunderstanding their application.

Three reasons require us to maintain the mystery which these terms signify. If there had been a human self in Christ, other than His eternal and divine self, it would be impossible rightly to ascribe the human life and death of Jesus Christ to the eternal Son. All His human actions, teachings and sufferings would have been those of a mere man — exclusively so, — and all the hopes which are based upon the conviction that God Himself has submitted to our conditions, has felt our temptations and has borne our sorrows would be invalid.

[1] As quoted by C. J. Hefele, St. Cyril, Alex., says, *Letter to Acacius*, "The one and unique principle or subject or ego in the God-man is the Logos. He is also the bearer of the human in Christ."

In the second place, the representative value of the Manhood of Christ, whether as Example or as Mediator, depends upon its transcending the limitations of human individuality, which it apparently could not have done if the self by which it was controlled had been human. It is unnecessary in this connection to discuss the profound question of the interpenetrability of human persons. It is enough to say, what all experience confirms, that no human individual is capable, even if sinless, of attaining, or of being given, the status of catholic example and redemptive sufferer in behalf of mankind. The representative powers of human individuals are too limited in relation to the race as a whole, and their capacities of spiritual endowment are too limited in relation to God, to make it possible for a human person to be acknowledged as divine vicegerent in redeeming mankind.

The third reason which requires us to derive the personality of Christ's Manhood from that of the eternal Son is that the personal unity of Christ cannot successfully be maintained if it be granted that He possessed more than one self or ego. It is clear that if He had assumed a human ego, there would have resulted a duality of selves in Him, and there would have been no proper union of Godhead and Manhood, but only an external association, *συνάφεια*, such as Nestorianism was condemned for maintaining. God would at most have dwelt in a man.[1]

[1] Cf. ch. ii. § 7, above.

That God assumed our nature so as to make it properly speaking His own could not be maintained. The doctrine of the Incarnation would be nullified.[1]

§ 3. Various reasons compel us to maintain that the Manhood of Christ was entirely free from sin, both actual and original.[2] It is of course impossible to demonstrate in a direct way the universal negative that Christ never sinned, but we do not need such demonstration. That He exhibited a positive perfection of moral and spiritual character which is absolutely unique cannot be gainsaid by those who read the Gospels without prejudice. Such an one as Jesus Christ could not have failed to detect sin in Himself, if it had existed, and His sincere truthfulness is beyond question. It is convincingly significant, therefore, that He claimed to be sinless,[3] and that this claim did not introduce a disturbing element into His spiritual self-manifestation.

The character which makes such a claim seem natural rather than culpably presumptuous on His

[1] On the impersonality, *sic*, of our Lord's Manhood, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, p. 294; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 26; R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II. pp. 123–125, 139, 269; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. ii. 1; iv. 2–6. Patristic: St. Leo, *Ep.* xxv. 3; Leontius, *adv. Nest. et Eutych.*, lib. I (Migne, *P. G.*, 1277 ff.); St. John Damasc., *Orth. Fid.*, iii. 3.

[2] On our Lord's sinlessness, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxi. 7; xxxiv. 1; H. R. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 400–404; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 190–191; and *Thirty-Nine Arts.*, pp. 216–223; Jas. Stalker, in Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Sinlessness"; H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 165–168.

[3] St. John viii. 46.

part transcends apostolic invention. It is undeniably real, and not less undeniably superhuman; and Christ's own claim to be superhuman — to be one with God — must be accepted in order to justify our belief in His righteousness. As has elsewhere been shown, He was God or He was not good.[1] His being God not only explains the sinlessness of His Manhood and human life, but requires it. God cannot sin, and this means that He cannot incur real liability to sin. Peccability and Godhead, from the nature of things, cannot be truly ascribed to one and the same person. This does not mean that the power and freedom of God are externally limited, but that both are perfect in Him, and that spiritual perfection is impregnable to every assault of evil.

This impeccability of Christ is entirely consistent with His being truly human. Sinfulness is not of the essence of human nature, but is an imperfection which He came to remedy. Even the capacity to sin — peccability — pertains to men only as a condition of growth, as something ultimately to be outgrown. The perfect man that each of us is intended to become will not be liable to sin — not because he has ceased to be human, nor because his freedom is curtailed, but because the growth of real freedom is itself the growth of a perfection of spiritual character which cannot be either deceived or overcome by any form of evil. Christ came to exhibit in each stage

[1] In ch. ii. 3.

of our earthly experience the perfection which by His grace we can hereafter attain. He could not do this and at the same time be subject to the peccability of our undeveloped manhood. He had to assume a perfect manhood — a manhood filled with grace from Himself, and thus enabled successfully to bear the fearful strain and suffering which His resistance to human temptation was to bring upon it.

The relation of our Lord's impeccability to the reality of His temptation, and of His truly human victory over it, can best be considered at a later stage,[1] and we content ourselves at this point with the remark that the personal impossibility that Christ should yield to temptation does not forbid the belief that His success had to be won by efforts and sufferings which put His Manhood to the very fullest proof. He was not less truly touched with the feeling of our infirmities because sinful indulgence of them was foreign to His perfection. There was indeed a sense in which He was *made* perfect by suffering, but this perfection was an actualization in terms of human conflict with evil of a perfection which was not only potential but indefectible from its most incipient stage of development.

The necessity that Christ should be morally impregnable ought to be apparent to those who seriously consider His Person and mission. To believe that very God could sin under any conceivable conditions to which He willed to submit we have seen to

[1] See ch. viii. §§ 5–6, where refs. are given.

be abhorrent to Christian instinct. Furthermore, Christ came to set a perfect example, to overthrow the powers of evil, and to offer Himself a spotless sacrifice in behalf of mankind. The notion that such a mission, undertaken by such a Person, could have been to any degree liable to failure through the Saviour's own transgression cannot be seriously entertained.

§ 4. The purpose of the Incarnation is a permanent one, and the truth that our Lord neither has abandoned nor ever will abandon the nature which He assumed in the womb of the Virgin is a vital article of the Christian faith. The Manhood of Christ, not less truly than His Godhead, is essential to His equipment as Mediator between God and man, and the need of mediation does not expire with the achievement of redemption. We shall always need a great High Priest in the heavenly Holy Place who can "be touched with the feeling of our infirmities," and who can "save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through Him, seeing He ever liveth to make intercession for them." [1] Endless continuance is a vital mark of Christ's heavenly priesthood as described in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, and our everlasting life has been made to depend for its continuance, as well as for its acquisition, upon abiding relations to the Manhood of Christ and to His flesh and blood.

Sin reveals itself in us in the form of insubordina-

[1] Heb. iv. 15; vii. 25.

tion of the flesh to the spirit, and the universal prevalence of this discord explains the inveterate tendency — a tendency found in much theological literature — to assume that in final analysis flesh is essentially anti-spiritual, a burden imposed for temporary and probationary reasons, but suitable neither for the self-expression of spirit nor for its permanent abode. It is this assumption which chiefly explains certain very troublesome vagaries: — for example, (*a*) the influence of Manichæism in ancient and mediæval times; (*b*) the continued vigour of protestant repudiation of sacramental doctrine and of many externals of the catholic system; and (*c*) modern recoils from the ancient doctrine concerning the resurrection of the flesh, of Christ's flesh on "the third day," and of our own bodies when He shall come again. The doctrine that our Lord rose again from the grave on the third day has been, indeed, too plainly the mainspring of Christian belief and hope to be repudiated definitely by those who profess to accept historical Christianity. But inability to perceive how matter can be useful in the spirit-world has caused certain modern theologians to interpret our Lord's resurrection in a manner which reduces it to an exhibition of appearances, misunderstood by those who saw them, but really intended to prove to the disciples that their Master lived on in the spirit-world.[1] In brief, we are asked to surrender the notion that Christ now

[1] Keim's "telegram from heaven" theory, which appears to be reasserted by H. B. Streeter, in *Foundations*, pp. 127 *et seq.*

possesses the body which He took of the Blessed Virgin and in which He suffered for us, a notion which is declared to be hopelessly unspiritual.

A proper discussion of the nature and evidence of the resurrection belongs to our next volume. We are now concerned with the broad proposition that the material part of the nature which the Son of God assumed in the Incarnation was no temporary equipment for temptation, suffering and death, but was to become a permanent vehicle of quickening and saving grace. Christ made it to be this by subjecting it in temptation to His spirit, by carrying it successfully through death, by mysterious changes in the resurrection, whereby it was emancipated from certain earthly limitations, by enthroning it at the centre of things in the heavens, and by mystically extending it, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, so that it might become the quickening bond of union between Himself and His redeemed.[1]

No creature of God can be essentially anti-spiritual; and if our bodies seem to be so, this is partly because they have not reached their full development as instruments of our spirits, and partly because our spirits themselves are not fullgrown. Being enmeshed in sin, they misuse the flesh. The flesh is the sphere within which the human spirit manifests itself. Such is human nature. Accord-

[1] Cf. ch. ix. § 8, below; W. Milligan, *Ascension*, Lec. iv; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, pp. 63–65.

ingly if the flesh appears sinful, its sinfulness is a true manifestation of our spirit.

Matter was made for spirit, and has no meaning except as spirit employs it.[1] And it is a suitable instrument of spirit. Through its manipulation God makes Himself known to us, and we have no other means whereby to manifest ourselves, or even to develop ourselves, apart from the use of matter. The capacities of matter are greater than we can verify, for our spirits have not yet attained to their destined mastery, and our bodies have not been glorified. But the recent breakdown of accepted ideas as to the intractable solidity of matter should suggest caution in negative dogmatizing as to what a glorified spirit can do with it. The sum of our argument is that a living man is constituted by the union of matter and spirit, so that their disunion constitutes his death. The only mode of human self-development and self-manifestation which man has ever experienced is conditioned by this union, and by the use of the body. There is no particle of evidence that human nature either will or can enter into the fulness of its development except as thus constituted and conditioned.

Jesus Christ to-day shares in human nature — the nature which we possess, — and for this reason exhibits the goal of our development, being the Head of the Church, which is His mystical Body. We sacramentally feed on His flesh and blood, His

[1] Cf. J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, ch. i.

flesh being at once the food of immortality and the veil through which we enter the Holy Place, and His blood being an ever-flowing stream of cleansing, as well as a perpetual witness above of His meritorious death for us.[1]

II. *Its Properties*

§ 5. It has been seen that the human nature which our Lord assumed was in all generic respects like ours, but that it was the Manhood of a divine Person, having no other ego than His, and that it was free from sin. In brief it was at once really human, and absolutely unique in perfection and grace.

Being truly human, Christ possessed every part of our nature, including a real body. "The Word became flesh." [2] Moreover the flesh which He took was neither an unreal exhibition, as the ancient docetists imagined, nor exempt from the normal limitations of our physical nature. For example, it was not incorruptible, as certain writers of the sixth century maintained,[3] and the fact that it did

[1] On the permanence of our Lord's Manhood, see *Ch. Quarterly Review*, July, 1897, pp. 353–355 (where useful patristic refs. are given); D. Stone, *Outlines*, pp. 84–85. Both the mediæval and later Roman neglect of our Lord's heavenly priesthood and the Lutheran idea of the deification of our Lord's Manhood have helped to drive this truth into the background. [2] St. John i. 14.

[3] Julian of Halicarnassus was their leader. They were called aphthartodocetæ. The emperor Justinian undertook to enforce Julian's view, but his death cut short his purpose.

not actually see corruption is to be explained by an exercise of power by Him who assumed it. If that power had not been exercised, the withdrawal of its animating spirit on the Cross would have been followed by the corruption to which the human frame is naturally liable.

That the body of Christ was protected from the attacks of disease we can readily believe, but that it was naturally exempt from the influences which cause human sickness, we have neither scriptural nor other warrant for asserting. We know that it was subject to weariness, and to hunger and thirst.[1] Abstractly speaking, Christ might, no doubt, have sustained His body by miraculous power. But such a course, if habitually pursued, would apparently have been inconsistent with the conditions to which He willed to submit; and the Gospel narratives show that He did not relieve the natural distresses of His flesh except by resort to the means which are normally available to human beings.

Speaking more comprehensively, Christ was subject to the physical sufferings, the pains, to which we are liable, whether such as were inflicted from without, of scourging and of crucifixion, or such as were due to reaction of mental agony on the body, as in Gethsemane. This was so not only because the body which He took was really human, but also because the purpose for which He came was to suffer and to die for mankind.

[1] St. John iv. 6–7; St. Matt. iv. 2; St. John xix. 28.

The healing virtue which on certain occasions flowed forth from His body [1] affords no evidence of natural difference between His body and ours. The source of that virtue was Himself, His flesh being simply the medium of its operation.

His body was limited in relation to space and local presence. It could not be at more than one place at the same time. Accordingly, in the nature which He assumed, our Lord was not locally present at any particular moment during His earthly life in more than one place; and He was physically subject to the laws of motion from place to place, leaving one place to reach another, and passing through intermediate places. His body, as such, neither was, nor could become, omnipresent, and its special presence on many altars which has been afforded since its heavenly exaltation is not only supernatural, but is of a special kind — a mystery which leaves unaffected the limitation of its physical presence to one place in heaven.[2] Our Lord's glorified body is still a true human body, and the supernatural changes which it has undergone affect its condition without subverting its kind.

Our Lord's physical appearance is nowhere described in Scripture except in symbolic terms, and these terms vary in opposite directions according to

[1] St. Mark v. 30; St. Luke vi. 19; viii. 46.

[2] This subject belongs to our 8th volume. But cf. J. H. Newman's distinction between presence *in loco* and *substantive*, in *Via Media*, Vol. II. p. 220.

the connections in which they are given. The silence of the Gospels on the subject appears to indicate that there was nothing remarkable in his form and visage. The notion that He must have exhibited marvelous physical beauty has no adequate basis. We can be sure of this only, that His body was externally suited for the purposes of His earthly life. A display of physical beauty would perhaps have been inconsistent with these purposes.[1]

§ 6. The human mind of Christ[2] was obviously endowed with grace to a unique degree; but its endowments, according to the evidence of the Gospels, did not subvert and nullify the limitations which necessarily characterize human consciousness. Being by nature finite, it could not be directly privy to the activity of infinite intelligence. Therefore it could share in our Lord's divine knowledge only in so far as such knowledge was imparted to it in its

[1] On our Lord's real flesh and physical limitations, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xiv; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, pp. 60–65; H. V. S. Eck, *Incarnation*, pp. 52–53; H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctr. of the Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 383–385. On the appearance of Christ, cf. Geo. Matheson, *Studies in the Portrait of Christ.*

[2] On our Lord's human mind and knowledge, see *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 199–205; D. Stone, *Outlines*, pp. 82–83, 295–298; *Ch. Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1891, art. "Our Lord's Knowledge as Man."

Among those who fail to do full justice to our Lord's human limitations are Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, V. liv. 6; Archd. Wilberforce, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–74; H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 461–480; and C. J. Ellicott, *Christus Comprobatur*, 4th address.

Among kenotic or quasi-kenotic treatments are Bishop Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 71–225, and A. J. Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth*, Lec. iv.

own psychological terms. Omniscience does not function psychologically, or in manners open to psychological, human, scrutiny.

Divine intelligence was indeed united with the human in Christ. In Him both intelligences had a common centre and agent — the Self of the Word-incarnate. And this union appears to have involved a certain and protective influence of the divine mind upon the human, an influence by which alone we are able to account for the unique perfection of His human intelligence and wisdom which He exhibited. But this influence could not, in view of the exclusively psychological methods of human intelligence, take the form of direct emergence of divine intelligence within His human consciousness. The data of the Gospels indicate that it should be described in terms of grace. By the grace of union, as it is technically called,[1] His human mind was enhanced in its powers and protected from mistaken use of them; but the law held in the case of His Manhood that the effect of grace is to perfect and to assist — not to denaturalize — the human.[2]

Accordingly, His consciousness retained the methods of functioning, and the limitations, which characterize human intelligence. His divine omni-

[1] According to St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. vi. 6, the grace of union "is the being personal which is given gratis to the human nature in the Word." Out of it flows habitual grace, or the supernatural endowments of Christ's Manhood.

[2] Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit et supplet defectum naturæ. St. Thomas, II. II. clxxxviii. 8.

science neither did nor could come within His human attention so as to disturb and denaturalize His truly human experience and intellectual growth; for with all its unique endowments, our Lord's human mind grew like ours. It was subject to the limitations of attention which characterize our acquisition of knowledge. He had to learn by experience; and if He was endowed with a supernatural tact, so as to escape any errors that would have made Him a fallible Revealer of the mysteries of His Kingdom, we have no warrant for supposing Him to have been, or to have become, possessed in His human mind of universal information. The Gospels show that He was subject to surprise, and to the necessity of gaining information by enquiry. In one very important particular He confessed His ignorance.[1]

In view of all these considerations, we venture to summarize what can be known of our Lord's human intelligence in the following particulars: (*a*) It was truly and properly human, being subject to growth and to the laws of human experience in such growth; (*b*) His entire freedom from sin exempted His mind from the moral prejudices and spiritual obliquity of vision that hamper us in our assimilation of truth, and lessen our attention to those particulars of

[1] Of the day or hour of the judgment. St. Mark xiii. 32. Cf. St. Matt. xxiv. 36; Acts i. 7. A survey of patristic and scholastic views on our Lord's ignorance is given by Forbes a Corse in *Instructiones Historico-Theol.*, Bk. III. ch. xix–xx.

experience which ought to determine and control our thoughts and judgments; (*c*) We may infer both from His prophetic mission and from the mystery of the union in Him of Godhead and Manhood in one divine Self, that His mind was illuminated and protected from error to a unique degree by divine grace. The illuminating Spirit was imparted to it without other measure than that imposed by the finite receptive capacity of human intelligence; (*d*) His human self-consciousness had to grow because it was human, but it was none the less the consciousness of a divine Self; and the supposition that it could ever have led Him into erroneous judgments concerning His Person is incredible. In brief, our Lord submitted to the conditions of a really human experience and mental development, but His mind was possessed of unique endowments, such as were befitting to Him who came to reveal Himself as God-incarnate.[1]

§ 7. In a previous section,[2] Christ's entire freedom from sin and His moral impregnability have been set forth. The inference should not be made from His sinlessness, however, that He had no human will as distinguished from the divine. Apollinaris fell into this error, mistakenly assuming that a human will is by nature sinful.[3] It is true that the human will is not naturally capable, without divine grace, of invariably avoiding sin; but this moral

[1] On the relations between our Lord's divine and human minds, see ch. viii. § 2. [2] In § 3. [3] See ch. ii. § 6, above.

insufficiency is an element in the divine plan that man's spiritual development should at every stage be conditioned by those relations of dependence upon God and upon His grace which are guaranteed by true religion.[1] In making man religious God inaugurated a primitive state in which sufficient grace constituted the perfecting factor. He did not leave man to his natural insufficiency or to the necessity of sinning. It was an avoidable transgression on man's part that subverted this primitive state of grace and righteousness; and the sinfulness which Christ came to remedy was not due to an essential malignity of human nature, but to an unnecessary alienation by man of the grace whereby God had completed his equipment for righteousness.[2]

In Christ this adventitious entail of sinfulness was broken. He took human nature in its pristine flawlessness, and in taking it filled it with grace, thus exempting it from the natural moral insufficiency to which mankind had fallen. This was not an alteration of the nature which He took, but was the restoration in a second Adam of the spiritual equipment which God intended human nature should enjoy when He created mankind.[3] These considerations justify the contention that in taking human

[1] Cf. *Creation and Man*, pp. 263–264. [2] *Idem*, pp. 280–283.

[3] "The essential feature of Christ's probation as man was, not that he should feel the force of temptation as we ourselves have to feel it now, but that He as the Second Adam should feel it as it was felt by the first Adam before he fell." Th. Wood, in *The Second Adam*, as quoted by the *Church Times*.

nature God did not need to shrink from assuming a real human will in order to avoid incurring the sinful propensities which characterize fallen mankind. They also show that the will which He thus assumed, although truly human, enjoyed advantages *ab initio* which, although designed to be imparted to us, are not fully utilized by us except as the result of protracted development in His grace.

These advantages enabled Christ to exhibit in human terms, and at every stage of growth from childhood to manhood, the pattern according to which our own characters should be formed. And this is the secret of His example — not that He had no advantages compared with those whom He came to save, but that He exhibited the perfection toward which, by our participation in His grace, He enables us to grow.[1]

But the uniqueness of the advantages enjoyed by our Lord's human will, the fact that it was the will of very God, and His uninterrupted exercise in the Godhead of the divine will, did not nullify the reality of His submission in our nature to the conditions of human volition. The conformity of His human will to His divine will was truly moral. It was not due to confusion of wills, or to a disturbing invasion of divine volition within our Lord's human experience. This could not occur, for it is not possible for infinite volition to appear within human observation. The divine will does not act psycholog-

[1] *The Kenotic Theory*, ch. vi. Cf. chh. vii. 7 and viii. 1, below.

ically, nor can its action become a confusing phenomenon within the sphere of psychological or human deliberation and choice.

Possessing a truly human will, and one which was free from nullifying interference, Christ experienced all that we experience in willing, except the handicap of proneness to sin. His human volitions were conditioned by the motives which human experience and human appetites afford; and therefore He could be, and was, tempted in the manners in which we are tempted. Inevitable though His resistance to temptation was, it was conditioned by arduous moral effort and by suffering — suffering which was as much greater than ours as His resistance was more strenuous and persevering. Accordingly He was touched with the feeling of our infirmities, the more so that He endured to the full the cost of not yielding to them. His victory was therefore a human victory, not less so that it was made possible and guaranteed by grace without measure.[1]

§ 8. Our Lord did not take our nature in order to become a private in the ranks of humanity, but that He might become a new Head of our race, the Mediator between God and man, the Revealer of God and the Redeemer of mankind. Accordingly, while He condescended truly to share in our nature, to experience our experiences, to suffer and to die for us, it was not consistent with His mediatorial

[1] See ch. viii. §§ 5–7, below, on the reality of Christ's human struggle against temptation. Refs. are there given.

office and redemptive mission that He should be reduced in all respects to our level. Only by endowing His Manhood with super-eminent gifts of spiritual knowledge, wisdom and strength could He speak as He had to speak, work as He had to work, fight the forces of evil as He had to fight them, endure the accumulated pains of humanity, and carry His Manhood safely through the way of death to life and glory, so as to become in it the ever-living Saviour of His redeemed.

Over against these contentions lies the modern argument that the value of Christ's example depends upon His having had no advantage over us in resisting temptation. This argument proves too much to be regarded as valid. It proves, among other things, that He must have shared in our universal inability to avoid sin. If He had done so, however, the result would have been that, so far from affording an example to follow, He would have given one more exhibition of human weakness, and would Himself have been in need of salvation. Only on the Pelagian assumption that men are capable, without supernatural assistance, of wholly avoiding sin is it possible to explain our Lord's sinless victory, unless we acknowledge the truth that His spiritual equipment was as unique as was His consequent sinless perfection. Without special equipment He could not have transcended our weakness so as to exhibit the perfection which we are created to acquire; and just because the peculiar

endowments of His Manhood make Him an unfailing source of grace to His redeemed, we are assured of the possibility of ourselves ultimately reaching the moral and spiritual goal which He has exhibited and teaches us to attain.

The grace with which His Manhood was endowed was twofold, viz. the grace of union and the gift of the Holy Spirit. By the grace of union is meant the mysterious but inevitable effect of His Manhood being that of a divine Person, united hypostatically with the Godhead. We have seen that the functions and powers of Godhead could neither be imparted to the Manhood, nor obtrude themselves within our Lord's human consciousness. But the meeting of Godhead and Manhood in one ego could not fail to bring about some sort of communion between them, and the Manhood could not fail to be supernaturally uplifted by such communion. We do not presume to describe the manner of this uplifting, but the narratives of the Gospels show that its effects were both illuminating and sanctifying, without there being the slightest interference with the integrity of His human experience and action.

We are told that the Holy Spirit was given to Him, that is, to His Manhood, without measure.[1] The meaning is that the Spirit was imparted as fully as finite manhood can receive Him.[2] The source of this gift was primarily the Father. But it was not exclusively He, because in the eternal

[1] St. John iii. 34. [2] Cf. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. vii. 11.

Trinity the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son as well as of the Father. Accordingly it was the Son's own Spirit that was imparted to His Manhood. This is the truth which lies behind the ninth anathema of St. Cyril of Alexandria against those who say that our Lord depended upon the Spirit as upon another, that is, as upon one external to Himself. We are justified, however, after the manner of the Gospels, and in accordance with the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*, in speaking of Christ as aided by the Spirit, when we are in fact describing the assistance of His own Spirit to His Manhood.[1]

III. *Implicates and Values*

§ 9. The implicates and values of the doctrine that the eternal Son of God took a real human nature, and submitted to the conditions of a genuinely human experience, can be conveniently summarized in relation severally to history, mediation, ethics and the dispensation of grace.

The reality of our Lord's human nature and life places Him, in so far as He was human, within the sphere of human history, and to that extent subjects Him to historical interpretation. His birth of a virgin, the events in His life, His conversation and teaching, His miracles, sufferings, death, resurrection from the tomb, and ascension into the heavens, are

[1] *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 123–126. On the grace of Christ, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. vii–viii; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, §§ 191–192; J. B. Franzelin, *de Verbo Incarnato*, thes. xlii.

reported to us as facts which take their place in history, and which may be treated, like other historical facts, as a proper basis of critical scrutiny and reasonable inference.[1]

The accuracy of the narratives in which these facts are given has, indeed, been assailed with much learning and skill; but while it has been shown that some mutual inconsistencies of detail occur in the Gospel narratives, these inconsistencies are no greater than are inevitable in the concurrent testimonies of human witnesses. That the knowledge embodied in the Gospels is that of contemporaries, and includes reminiscences of those who themselves saw and heard what the Gospels report, is abundantly established. The more radical denials that Jesus Christ actually lived cannot be entertained for a moment;[2] and we are warranted in assuming that the Gospels have sufficient historical value to justify our general dependence upon the data which they give for the inferences which we make from them concerning the Person of Christ, and concerning the significance of His mission and achievements.[3]

[1] On the connection of Jesus Christ with human history, see W. N. Clarke, *Outline of Christ. Theol.*, pp. 260–261; H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, Bk. III. ch. ii; E. S. Talbot, in *Lux Mundi*, 4th Essay.

[2] See T. J. Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ;* S. J. Case, *The Historicity of Jesus.*

[3] See A. S. Peake, *Christianity, Its Nature*, etc., ch. ix; G. P. Fisher, *Grounds of . . . Belief*, ch. xii; L. Ragg, *Evidences of Christianity*, ch. iv.

In acknowledging that in so far as He entered into human history our Lord's life is susceptible of historical treatment, we do not admit that a historical description and explanation of Him is adequate. History itself being witness, there were events in our Lord's life, and elements in His character and achievements, which cannot be explained unless we assume, in accordance with the belief of His witnesses, that His Person transcends the possibilities of direct historical manifestation and description.

Yet so far from confessing that His entrance into history constitutes an unintelligible breach of the continuity which, in common with natural scientists, we believe to determine the possibility of every event whatsoever, we maintain that the eternal Word's historical self-manifestation (including His miraculous birth and resurrection), reveals the point of view from which, and the determinative purpose by which, all historical continuities are to be interpreted and explained. The events of Christ's life signalize a shifting of scenery and an introduction of new factors into human history, but the whole world-drama depends for meaning and fulfilment of its purpose upon what Christ was and did.[1]

The catholic faith depends for its validity, and for its determinative contents, upon the historical manifestation of God-incarnate. This means that the Christian proceeds through fact to faith. The faith indeed transcends its historical premises; but

[1] *Creation and Man*, ch. iii. § 3.

it is revealed by historical facts, so that its determinative elements have the permanent validity and immutability of such facts, and can be justified in each new generation by appeal to them.[1] It is true that no human history of Christ can be an adequate description of Him; but the Christ of history is the Christ of faith, and the Christ of faith has the validity for human apprehensions of historical fact. In common with modern Ritschlians we pragmatically accept the manifestation of Christ as revealing one who has for us the value of God. But the historical validity of His manifestation — and the quality of His Manhood compel us to pass from mere value-judgment to the existential judgment that Jesus Christ is really and ontologically very God.

§ 10. We have seen [2] that if our Lord was to be a true Mediator between God and man, He had to be able to "lay His hands on both," to be at once full God and full man. Only thus could He truly and fully represent each to the other. We also saw that if His Manhood was to escape the isolating limitations of human individuals, it had to possess a divine Self, one which is capable of transcending these limitations. Because in Christ God wears our nature He becomes a real Head of our race, a proper representative of those whose nature He has assumed.

[1] Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 308–310.
[2] In ch. iv. § 10.

It is plainly presupposed in all this that the nature which Christ assumed was generically the same as ours, and subject to the conditions and limitations which are essential to genuine manhood and human life. Moreover, if He was to save human nature He had to assume all of its parts. If His flesh was unreal, there has been no such redemption of the body as is set forth in the apostolic writings. And if He was lacking in a rational human soul, there is no real likeness between His consciousness and ours, no common experience to unite Him with us, and no basis of salvation for our spirits.

It is also clear that if He was to become the kind of representative before God that we need, He had to submit to all the conditions of human experience except the one which would have nullified His redemption mission — except sin. It was necessary that He should bear our pains and sorrows and be touched with the feeling of our infirmities. He had to be tempted in all points like as we are, and to experience in our nature the dependence upon divine grace which attends human victory over evil. No view which either ignores or fails to do justice to these requirements can fail to weaken, and ultimately to nullify, the reasons which justify our acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as Saviour of Mankind.

The necessity that the Mediator should be human and share in human experience is also apparent when we consider His threefold office of Prophet, Priest and King. His prophetic office was to make Himself

a revelation of God to those who can apprehend nothing except in human terms. We cannot conceive of the possibility of such a revelation unless the divine Revealer somehow manifests Himself in the terms of human nature and experience. We acknowledge that even the Manhood of God, being human, cannot either bring the Godhead within our observation or fully manifest a divine Person. Such a revelation was both unnecessary and impossible. But the sufficient self-manifestation which we believe the Son of God to have achieved was, so far as we can see, necessarily conditioned by His sharing in human nature and experience, so as to become subject to the observation of which men are capable, and so as to converse with men after their manner.

Again, if He was to be our Priest, and if He was to offer Himself for us as our true representative, He had to become one of us. The reality of His being perfected for His office by suffering and of His dying for us, the validity of what is revealed as to His heavenly priesthood, His sympathy with us, His making His flesh and blood the veil and propitiatory medium of our access to God and of our ultimate enjoyment of eternal life, all these presuppose and depend upon His having taken a real human nature and upon His retaining it forever.

Jesus Christ is the vicegerent of the Father, a King whose kingdom has no end. As such He is the Head of the Church, which is His Body. From Him proceeds the authority which His ministers

exercise on earth, and we are under His sway. But unless this sovereignty is human as well as divine, it is remote from human apprehensions and conditions. The Head of the Body, if His headship is more than a metaphor, must share in the same order of life with the Body, and if the Church of Christ has a vital relation and organic subordination to Him, this must be because He has taken, and evermore shares in, the nature which the members of His Body possess.

§ 11. The ethical significance of the assumption of real Manhood by the eternal Son is that the divine Author of the law for man has for love of us submitted to become subject to it, and to incur the temptations to disobedience by which we are beset. That there could be no uncertainty as to the success with which very God would meet these temptations leaves untouched the precious truth that He condescended to win the victory at the cost of the same persevering human efforts and human sufferings which constitute the price of moral victory on our part. In fact, because He alone fought victoriously all along the line, He alone made all the human effort and endured all the sufferings which perfect victory involves.

It is this human cost of His victory, willingly paid, which constitutes the appealing quality of His example. He was touched with all the feeling of our infirmities and can understand by reason of personal experience the nature and cost of the battle

which, in lack of His grace, we fail to win. He did truly experience the cost, for even the most abundant grace, while it clarifies moral judgment and fortifies the will, does not reduce the effort and pain of successfully resisting temptation. Accordingly, He learned by experiment that we need His advantages in order to achieve His victory; and it was His mission to equip Himself by obedient suffering and victory over death, so as to become the source to us of the grace wherewith He led the way and showed us how to vanquish the evil one.[1]

The ethical value of His assumption of our nature in order to submit to our conditions and win our battle does not lie in any precariousness of the result of His submission to be tempted, but in the real human cost which He incurred in winning His victory and in His enabling us to share in His grace. To suppose that very God could under any circumstances have made His righteousness liable to overthrow — and we may not assume that the Son of Man was any other than God of God — is to treat as contingent the permanence of the ultimate basis and source of righteousness and of moral obligation.

Because in Christ God bore the cost of human obedience, in Christ God achieved a meritorious and divinely acceptable sacrifice which is sufficient for the sins of mankind. For the same reason God in Christ has constituted Himself a Judge who has

[1] Cf. Heb. v. 8–9.

experienced our trials to the uttermost, and who can approve His judgments to the consciences of men themselves as at once just and merciful. Furthermore, because the grace whereby He won the victory is the grace in which He enables us to grow, the foregone certainty of His victory does not reduce the value of His example, but demonstrates the certainty of our own victory, if and when we complete the growth in Him which He makes possible for us.[1]

§ 12. We have seen that the validity and ever prevailing power of the Christian dispensation, and of its sacramental institutions, depends upon the fact that its Founder is truly divine. The counter truth now to be emphasized is that the form which that dispensation has taken has been determined by our Lord's assumption of our nature, and that the reality and permanence of His Manhood affords the medium, in communion with His Godhead, through which the sacramental means of grace receive their efficacy.

The Incarnation is thus seen to be the initiation of a dispensation of grace which is adapted to the necessities of our composite and finite nature. Our own nature has been perfected and consecrated in Christ that it may become the means by which we can lay hold of Him, and enter into an organic and interior union with Him in His mystical Body, the Church. This union in Him makes us sharers in His grace, the appointed sacramental manner of

[1] The subject of His example is resumed in ch. viii, below.

this participation being in line with both the heavenly medium and the earthly recipients of grace.[1]

The essential goodness of our nature as God created it is thus vindicated in all its constituent elements; and the spiritual use for which the flesh was created is revealed. Through our union with Christ our bodies become temples of the Holy Spirit. And the process is begun of preparing them for their deliverance from the grave and for full subjection to our spirits, for their destined supernatural change into incorruptible ministrants of personal blessedness and self-expression forever.

The taking of flesh by the Word is then the master-key by which we unlock the mysteries of the Kingdom of God. It is the original type by which the subsequent pages of God's Word — the later workings of His purpose — are impressed. The Church and her sacraments constitute an extension of the Incarnation, and their conformity to the original type imparts to them a verisimilitude of truth.

The spiritual evolution of man, which was interrupted by sin, is thus renewed and carried on to its eternally ordained consummation. The Incarnation, and the development of our Lord's Manhood by obedient suffering and victory over death, have prepared a potential germ which we can assimilate.

[1] A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. ix. 3; Morgan Dix, *Sacramental System*, Lecs. i–ii; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, V. lvii; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. lx. 4–5; lxi; J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, ch. vi.

Its sacramental involution in us affords the needed factor for our development and for our immortal survival in God's appointed process of supernatural selection.[1]

[1] Cf. ch. iii. § 6, above.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNION OF NATURES

I. *The Doctrine*

§ 1. We have seen that, for the protection of apostolic doctrine concerning Christ, as against subversive speculations and definitions, the ancient Church defined its leading particulars in the decisions of the first four of her Ecumenical Councils. The first Council affirmed that Jesus Christ is truly divine, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, and the second affirmed that He is perfectly human, lacking no proper part of our nature. The union of Godhead and Manhood in Christ, with which we are now concerned, was defined by the third and fourth Councils. As against what is called Nestorianism, the third Council maintained that in the one Person of Christ these natures are inseparably united; and as against the Eutychian inference that this union destroys their duality, the fourth Council declared that they are unconfusedly united.[1]

The last mentioned Council recapitulated the doctrine of union in the following terms: "One only Christ . . . acknowledged to be in two natures,

[1] On all which, see ch. ii. §§ 5–8, above.

ἐν δύο φύσεσιν, without confusion, ἀσυγχύτως, without conversion, ἀτρέπτως, without division, ἀδιαιρέτως, without separation, ἀχωρίστως, the difference of natures not being in any wise annulled by reason of the union, but rather the properties of both natures being preserved and meeting, συντρεχούσης, in one Person and one hypostasis," etc. The determinative meaning of this is that the Person of the Word has become the Person also of a perfectly human nature, the two natures having one subjective centre or self, but each of them retaining without either reduction or absorption its distinct integrity and operation.[1] There is no warrant for incorporating the very different notion, that the Person of the Incarnate is a composite totality, resulting from the union of natures. Rather the Person is treated as the common centre, ego or self of whatever is proper to God, on the one hand, and of whatever, on the other hand, is proper to man. The Godhead and the Manhood *meet* in the one centre, viz. the Person of the eternal Word; but that Person *in se* is indivisible and incomposite spirit. And this holds good whatever He may appropriate and make His own property by taking our nature. No doubt the most orthodox writers sometimes speak of the two natures as if they combined to form the Person of Christ, but in such cases they will usually be found, without prejudice to the meaning of dogmatic

[1] On the doctrine of the hypostatic union, see ch. iv. § 1, above, and the refs. there given.

definitions, to be speaking metaphorically, extending the stricter use of Person so as to include in its reference the natural properties and functions by which it manifests itself. Moderns have mistakenly treated this metaphorical use as the technical meaning of Person in Chalcedonian Christology, and thus have been led to attribute to that Christology a dualism which in fact it does not contain. If the Person of Christ is simply the totality or circumference of two diverse natures, their union is unreal and the oneness of Christ is merely a figure of speech.[1]

Acknowledging that the terms which we use in explicating the term Person in Chalcedonian Christology are modern, we continue to maintain that the doctrine of hypostatic union asserted at Chalcedon makes this union to lie in the possession by the two natures of a common centre or ego, appropriately described as a self. The Chalcedonian distinction between Person and nature is not between the total makeup of an individual, psychologically considered, and divine and human elements in that makeup. Broadly speaking, it corresponds to the distinction between self, in the sense of the indivisible and invisible centre and determining agent of rational functioning, and all the properties and functions in which this self subsists and expresses itself.[2] To

[1] It is from such a point of view that H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 294–295, describes the doctrine of two natures, in its traditional form, as importing into the life of Christ "an incredible and thoroughgoing dualism." [2] Cf. ch. ii. § 8 *fin.*, above.

affirm that in Christ one Person subsists in two natures is in effect to affirm that the same ego or self is the self and energizing agent of the properties and functions of God, on the one hand, and of the properties and functions of man, on the other hand. The two really meet in one self; and Jesus Christ naturally functions in two diverse and mutually incommensurable manners, but from one determinative centre.

Such doctrine postulates the reality of self as distinguished from psychical functioning; and the tendency to deny its reality has much to do with modern failures to do justice to traditional Christology. Our reasons for affirming its reality have been given.[1] What we are now maintaining is that the reality of the union of natures declared at Chalcedon depends upon the central self of Christ being real and determinative, and upon its being the same self in both Godhead and Manhood. An eternal Self of the Godhead has entered into history. Without ceasing to be a Self of Godhead He has also become the Self of a real Manhood. Thenceforth the eternal Logos energizes without self-disruption in two modes of being and life, and in the manners appropriate to each.[2]

[1] In ch. iv. § 2. Cf. § 7, below.

[2] It is the supposition of two life centres, defended by Dr. Martensen and others, which gives a dualistic quality to Christological doctrine, rather than the ancient doctrine of diverse and twofold functioning of one central Self of the eternal Word.

§ 2. These two modes of being and life are mutually incommensurable and, if intermixture is thought of, mutually incompatible. Omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence, for example, cannot invade and mix with finite power and knowledge and local presence. If they could, they would obliterate the limitations of the finite. But they cannot do so, because the infinite and the finite are mutual incommensurables. The one cannot be described in terms of the other, and their differences are not those of measure or degree, but of kind and mode.[1]

Two imperfect mechanical illustrations will perhaps help to make the point clear. They have no evidential value. A circle and a square can be drawn in such wise as to have the same centre, but neither one can either be changed into the other — squaring a circle is impossible — or be described in terms of the other. Their having a common centre leaves them mutually discrete to the end. Again, a sewing machine and a cutting machine may be belted or geared to one axis, and that axis may be the energizing factor of both. In this case there is a real union between the two machines, and the same axis energises in both, but there is no confusion. The sewing machine sews and does not cut, while the cutting machine cuts and does not sew. Neither operation interferes with the other. The

[1] A divine-human consciousness is either a mere symbol for human consciousness endowed with grace or an impossibility.

axis indeed both sews and cuts, but it does each in a distinct machine, and in obedience to distinct laws.[1]

The classic illustration is given in the Athanasian Symbol: "As the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ." The self of a man is self of both flesh and spirit. That is, two diverse and mutually incommensurable things, having different methods of functioning, meet in one personal ego. My soul possesses one group of attributes and functions and my flesh another. The two interact, but the difference between them is never broken down, although amid their mutual differences their several functions are all my own — the functions of one self. My self resides primarily in my soul, and my soul, within its limits, controls my flesh and enables it to transcend the functions of inert matter; but the difference between spirit and matter remains unaltered, and what matter is enabled to do by reason of the soul united with it, is done in uninterrupted accord with the laws and limitations of matter.

The eternal Logos is Self in Christ of Godhead and of Manhood. Each represents a distinct method of functioning, and the same Self functions in both. The Manhood, through its participation in the same Self with the Godhead, is elevated by grace; but the

[1] An important truth which this illustration does not cover is the interaction of the Godhead, in the manner of grace, on the Manhood. But grace, as we have already seen, does not alter the natural mode of functioning of human nature.

supernatural capacities which it thus acquires do not subvert the human manner of its operation or reduce the validity of the laws which otherwise describe human functioning. There is no commixture of natures in Christ.[1]

§ 3. There is, however, a mysterious interaction. As St. Leo the Great says in his *Tome*, "Each form" (nature) "does what is proper to it *in communion with the other*." [2] This intercommunion or περιχώρησις flows obviously from the common selfhood, not from obliteration of difference. Having one centre, the Godhead and the Manhood exist in each other, without even partially becoming each other, and without being mixed so as to produce a *tertium quid* — a divine-human which could be neither truly divine nor genuinely human.[3] The saving mystery that one Christ is God and Man rests upon the twofoldness of His properties and functions, not upon an impossible mixture of Godhead and Manhood.

But diverse as they are, the Godhead and Manhood possess real affinities. They both represent proper

[1] Before experience with error had brought out the implications of such terms, the ancients did use expressions that signify such commixture — *e.g.* μίξις, κράσις, etc., — while clearly maintaining a continued distinction of natures. Cf. J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, p. 243, n. 3; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 11.

[2] In ch. iv.

[3] St. John Damasc., *Orth. Fid.*, Bk. III. ch. vii *fin.* Cf. R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II. p. 271, who there erroneously defines the *communicatio idiomatum*, however.

modes of personal life and action, and a divine Person can subsist and act in both.[1] Moreover a Person who eternally subsists and operates in the Godhead, and after the divine manner, cannot, we may be certain, subsist and operate in human nature, and after the human manner, in such wise as either to destroy the moral harmony of His operations taken together or to fail in fulfilling the divine purpose of His assumption of our nature. In such a Person the divine will necessarily be morally and spiritually determinative. In brief, the personal control of His human life will reflect, after the human manner, the moral and spiritual perfection of His divine life; and His Manhood will not fail in His hands to achieve what divine grace can enable it to perform in advancement of His dominant and eternal purpose. Accordingly, our Lord's Manhood was uplifted and enhanced in various ways by a grace of union,[2] without being thereby either changed from being human or enabled to act otherwise than in harmony with the intrinsic limitations of human nature.

The interaction which we are considering was in a sense mutual, but with a qualification growing out of the nature of Godhead. The Godhead cannot be enhanced by union with the human, because it is already perfect, and every perfection of manhood proceeds from divine creation and assistance. It is

[1] Cf. ch. iii. § 4, 3d paragraph, above.

[2] Cf. ch. v. § 8, above, on the grace of Christ.

also by eternal nature infinite, and the finite limitations of manhood cannot be imparted to it. Such limitation would be equivalent to a destruction of Godhead, for finite Godhead is a contradiction of terms. Just as the action of the divine on the human in Christ had to harmonize in its effects with the human remaining fully human, so the action of the human on the divine had to be in harmony with the divine remaining fully divine.[1]

The Godhead and Manhood of Christ meet in His Person alone, for it was He only, the second Person of the Godhead, who became incarnate. The Trinity did not take our nature. This means that the divine which was affected by the human in the Incarnation was a divine Person — not the Godhead *in se*. The Son was limited by the Manhood which He assumed; but this was not by reduction of His Godhead, an intrinsic impossibility, nor by His abandonment of it, which would have nullified the effectual union of Godhead and Manhood in Him. The self-limitation which He voluntarily incurred was this, that in the nature which He assumed — in that only — He willed to submit His personal life and actions to the limitations of human nature and experience. These limitations became His own; and, as touching the Manhood, He incurred experiences and submitted to modes of action into which

[1] St. John Damasc., in the passage cited above, likens the action of our Lord's Godhead on His Manhood to the shining of the sun. The light is not changed in nature by that on which it shines.

Godhead and divine action could not obtrude or emerge so as to remove their limitations and reduce their reality.

§ 4. The doctrine of the union of natures is completed by that of the *communicatio idiomatum*, now widely misunderstood because of the change made in it by Martin Luther. According to his form of it there is a communication of properties, idioms, from one to the other nature. This we have seen to be both impossible and fatal to any meeting in Him of true Godhead and real manhood.[1] Its retention in German tradition helps also to explain the acute form which the problem of the union takes in the modern Christological speculation — the problem of explaining how the divine can be communicated to the human without overshadowing and obliterating the limitations of the human.

The catholic doctrine raises no such difficulty. It teaches an ascription of the divine and the human properties to the Person who possesses the natures to which they pertain. There is no intercommunication of natural properties between the two natures, but their concurrence without confusion in one personal centre or Self. This justifies indeed the ascription of human predicates to Christ under divine titles, and of divine predicates to Him under human titles. But this is because these titles in any case denote the same central Self of both natures, as distinguished from the particular nature from

[1] On Luther's doctrine, see chh. i. 6 (*a*); ii. 10, above.

which His title happens to be taken in the given instance.[1]

To take an example from conciliar language, when being borne of a Virgin is ascribed to God, and this is the meaning of the Blessed Virgin being called Θεοτόκος, there is no ascription of human birth to Godhead,[2] but an identification of the *Person* born of the Virgin, as touching the Manhood, with one who, in relation to His eternal nature, is rightly called God. Similarly, when it is said of the divine Logos, in a context in which He is declared to be God, that He became flesh,[3] the ascription of becoming flesh is made to the Person as taking our nature, and not to the divine nature from which the name employed is derived.

Parallel instances occur in the New Testament in which divine predications are ascribed to Christ under human titles. It is said that "no man hath ascended into heaven but He that descended out of heaven, even the Son of Man."[4] This does not mean that manhood had either "ascended into" or "descended out of heaven," but that the Person, there denoted by a human title, is He who, by virtue of His divine nature, fills heaven and earth.

[1] On the *communicatio idiomatum*, see ch. ii. § 7, above; and *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 40–46; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, nn. 5, 63; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xvi; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, V. lii. 3; liii. 3–4; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 293–294.

[2] Nor of divine motherhood to the B. V. M.

[3] St. John i. 14. Cf. Acts xx. 28; 1 Cor. ii. 8; 1 St. John i. 1.

[4] St. John iii. 13.

The same ascription of a divine predicate to Christ under a human title appears in the saying, "The second Man is of heaven." [1]

These interchanges of titles and predications result sometimes in startling juxtapositions, especially when given in the indirect form of calling the mother of Jesus "Bearer of God," Θεοτόκος, and "Mother of God," *mater Dei*. But the truth involved is always the same, so far at least as catholic theology is concerned, to-wit, that whatever name is given to Him, there is but one Self in the Word-incarnate; and in that Self both Godhead and Manhood, with their several properties and functions, truly meet.

There is no commixture of natures, and no mutual transference of natural properties between them, but there is a true possession of both natures, and of their several properties, by one Mediator between God and man, the Lord Jesus Christ.

This doctrine involves four particulars: (*a*) Whatever is true of Christ's human nature and experience is true of God, the Word-incarnate; (*b*) Whatever is true of Christ's eternal Godhead, and of the second Person of the Godhead, is true of the Man Jesus Christ; (*c*) We may not ascribe the distinctive properties and functions, the idioms, of the Godhead to our Lord's Manhood nor may we ascribe those of His Manhood to his Godhead; (*d*) Every predication which we make of the Person of

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 47. A. V. reads, "the Lord from heaven."

Christ should be made with discriminating reference to the nature to which it properly appertains.

It is a forgetfulness of this last principle which is most apt to lead astray the unwary; and the most conspicuous modern instance is connected with the description of the eternal Son as self-limited. This description is perfectly true and justifiable, if we remember that it is only as touching the Manhood which He assumed that He is thus limited — a limitation which cannot be reduced to unrealty by open invasions of divine functioning within our Lord's human experience, but which none the less cannot from the nature of things be ascribed to His Godhead.

II. *Modern Difficulties*

§ 5. We have felt constrained to give anticipatory hints as to the historical causes and explanations of modern difficulties, and this fact will abbreviate our present discussion of them. But it is desirable to summarize them in this connection, even at the cost of some repetition, in order to complete our exposition of the doctrine of the union of Godhead and Manhood in Christ.

The leading historical cause of the modern breach with Chalcedonian Christology, and of the development of a theory of kenôsis, appears to be the semi-monophysite interpretation of the Incarnation by Martin Luther, as being an infusion of divine properties into human nature. It is true that, with the

subsequent shifting of emphasis among the Germans to the integrity of the human, the original Lutheran "orthodoxy" received significant modifications in German thought; but the notion of some kind of fusion of natures in Christ held its own, and the obvious incompatibility of divine and human attributes, when regarded as meeting in one nature and natural experience, inevitably gave a new and more acute form to the problem of the hypostatic union.[1]

This problem was evaded rather than solved by the theory of a progressive Incarnation, for the mutual incompatibility which forbids the intermixture of divine and human attributes in one order of life and experience is not reduced by any gradualness of such intermixture. An ultimate deification of manhood in glory means its ceasing to be really human; and this forbids the comforting Christian assurance that we still have a High Priest in the heavens who can be touched with the feeling of our infirmities. The continuance of effective mediation depends upon the permanence of our Lord's possession of our nature and of real human properties.

The kenotic theory seemed to vindicate the truly human nature of our Lord's earthly life and experience, and the preciousness of this gain has helped to obscure its remoter and objectionable consequences. Plainly put, a depotentiated Godhead is not divine; and unless the nature which the Incarnate retained is full Godhead — and a partly

[1] Cf. chh. i. 6 (*c*) and ii. 10–11, above. Also ch. vii. § 3, below.

inert Godhead is the climax of unreality — He was not, while on earth, really what He claimed to be, one with God the Father and participant in all that the Father doeth and hath.[1] Moreover, the mutual incompatibility which constitutes the nerve of the kenotic argument, if rightly employed in that argument, has permanent validity; and the present possession by Christ in glory of the fulness of divine power, knowledge and presence depends upon an end being put to the union of Godhead and real Manhood in Him. Such a conclusion is fatal to Christian hopes.[2]

The lines of Christological speculation which we are criticising proceed from a mistaken point of departure, and cannot be given correct guidance until the assumption that there is a fusion between the divine and human in Christ's experience is reconsidered and eliminated. This is not less true because kenotic terminology is employed by writers who avoid the ultimate logic of kenoticism. Apparently — we speak subject to correction — they have not sufficiently considered the implications which others find in kenotic terminology, implications which help many who do not fully share in their conservative instincts to lose hold upon the truth of the Deity of Jesus Christ. In brief, their Christological thought seems to be hampered, and made less clear and satisfying, by their dependence upon terms which

[1] St. John v. 19; xvi. 15.

[2] The kenotic theory is discussed in the next chapter.

connote the mistaken assumption as to the nature of the Incarnation that has led modern German Christology into a maze of unnecessary problems.

§ 6. Another cause of difficulty in modern Christology is the habit of treating the human life and consciousness of Christ as the unifying principle of doctrine concerning His Person. This appears to be due partly to a laudable but, as has been seen, onesided anxiety to do justice to the reality of Christ's Manhood and submission to our conditions, physical, mental and moral. But it seems to be fortified by, and in many writers to be due to, a modified naturalism, which acknowledges the superphysical nature of consciousness, but which refuses to admit the reality and credibility of anything in the Person of the Word-incarnate that did not emerge among the psychical phenomena of His human consciousness.[1]

This last influence appears in the present excessive dominance of psychological standards in describing and estimating the personal resources of Christ, and also in the momentary tendency to deny the reality of any other personal self than the phenomena of consciousness, considered as cohering in a distinct unity within each individual. We have already given reasons for regarding this denial as an aberration of specialists — often at fault in constructive

[1] Forbes Robinson pleads that our Lord did not have omniscience, because no sign of it appeared in His conversation. *Self-Limitation of the Word of God*, p. 81.

theorizing — and as inconsistent with necessary postulates of every-day experience and moral responsibility.[1] Its bearing on modern Christological difficulties will be considered in our next section.

The assumption that an exhaustive analysis of the psychical and physical phenomena of our Lord's human life is equivalent to a survey of all the factors and resources of His individuality which we have credible reason for acknowledging as real, embodies a specious fallacy — a fallacy resembling that which led the materialist of yesterday to deny the objective reality of the human mind, as distinguished from physical functionings of brain stuff. The methods of psychology, combined with the historical method, have indeed proved helpful in analyzing what can be known by us of our Lord's consciousness — His psychical experience, His human mental life. But this analysis brings to light a combination of unique perfections and claims which cannot be reasonably interpreted without hypothecating the truth of these claims, and acknowledging the existence within His being of a source of illumination and grace which forever escapes psychical methods of scrutiny.[2]

[1] In ch. iv. § 2, above.

[2] When we regard the union of natures in Christ as a problem to be explained, we shall be baffled and be tempted to surrender one side of the truth in the interest of the other. But when we regard the union as the clue to the combination of saving power and condescending identification with our sorrows which He displayed, we shall find in it a pragmatic value which confirms our faith therein.

The knowledge of our Lord's Person which the apostles ultimately acquired was based upon an education which consisted, in its first stage, of daily contact with Christ's human life and conversation; and apart from the knowledge thus obtained they could not have advanced further, nor can we. But when by experience of His resurrection, by reflection on His teaching, and by the illuminating guidance of the Holy Spirit, they gained a more mature development in the knowledge of Christ, the perspective in which they regarded Him was changed, being determined by a fuller understanding of Him than can be deduced from their experience of His life of humiliation, exclusively regarded. Thenceforth it was the thought of His divine and adorable Person which became the clue — the unifying principle of their Christology.

In making the human life and experience of Christ its unifying principle, modern Christology has reverted to the difficulties which made the apostles so slow in apprehending the significance of our Lord's teaching; and until their post-resurrection standpoint is acquired, until the divine Person of Christ once more becomes the interpretative principle in considering the mysteries of Christ's human life, the important results of modern analysis of the data of the Gospels will fail to exhibit their true significance to the earnest and gifted scholars whose point of view we are criticizing.

§ 7. Unless we have radically misinterpreted

Chalcedonian Christology, its credibility, and even its intelligibility, depend to a degree upon taking careful note of the objective existence of a self in each rational individual, and upon refusing either to confuse it with psychical phenomena or to reduce it to a mere symbol of the coherent unity of these phenomena in each individual.[1] The sharp distinction made by the Council of Chalcedon between person and nature in Christ, and the inclusion of all psychical functionings in "nature," plainly shuts these phenomena out of the reference and meaning of "person," or ὑπόστασις, in the Chalcedonian definition.[2] That the Chalcedonian fathers regarded the Person of Christ as objectively real, in spite of the exclusive meaning with which they employed the term Person, or ὑπόστασις, is not intelligently to be denied. But the only objective reality which they can be supposed to have retained in mind, after eliminating all natural energies and operations, is the αὐτός or self, which in common speech and moral judgment has always been implicitly postulated as the determining spirit, centre and agent of every rational individual. This conclusion is not less certain because the term by which they denoted this self even then had also a more comprehensive use, one which sometimes crept into

[1] The reasons for belief in a real self are given in ch. iv. § 2, above.

[2] The sixth Council, by its assertion of two wills in Christ, accentuated this delimitation of terms. Cf. ch. ii. § 8.

orthodox Christological literature with confusing results. Our appeal is from these looser employments of the term to the plain implications of the authoritative distinction between person and nature, as determining the meaning of person or ὑπόστασις in Chalcedonian terminology.[1]

Recent evaporations of the meaning of the term self, and refusals to take seriously the reality which that term denotes in common language, have concealed even from the most careful enquirers of the modern type the traditional use of the terms person and personality. These terms, as now employed,

[1] In its trinitarian application, as used by the Cappadocian Fathers, the term ὑπόστασις practically meant mode of divine subsistence. Its use in Christology, in particular during the Nestorian controversy, was at first confused, but when once crystallized by ecumenical acceptance of the Cyrilline phrase καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν, it came to mean that central reality in the Word-incarnate which is one, as distinguished from His two natures, φύσεις, or Godhead and Manhood. The decisions of the fourth and sixth Councils gave permanent authority to this meaning — a fact which overrules any different meanings which may be thought to be given by individual ancient writers.

Moderns are apt to misinterpret the term person in Chalcedonian Christology because of their analytical method, which is inapplicable. They seek to ascertain analytically the psychological content of the Chalcedonian conception of person, when it has no such content. Instead of defining person analytically and psychologically, those who were responsible for the Chalcedonian terminology contented themselves with distinguishing it by delimitation, i.e. by excluding natural functioning, even volitional functioning, from its notional content. They did not, of course, conceive of person as separate or separable from nature and from natural functioning, but by their decisions they did delimit the notion of person in the manner which we have described. Cf. *The Trinity*, chh. iii, vi.

practically include in their meaning or reference the rational functioning, the psychical activity, by which self manifests and expresses itself. In brief, the ancient distinction between person and nature has become to moderns an overlapping distinction. The Chalcedonian definition has accordingly become somewhat unintelligible, and is made to seem liable to criticisms which are in fact non-relevant.

If the oneness of Christ's Person means, as moderns tend to make it mean, the oneness of His psychical life, of His consciousness, the assertion of His possession of full Godhead, and of two natures, becomes an extraneous and enigmatical assertion.[1] It becomes one which cannot be vindicated without the very subversive modification which the Lutheran doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum* made, and which has in fact, as we have seen, influenced modern Christology with confusing results.

But when the Self of Christ — the second Person of the Godhead — is given its ancient central place, the meaning of Chalcedonian doctrine becomes self-coherent. It means in effect that the Self of the eternal Word, already exercising, and continuing to exercise, the functions of the Godhead — functions which never have taken, and never can take, a form open to human observation and inconsistent with the integrity of human experience — this Self has become also the Self and Agent of

[1] Enigmatical as implying an invasion of divine functioning — *e.g.* omniscience — within Christ's human consciousness.

human functioning. Accordingly the functions of God and the functions of man are alike the functions of His one Ego, without any mutual confusion being involved. They meet in a common centre and Self, there being a real communion without commixture.[1]

§ 8. These considerations are germane to the modern criticism of catholic Christology that it is hopelessly dualistic.[2] This criticism would be valid, if the catholic doctrine of Christ's Person meant what moderns often make it mean. The presence of two mutually distinct and complete natures in one historical individual, without any transcending Self to constitute their unifying and determining centre, disregarding the patent impossibility of divine functioning emerging in human consciousness, is not a union properly speaking. It is an extraneous association without vital union; and the unity of Christ's Person, which all serious believers to-day acknowledge, is hopelessly nullified, if such a doctrine is maintained.

Because we ascribe a distinct objective reality to

[1] St. Athanasius, *de Incarn. c. Apoll.*, I. xiii, complains of those "who do not understand . . . that 'Christ' is not spoken of in one way only, but by that one name itself is exhibited an indication of two things, Godhead and Manhood. Therefore 'Christ' is called Man, and 'Christ' is called God. 'Christ' is God and Man, and 'Christ' is one."

[2] A criticism made, *e.g.*, by H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 294–295. Cf. also P. T. Forsyth, *Person and Place of Christ*, Lec. viii.

the Self of Christ and, on the basis of apostolic experience, believe this Self to transcend human selfhood and to be capable of living and acting in two orders of life, in two diverse modes of functioning, without their differences being removed, and consequently without the divine emerging within and overshadowing the human, because of these premises, we are able, without nullifying our belief in the real unity of Christ's Person, to acknowledge in Him a duality of natures — two modes of life and functioning, with whatever substantial media may be involved in these functionings. Thus interpreted, the Chalcedonian Christology appears to be self-consistent, free from postulates which are not found in the every-day speech and thoughts of men, and exempt from the gravest difficulty of modern Christology. The difficulty referred to is that of explaining how the essentially infinite divine can be given place in the essentially finite human without ceasing to answer to our necessary ideas of the divine.

The question naturally emerges at this point, What kind of reality is self, as implicated in common experience and as hypothecated in this discussion? The only answer which human experience justifies is that it belongs to the spiritual order.[1] This answer is reached by elimination. By hypothesis

[1] The supposition that it is a sort of physical monad, an impenetrable atom, finds countenance only in unthinking and irrevelant attacks upon its reality.

it is not to be identified with the physiological and psychical functioning whereby its existence and activity are made known, and matter cannot reasonably be regarded as capable of what self is capable. No more definite answer can be given because no one ever directly observed a self, and what it is, *in se*, we can only describe relatively in terms of the demonstrations of its activity, and negatively by eliminating the properties of matter. And we have to assume that it transcends all that we can observe, because the psychical phenomena which we do observe are not self-explaining and cannot be explained on any lower basis.[1]

Inadequate as this answer is, it justifies an important inference with regard to the psychological analysis of our Lord's consciousness which is so influential in modern Christological speculation. Self cannot be a direct subject-matter of such analysis, for it is not *in se* either a physical or a psychical phenomenon. Psychical phenomena are the evidences which prove that a spiritual self is functioning, and they afford the terms by which we frame a so-called definition of person, as the self-determining subject of a rational nature — a purely relative description. Accordingly the conclusions properly arrived at through psychological consideration of our Lord's consciousness are significantly limited, and become gravely misleading when made to constitute the sole basis of Christology.

[1] See *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 49–50.

III. *Implications and Values*

§ 9. Because of His possession of one unifying Self, we are assured that the divine and human have met in an effective, although unconfused, union in the Word-incarnate. In this connection it should be noted that the sharp distinction between a self and the properties and functions by which it expresses itself — the ancient distinction between person and nature — does not imply their separability. A rational nature cannot exist except as pertaining to a person or self, and to suppose that a person can exist apart from its characteristic functioning, and from the media within the individual which may be required for such activity, is contrary to experience and reason. The Self of Christ does not less truly subsist in the natures in which He operates because it is to be distinguished from them in a sound Christology. And because this is so, the Self of Christ is a true bond of unity between Godhead and Manhood, between divine power and grace and genuine human experience.

It follows that He whom we worship as Lord and God is no other than He whom we lay hold upon as the second Head of our race, and as united with us by human experience and sympathy. Our sacramental appropriation of His body becomes a means of receiving and growing in the grace which He divinely imparts, and by which He won a perfect victory over Satan in our behalf; and our union

with Him in His Manhood is a true union with God, the blessed centre of the social joy and glory of that endless life for which God has made us, and for which, in and through Christ, He saves us.

§ 10. On the other hand the continued diversity of the natures which meet in the Person of Christ teaches us to avoid the pantheistic tendencies which are engendered by monophysitism in all its forms and modifications. Every species of confusion between Godhead and Manhood — often due to unguarded emphasis upon the real affinity which exists between them — tends to reduce our sense of the self-protecting holiness of God, which justifies and forever demands our worship of Him, and which forbids the slightest commixture of Godhead and created natures. It also undermines our sense of absolute and perpetual responsibility to God, which depends upon realization of the permanent otherness of God, the ineffaceable difference between the Supreme Being and all His creatures, however highly exalted by His grace.

If human nature is absorbed and deified in the Godhead of Christ, we seem to be justified in thinking, as a certain type of mystics think, that we too, through union in Christ, may somehow be deified,[1] and that our responsibility to God is but a passing experience, instead of being an absolute and un-

[1] The phrase of St. Athanasius and other ancient writers, that "God became Man that man might become God," is seen, in the light of later experience with error, to be misleading.

alterable law of our nature. Similarly, if we think that in any proper sense Godhead is merged in the Manhood of Christ, whether by conversion or by a real reduction or kenôsis, then our conception of God will cease, as soon as the logic of such error is actualized, to differentiate Him from ourselves in the ineffable manner which Christian worship and human sense of responsibility presuppose and require.

The jealousy with which many moderns repudiate the notion of what they call a magical efficacy of sacramental media is partly explainable by their conviction — one in which catholics share — that matter is not susceptible of deification. Their repudiation is in this regard non-relevant to catholic sacramental doctrine, which guards the distinction between the outward and inward parts of the sacraments, the creaturely and the divine, with careful technicalities. The basis of catholic belief in the possibility of matter being employed by Christ in imparting His grace to us, is the doctrine of an assumption of flesh by Him, and of the enhanced susceptibility to spiritual control and use which its glorification in Him has imparted to it. But it is the ineffaceable distinction between the two natures of Christ which prevents this belief in the spiritual utility of matter, thus consecrated by Him, from becoming a belief in the deification of flesh, and from imparting to sacramental doctrine the magical significance which is mistakenly, al-

though sincerely, read into it by anti-catholic writers.[1]

Reverting to the precious truth which was emphasized in the last section, that there is a real meeting of Godhead and Manhood in one Person, this meeting together, and communion, in the Self of Christ, is robbed of its significance and value for us, if the natures thus united cease in either case to be what they were before their union. If Christ did not retain after the Incarnation the fulness of His Godhead, if He lost any of the properties and functions by reason of which it is what it is, then something else than the God whom Christ claimed to reveal became subject to our experiences and sorrows. And if the nature which He assumed was not in the full and proper use of the terms our nature, subject, except as to sin, to the limitations which are natural to us, then it was not true humanity that met the divine in the communion of Christ's Person. The twofoldness of natures is as vital to our belief in the meeting of God and man in Christ as is the unity of Person.

§ 11. Belief in the reality of a self in Christ as distinct from the phenomena of His consciousness

[1] The phrase *ex opere operato* in effect means simply that in rightly performing or ministering a sacrament of Christ His minister achieves (independently of his own faith) something which has attached to it Christ's sure pledge of grace to contrite and believing recipients of the sacrament. That the sacraments are *moral* instruments is a truism of catholic theology.

does not at all depend for its validity upon our success in trying to define or describe self. As has been noted, self defies scrutiny but is unavoidably postulated, however unconsciously, in every moral judgment. The writer of this volume ventures the personal opinion that this belief in self affords the only available clew to a reasonable view of the manner in which the divine communicated with the human in the mental life of Christ on earth. There can, of course, be no adequate explanation of relations between an infinite intelligence and human consciousness, for both the divine element, and the connecting link between the divine and the human lie beyond human scrutiny and defy analysis. That this is so constitutes the most significant implication of Dr. W. Sanday's suggestive resort to the subconscious as containing the determining factor and explanation of the mystery to which we refer.[1] The subconscious can mean only that in us which escapes conscious scrutiny, and to acknowledge the subconscious is to acknowledge the existence of something in ourselves which does not appear among the psychical phenomena of consciousness.

Dr. Sanday calls this invisible something "subconscious" and "subliminal consciousness" — the last description curiously applying the term con-

[1] In *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, Lec. vii. His speculation was appreciatively welcomed by Darwell Stone, in *Ch. Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1910, art. II.

sciousness to what is confessedly unconscious. We prefer to call it the "self," and to speak of it as transcending consciousness rather than as subconscious and subliminal. It is the inscrutable agent of consciousness, as distinguished from all subjective processes, whether conscious or unconscious. By this change of terminology we escape certain misleading connotations, which we think have imported embarrassing elements into Dr. Sanday's otherwise helpful speculation, and which have laid his position open in two respects to damaging attack. We believe that Bishop D'Arcy is right in objecting to spatial or regionary descriptions of departments of the mind,[1] and we find a horizontal dividing line between the divine and human in Christ as objectionable, when pressed, as a perpendicular one. We also think that the objection of several critics to giving the subconscious, the unconscious, so high and determinative a value as Dr. Sanday appears to give it is well made, that is, if the subconscious is nothing more than a subliminal process, having no transcending self to determine its direction.

Although no pictorial description of the relation between the consciousness of Christ and the invisi-

[1] Cf. two arts. of his in the *Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1911, and Jan., 1912, "Theology and the Subconscious" and "Is Personality in Space?" E. D. la Touche drastically criticizes Dr. Sanday's argument, in *Person of Christ*, pp. 380–386. The subject has been widely discussed. Dr. Sanday has replied to his critics in *Expository Times*, July, 1913, pp. 438–444.

ble reality in Him, by which alone the phenomena of His consciousness can be accounted for, may be pressed as having more than figurative and suggestive value, it is practically inevitable that men should resort to such descriptions when trying to attain a self-coherent apprehension of such a complex mystery. But we prefer, if we must employ a description of this kind, the non-psychological figure of the circumference of a circle and its centre — the centre being without dimensions, that is, immeasurable, and constituting the determinative factor of the circumference.

Both in us, and in Christ as sharing our nature, the invisible self, as we prefer to name it, lies within and constitutes the controlling centre of the phenomena of consciousness. And we need to add, by way of interpreting in our illustration the immeasurable quality of the centre — a point has no measure, — that although posited within the circumference of conscious activity, the central self transcends the phenomena of consciousness. An acting ego is not to be measured by what can be observed of its functioning.

The Self of Christ is the eternal Son of God, and it is such a self that is the determining centre of His conscious activity as Man. But He is also a central self and active agent in divine activity, and this fact makes His Self the point, so to speak, at which the illuminating and enabling influence of the divine reacts upon the human mind and will of

Christ, these retaining their integrity and human method of operation.

Writing as subject to correction, we think that some such description retains what is valid in Dr. Sanday's suggestive speculation, without involving the objections to which his terminology seems to be open. But the point which we are seeking to enforce — a point which is vital whether our method of exhibiting it is defensible or not — is that the unity of selfhood in Christ, whatever description of self may be found most agreeable to the postulates of experience, is the true basis of belief in the communion without confusion of Godhead and Manhood in Him. It explains the transcending quality of His grace, without destroying the naturalness of His human life and experience.[1]

§ 12. To recapitulate as to the value of an union of Godhead and Manhood in one Person, if Jesus Christ is at once truly God and truly Man, then all that He did and submitted to, God did and submitted to; and all that He endured and achieved, Man endured and achieved — and in a Manhood with which all of us can become identified by His grace, so as to share in the merits and benefits which He has gained. God, as touching a manhood which

[1] Cf. a suggestive passage by Dr. Sanday, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–133, on the possibility of the divine operating "deep down at the roots of being" so as to perfect without subverting the human. The right description of this operation of Godhead on Manhood in Christ is "grace of union." Cf. § 3, above, and ch. v. § 8.

was truly His own, was born of a human mother, shared in all our natural conditions, obeyed the law, being tempted in all points like as we are, submitted to weariness, physical and mental pain and hunger, and died upon the Cross, taking upon Himself what to us are unendurable consequences of our sins against His majesty. On the other hand, in Him Man possessed the grace and impregnable strength to pass unscathed through all these stresses and agonies, to overcome death by a glorious resurrection, and to enter within the haven of life eternal. Moreover, His Manhood, because of what it has endured, because of its divinely infused grace, and because of its quickening and sanctifying value, has become for us the source of life, of cleansing and of glory forever. Through its sacramental infusion an involution takes place, whereby our divinely intended evolution is once more resumed after its hindrance by sin, and its completion is made possible after the pattern of transfigured glory which was shown by Christ on the mount to chosen witnesses.

When correctly interpreted and thoughtfully considered, the catholic doctrine of Christ, and of His place in the history of God's world, which has been imperfectly set forth in this and in the two previous chapters, is seen not only to be self-coherent, but to unify all that we can know of God, of man, and of God's purpose for man. And it clarifies our conception of the totality of things in a manner too

exceptionally successful to be regarded as false. And the whole doctrine depends for its coherence and illuminative value upon the meeting of Godhead and manhood in Christ. Every evasion of this central mystery — usually made in the interests of simplicity — disturbs Christian philosophy and raises unanticipated difficulties. Accordingly, the juxtapositions of infinite and finite predications which are found in catholic descriptions of Christ, so far from being objectionable and misleading, are needed protectives against impoverished and confusion-provoking conceptions of His Person.

And what a wonderful Person in Jesus Christ! In Him all in God that sends us to our knees, and all in man that we would find in the best and dearest of friends, is united in a harmonious perfection which transcends invention, and therefore could not have been exhibited in the Gospels if their protrayal of Him were not substantially true to fact. If we contemplate only His majesty, we shall shrink behind with awe, as did the disciples when they followed Him on the way to His death; but if we dare to reckon Him as simply one of ourselves, we shall be embarrassed by His claims, and our allegiance to Him will be reduced in value, being retained only at the cost of rejecting vital parts of apostolic testimony concerning Him. It is only when we recognize that by reclining on His bosom we can feel the heart-beat of God, and that He is God exhibiting His way in a human life, and draw-

ing us with the cords of a truly human love, only then do we perceive how the sovereign power of the Infinite and the moral conflict of true man have become united for the otherwise impossible recovery of our race.

CHAPTER VII

THE SELF-EFFACEMENT OF CHRIST

I. *Development of the Kenotic Theory*

§ 1. Some references have already been made in previous chapters to what is called the kenotic theory, that in order to become truly human the eternal Word abandoned such of His divine powers and attributes as were incompatible with human limitations. In its more definite forms this theory has lost some of its prestige; but the kenotic form of thought still controls much Christological speculation, and embodies fallacies which, so long as they retain their influence, will continue to raise misleading issues and to obscure the really illuminating value of catholic doctrine. It seems desirable, therefore, to devote one chapter to a comprehensive, although necessarily brief, survey of the subject, for the double purpose of indicating the mistakes which vitiate every form of the kenotic theory, and of defining the truth which this theory mistakenly interprets. The writer published a much fuller discussion of this subject in 1898,[1] to

[1] *The Kenotic Theory Considered with Particular Reference to its Anglican Forms and Arguments.* For history and description, see also A. B. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ;* Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion, s. v.*

which his readers are referred; but in this chapter several additional thoughts will be given which subsequent discussions, and the writer's own further study, have suggested.

Kenoticism is of modern development and this is not necessarily a fatal criticism, for true theology will never cease to develop. But it is demonstrably inconsistent with the doctrine of the Ecumenical Councils, and this is a fact which throws an exceedingly heavy burden of proof upon its supporters, at least for those who accept in any proper sense the dogmatic office of the Church, and believe that she is especially guided by the Holy Spirit in defining the truths committed to her for the salvation of souls. If, by reason of the Incarnation, there exist in our Lord two whole and perfect natures, as the Church has declared, it is contrary to fact to allege that His possession of one of these natures has suffered reduction by His condescension in assuming the other.

"Kenosis"; W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, pp. 71–78; E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 351–366; H. C. Powell, *Principle of the Incarn.*, pp. 329–336. Kenotic writers, Bp. Gore, *The Incarnation;* and *Dissertations;* W. P. DuBose, *Soteriology;* A. J. Mason, *Conditions of Our Lord's Life on Earth;* R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation;* D. W. Forrest, *Authority of Christ*, chh. ii, viii; and others. Opponents to kenoticism, H. C. Powell, *op. cit.*; E. D. la Touche, *op. cit.*; W. Sanday (in effect), *op. cit.*; C. J. Ellicott, *Christus Comprobatur;* D. Stone, *Outlines*, pp. 64–66, 291–292; W. Bright, *Waymarks in Church Hist.*, App. G; Bp. Stubbs, *Ordination Addresses*, pp. 173 *et seq.*; and several articles in *Ch. Quarterly Review*, 1891–1899. These refs. are far from complete.

No doubt there have been tendencies on the part of some within the Church to emphasize too exclusively the divine side of Christ, and on the part of others to do the same for His Manhood, and these tendencies have obscured either the reality of our Lord's submission to human limitations or the fulness of His possession of the Godhead. But the somewhat stereotyped phrase of various patristic writers, "Remaining what He was, He took what He was not," [1] expresses the consensus of all Christological schools that in any age have retained the reputation of catholic orthodoxy. This consensus gained expression in the antithetic juxtapositions of divine and human predications which the fathers were so fond of making when describing the resources of Christ's Person.[2] They were, in particular, accustomed to ascribe by way of contrast certain of His operations to His divine power and others to His human nature; and modern writers have misinterpreted these contrasts as if they meant that our Lord gave each of His two natures its exclusive turn, acting at one time wholly in the Godhead and at another wholly in the Manhood.[3] No doubt the phrases employed are sometimes too

[1] Instances given in *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 5–6.

[2] Examples in the same work, pp. 6–9.

[3] Even Bp. Westcott thus misinterprets these passages, in *Ep. to the Heb.*, p. 66. Bp. Gore makes the same error, *Dissertations*, p. 166. Cf. W. Sanday, *Christologies*, pp. 92–95; and the reply made to such interpretations by *Ch. Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1899, p. 345.

abrupt to be free from such implication, but the background, generally speaking, is that expressed by St. Leo when he says that "Each form," meaning nature, "does what is proper to it *in communion with the other*." [1] This language interprets his less guarded phrases, such as, "It does not belong to the same nature to weep with feelings of pity over a dead friend, and . . . by a voice of command to raise him up to life again." In brief, while the ancients ascribed certain things to Christ "as touching the Godhead," and other things "as touching the Manhood," they never imagined that either nature of Christ displaced the other in His earthly life and nullified its distinctive and coincident operation.[2]

§ 2. It has been alleged that certain ancient writers did use language of kenotic meaning, but the passages quoted do not appear to support this contention. In any case, the writers referred to do not get beyond passing phrases, the modern interpretation of which gains its plausibility from a definite standpoint of which they were innocent.

When St. Irenaeus speaks of "the Word remaining inactive, in His temptation and dishonour and

[1] *Tome*, ch. iv.

[2] Such a phrase as, the Godhead does this and the Manhood does that, means, of course, that the Person of Jesus Christ does this by virtue of His Godhead, and that by virtue of His Manhood. The Actor is always the same. It is the natural mode of action that is twofold.

crucifixion and death,"[1] he need not be taken to mean more than that the Word did not employ His divine power *in such wise* as to hinder His Manhood from enduring what it was given to endure. When Origen describes the divine as humbling itself to "divine folly,"[2] he refers to St. Paul's phrase, "foolishness of God,"[3] and to his thought that the wisdom of God displayed in Christ crucified was regarded as folly by the gentiles. It is to be remembered in considering Origen's language that he is one of those who said that the Word, "while made a Man, remained what He was, God."[4] He also denied that our Lord was personally lacking, while on earth, in divine knowledge.[5] St. Cyril is alleged to have said that the eternal Son suffered "the measures of our manhood to prevail over Him."[6] The translation is misleading. He really said, suffered "the measures of our manhood to prevail in His own case." That is, its measures were not removed or made unreal by His assumption of it.

The writer who is chiefly depended upon in seeking ancient support for the kenotic theory is St. Hilary of Poitiers, who says with doubtful exegesis, "*Haurienda fuit natura cœlestis, ut exinaniens se ex Dei forma in formam servi hominisque decideret.*"[7] By comparing with this what he says

[1] *Haer.*, III. xix. 3. [2] In *Jerem.*, x. 14. [3] I Cor. i. 25.
[4] In *de Princip.*, i. 4. [5] In *c. Celsum*, iv. 5.
[6] So R. L. Ottley, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. p. 289. The passage is in *Quod Unus*, etc., Migne, *P. G.*, Vol. LXXV. 1332. [7] In *Psal.* lxviii. 4.

in another work,[1] that in the Incarnation there was an "*evacuatio formae*" without any "*abolitio naturae*," we find that he uses the term *forma* as equivalent to *habitus* or external semblance. In another place[2] he says, "*In forma servi veniens evacuavit se a Dei forma*," saying of this "*evacuatio formae*," however, "*non est abolitio naturae; quia qui se evacuat non caret sese, et qui accipit, manet.*" Kenotic in form as these passages may be regarded, they stand practically alone in patristic literature, and the inferences which are to be made from them are reduced in significance by the fact that St. Hilary elsewhere "seems . . . to represent the Son of God as subsisting simultaneously in two states or spheres." In one passage,[3] "Clearly his thought . . . is that of a single personality occupying simultaneously two distinct spheres of consciousness."[4]

It has to be acknowledged that St. Augustine and some of his contemporaries denied the reality of our Lord's ignorance even as touching His human mind, treating His confession of ignorance as an instance of economy.[5] And the tendency through-

[1] *De Trin.*, ix. 14. [2] In *Psal.* lxviii. 25.

[3] *De Trin.*, ix. 4. Our quotation is from R. L. Ottley, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. pp. 64–65.

[4] To speak of spheres of consciousness, in view of the psychological connotation of the word "consciousness," is to invite misapprehension. The divine mind does not psychologize. There are two knowledges, divine and human, but only the human is appropriately called "consciousness."

[5] Examples are given by Bp. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 132–138.

out the middle ages was to emphasize the divine aspects of our Lord's Person at the expense of some at least of His human limitations. Moderns have derived seeming support from this onesidedness for their opposite tendency to underrate the divine in Christ in the interest of the human. But Chalcedonian Christology affords no warrant for either of these mistakes.

§ 3. Martin Luther, as has already been shown,[1] gave a new standpoint to Christological thought. He saw in the Incarnation "(*a*) the attainment by God of . . . humanity as His own form of existence, and (*b*) the reception by Man of . . . Divinity as the very contents of his spiritual life; a union . . . by which two disparate, yet allied or kindred, natures coalesce for good and all into one single indivisible personality."[2] The problem of the Incarnation, as his successors viewed it, was no longer, How can the eternal Logos be the Self of both Godhead and Manhood, these two remaining distinct? It was, How can these two *coalesce* as to form one indivisible personality, the term personality having the modern and comprehensive sense? And to the present time Christologists of the modern type are controlled in their speculations by the Lutheran conception of the problem, although the eighteenth century saw a shifting of emphasis from its divine to its human factor.

[1] In ch. ii. § 10. Cf. chh. i. 6 (*c*) and vi. 5.

[2] Principal Dykes, as quoted by H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 234.

The difficulty of apprehending a coalescing of infinite and finite properties was felt at once, and this difficulty at first took the form of the question, How can we find place for divine properties and functions in our Lord's Manhood and experience during His humiliation? Two principal answers were defended in a controversy which was terminated by the Thirty Years' War. The Giessen theologians held the theory of two states. According to this, during our Lord's state of humiliation on earth, the divine attributes of the Manhood were held in abeyance in the interest of human growth, their exercise being delayed until His glorified state. The Tübingen school rejected this distinction of states, and maintained that the Manhood's divine properties were merely concealed during the earthly life. Both schools were concerned to justify belief in the permanent communication of divine properties to the Manhood. No mutation or reduction of the divine itself was admitted, and humiliation, when acknowledged, was attributed to Christ in respect of His human nature.

In the eighteenth century the theocentric gave way to the anthropocentric standpoint, and protestant theologians turned to a study of the historical Christ. The modern lives of Christ began to appear, many of them seeking to eliminate, at least to reduce, the miraculous element in the Gospels, with a view to humanizing their portrayal of the Master. The problem of the coalescing of

natures in Christ accordingly assumed a changed form. The question became, How can the divine be imparted to the Manhood in such wise as to leave it truly human and to permit a real submission by Christ to the normal experiences and limitations of human life? It can be seen that the Lutheran postulate of a communication through the Incarnation of divine properties to human nature still supplied the controlling factor in the problem, in spite of the comparatively superficial although practically important, change in its form. Dr. Dorner's answer to the new question was a theory of progressive Incarnation — the full communication of divine properties to the Manhood being consummated only after the glorification of Christ. The fallacies involved in this view have already been sufficiently indicated.[1]

The answer which has most seriously affected recent Christological speculation, and which therefore chiefly concerns us, is the kenotic theory. The obvious impossibility that divine properties should be fully communicated to real Manhood, the Manhood in which our Lord historically manifested Himself, is frankly admitted; and this mutual incompatibility between the two — that is in relation to an intercommunication of properties — combined with insistence on the genuineness of Christ's human limitations, became the basis of the theory that during His earthly life the Son

[1] In ch. ii. § 11, above, where refs. are given.

of God really abandoned whatever in His Godhead could not be subjected to the limitations of a perfectly normal human life. The formal logic of such argument is flawless, if we adopt its premise — the Lutheran assumption that the Incarnation is a communication of divine properties to human nature. On this "if" the whole argument turns, logically speaking. The kenoticists did not, of course, disregard the necessity of substantiating their theory by appeal to the New Testament, but their inferences from biblical data have been either consciously or unconsciously controlled, as we shall see, by the above defined Lutheran premise.

The kenotic theory has taken several forms, according to the extent of kenôsis which is maintained.[1] The more radical kenoticists have declared that the Godhead of Christ was converted into a human soul. The Logos, it is said, "remains *who* He was, though He ceased to be *what* He was." The "form of God" was changed into the "form of a servant." The Son's divine activity was suspended until His glorification. A more prevalent view distinguishes between what are called the absolute and the relative attributes of God, and denies that the latter — omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence — are essential to the reality of Godhead apart from creation. They could be, and were, abandoned by the Son, it is said, when He

[1] Summarized by A. B. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 139–164, 338–429. Cf. *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 14–19.

became incarnate. This view has exercised some influence among Anglican writers.

§ 4. But the influence of Dr. Martensen, a Danish Lutheran theologian, has also been felt in Anglican quarters. Apparently realizing the grave difficulties raised by supposing the Son to have ceased to exercise His cosmic functions while on earth, He hypothecated two life-centres in Christ. Acknowledging that "as the pure *Logos of Deity*, He works through the kingdom of nature by His all-pervading presence," [1] he urged, "We must conceive . . . of the Deity as wrapped up or clothed in the humanity of Christ; of the eternal infinitude of divine attributes as converted into an inner infinitude, in order that it might find room within the limits of human nature. In the measure in which human nature grew and developed, in that measure did the divine nature also grow in it; in the measure in which, whilst advancing in development, He became conscious of His *historical* significance, in the same measure did the *recollection* of His pre-existence and of His going out from the Father rise more clearly to His mind." [2] To Dr. Martensen also is due the sharp separation between "spheres" which certain Anglicans make, and their view that our Lord abandoned certain divine attributes in the human sphere, while retaining them in the divine sphere.

The most obvious difference between this view

[1] *Christian Dogmatics*, § 134. [2] *Idem*, § 136.

and traditional doctrine is that whereas Dr. Martensen hypothecates two centres and two spheres of activity for the God-man, catholic theology, warned by Nestorian error, acknowledges but one life-centre in Christ — the eternal Person or Self of the Word — and distinguishes in Him two natural modes of operation, rather than two spheres, there being a mutual communion, but, owing to their mutual differences, no interference between His divine and human operations. But we ought gladly to bear witness that Dr. Martensen and the Anglican writers who have borrowed some of their thought from him have tried, by their modifications of the kenotic theory, to do justice to the truth that Jesus Christ never ceased to be truly divine. If we are unable to accept even a modified kenoticism — a kenoticism improved at the cost of logical self-consistency, — we are not less ready thankfully to acknowledge the loyalty to our Lord as very God-incarnate which actuates the most prominent Anglican supporters of kenotic and quasi-kenotic theories.

The latest phase of Anglican speculation, while it retains in form Dr. Martensen's idea of two life-centres, speaking of two egos in our Lord — that of the pure Logos and that of the Logos as incarnate, — rejects the idea of a real kenôsis in favour of a voluntary self-limitation or self-restraint, with pointed emphasis upon its uninterrupted voluntariness. Our Lord is represented as voluntarily

limiting the exercise and manifestation of His divine power and of other infinite attributes during His humiliation.[1]

The controlling premise here is still the German postulate that, if the Logos had continued to exercise His divine omnipotence, omniscience, etc., this divine functioning would have emerged as a disturbing element in His human consciousness and experience.[2] The mutual differences in mode of functioning of the Godhead and of the Manhood, and the consequent non-interference of one with the other, are overlooked.[3] Any attempt, however orthodox in intention, to distinguish two egos in Christ, necessarily involves a Nestorian logic. Furthermore, limitation in the exercise of divine power does not become a possible conception by calling it voluntary. It is of the divine essence that God should be *purus actus*.[4] From the nature of things eternal action cannot become limited, for such an event means change, and change occurs only in temporal things and events. The Son's self-limitation is to be predicated of Him as touching the Manhood, not as touching the Godhead.[5]

[1] So Bishop F. Weston, *The One Christ;* and E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 386–392. It should be noted that Anglican kenoticists usually emphasize the voluntariness of the kenôsis.

[2] For example, see F. Weston, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–66; and *passim.*

[3] Cf. ch. vi. §§ 2, 10–11, above.

[4] See *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xi. § 8.

[5] As will be shown in § 6, limitations in the effects of divine power are not limitations of power.

The Anglican writers to whom we refer do not appear to embrace the Lutheran postulate in all its baldness — that the Incarnation signifies a communication of divine attributes to the Manhood. But their use of the argument that our Lord's full exercise of divine power is incompatible with His submission to human limitations is illogical unless something like that postulate is retained. In any case the development of kenotic Christology was historically due to an effort to solve a problem the form of which was created by Martin Luther's novel doctrine of the Incarnation, and which does not emerge in that form in the catholic doctrine.

II. *Kenotic Arguments*

§ 5. If our account of the origin of kenoticism is correct, its primary basis is the *à priori* argument that the Son of God could not retain, at least could not continue to exercise and enjoy, His divine power, knowledge and omnipresence, if He was to become really human and was truly to submit in our nature to the limitations of human experience and growth.

The validity of this argument is obvious, if the retaining of these functions and attributes means either their communication to the Manhood, as Lutheran doctrine postulates, or their emergence within our Lord's human consciousness, as kenoticists take for granted. But if the postulate

referred to is contrary to sound doctrine, as it certainly is to catholic dogma, and if the manner of divine functioning is not such as either interferes with the limitations of the created natures in which God is in any case an immanent Worker, or is susceptible of observance by human faculties, then the argument in question is non-relevant and invalid in such a connection. It really proves (*a*) that Godhead cannot be communicated to real Manhood; and (*b*) that divine functioning, even when proceeding from the same Ego to which human functioning is to be ascribed, cannot emerge as a disturbing element within the phenomena of human experience.

The pertinence of this may be illustrated by the relations which can be thought to exist between our Lord's divine omniscience and His human consciousness. That in Christ while on earth there was a mysterious communion between the divine and the human, so that a grace of union illuminated His human mind to a unique degree, we have already maintained;[1] but grace does not subvert human limitations and the laws of growth in human knowledge. It assists and perfects our intelligence without altering the manner of its exercise and growth. Our main point in this connection is that there could be no other operation of divine intelligence within Christ's human consciousness than that of grace. The reason for such a conclusion is

[1] Cf. chh. v. 8; vi. 3.

clear. Divine intelligence does not operate after the manner of human consciousness, but transcends in mode all temporal laws of attention and progress from point to point which control our mental processes. In brief, divine intelligence does not psychologize,[1] and therefore cannot obtrude itself as a psychical experience or phenomenon within human consciousness. If, therefore, as catholic doctrine teaches, Jesus Christ on earth was possessed of the intelligence of Godhead, this intelligence neither did nor could come within the open experience of His human consciousness, so as to nullify the reality of His submission in the Manhood to the normal conditions of growth in human knowledge. Even in the particular of self-consciousness, our Lord's human mind must have been unable to act otherwise than in the finite and progressive manner of human self-consciousness.

§ 6. The notion that creation itself involves a kind of self-emptying on God's part [2] — advanced to fortify the kenotic argument which we are considering — will not stand close scrutiny. If valid, it proves the untenable conclusion that power to

[1] If, contrary to our contention, it could be abandoned, its abandonment would not be a "psychological process," as P. T. Forsyth describes it, in *Person and Place of Christ*, p. 273. Such a description is simply meaningless.

[2] Found in F. R. Tennant, *Origin and Propagation of Sin*, pp. 134–141; Forbes Robinson, *Self-Limitation of the Word of God*, pp. 15–17 and ch. ii; E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, p. 388.

determine effects is self-destructive. It proves that God could not retain the fulness of His freedom and power except by not willing determinate effects. An act of will is indeed a self-determining act, but the limitations which it creates pertain to the effects which it produces. They do not *in se* reduce either the rank in being or the properties and resources of him who wills them. A being plus effectuating purpose cannot be treated as equivalent to that being minus essential power, without reducing the crowning characteristic of personal power to self-destructive impotence.[1]

To describe the self-determined accommodation of divine power to the production of a series of severely limited effects as self-limitation, unless the phrase is used in a purely relative and extraneous sense as describing the effects which God wills to produce, is to describe the manifestation of divine resourcefulness as its nullification. Determinateness of effects is essential to the exercise of any voluntary power, and cannot rationally be interpreted as reducing it. The comparative greatness or smallness of effects does not *in se* determine the power of their worker, although it does determine the manner and extent of the *manifestation* of that power to us. These are truisms.

It is true that a finite agent by adopting a purpose changes his will, and to the degree of the tenacity of his purpose relatively limits himself — that is,

[1] See *Ch. Qly. Review*, Oct., 1891, pp. 43–44.

shortens the range of effects which he can produce while maintaining that purpose. There is a movement in such cases from wider to narrower freedom, although not in the sense of an intrinsic reduction of power. But such a transition, with its relative shortening of previous freedom, is absent from divine volition. The will of God is not made less truly eternal, and less absolutely free from innovating transitions that would narrow, in this relative sense, the range of His action, because to have a beginning and to change pertains to the nature of the effects which He wills. The limiting, or introduction of limits previously non-existent, pertains to what is willed, not to the eternal willing of God itself. This never changes.

A confusion of thought somewhat similar to that which causes men to ascribe the limitations of creation to the Creator is found in the argument based upon the distinction between absolute and relative attributes of God — the argument that because omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence are relative attributes, they can be abandoned without subversion of the Godhead.[1] All true attributes of God signify absolute properties of His essence. This is so even when the terms employed are borrowed from relative aspects, from the relations

[1] A. B. Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, pp. 143–144, says, "This distinction between the relative and essential attributes of God is the speculative foundation of Thomasian Christology." The argument is dealt with in *The Kenotic Theory*, ch. vii.

between God and created things. We describe God as omnipotent, that is as sovereign over all power displayed in the created universe, but the reality in God to which we refer cannot rightly be regarded as an effect of creation. It is an eternal and essential property of God, as God — the absolute antecedent, so to speak, of God's creative action. Similarly, when we describe God as omniscient, the *omni* refers to finite things and events; but we are describing in inadequate terms a knowledge which characterizes God *as God*, a knowledge which reduces to absurdity the notion that any knowable thing can be unknown to Him. All the knowable things of this world are indeed products of creative will, but to suppose that their Creator can have His knowledge of them interrupted or shortened is to forget the eternal nature of divine knowledge *qua* divine. Omnipresence is also a relative term, but it signifies a necessary property of God which, because of its absoluteness, cannot from the nature of the case fail to actualize in every sphere of created being and place. In brief, creation being presupposed, God must be omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent in relation to it.[1]

The conclusion to which these considerations bring us is that no argument for the possibility of our Lord's abandoning divine omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence can rightly be deduced from their

[1] On these attributes and their relativity, see *Being and Attrib. of God*. ch. xii. §§ 1–4.

alleged relativity. They are not less absolute *in se*, because our knowledge of them, and the terms by which we have to signify them, are relative; and it is as possible for a truly divine Person to cease to be holy and loving — an incredible absurdity, of course — as for Him to cease, as God, to be almighty, omniscient and omnipresent.

§ 7. This last remark brings us to the ethical argument. The Incarnation, it is urged, must be regarded primarily as a drama of condescending love; and metaphysical considerations may not be pressed at the expense of this supreme requirement. Love is the primary attribute of God, and the heart of the Gospel message is that God has effectively shown His love by a real identification of Himself with our limitations and sorrows. To dwell on abstract requirements of Deity, requirements which cannot be described in terms of an incarnate life; is to convert this message into a metaphysical puzzle.[1]

That the ethical aspects of the Incarnation are absolutely vital is too generally realized to-day for us to consume space in acknowledging and maintaining so obvious a proposition. But the assumption that these aspects can be permanently vindicated by those who disregard what are invidiously de-

[1] The Ethical argument is discussed in *The Kenotic Theory*, ch. v. It is urged by A. J. Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 27–28; R. L. Ottley, *Incarn.*, Vol. II. pp. 287–288; Bp. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 218–220.

scribed as metaphysical attributes of God should be most earnestly denied. One would naturally infer from the disparaging language often used concerning these attributes and their requirements that they are the creations of futile speculation instead of necessities of true thinking about God.[1] To say, for example, that a depotentiated Person of the Godhead cannot be truly divine may be metaphysical — which means merely that it concerns what is fundamental to the being of God, and requires real thinking to apprehend its bearings; — but to allege that when, as against denials, we maintain this in interpreting the Incarnation, we sacrifice the ethical aspects of that mystery appears to us singularly fatuous. Only by careful maintenance of Christ's possession of full Godhead, and therefore of all that Godhead includes in order to be itself, can we continue to identify the display of love which He made in Jewry with an exhibition of the love of God. If the love which Christ displayed on earth was God's love, this is because Christ was God when He displayed it. To maintain His true Deity is therefore a vital condition of maintaining that His incarnate life has the

[1] See some weighty words on the danger of disparaging the "metaphysical" attributes of God by the late Dr. Bright, quoted from a personal letter in *The Kenotic Theory*, p. 98. The antithesis made between metaphysical and ethical attributes grows wholly out of our mode of apprehending them — not at all out of any opposition between them or mutual independence in the Godhead *in se*.

ethical value of divine love. And this cannot be done when we describe Him as deficient in what all our knowledge of God requires us to ascribe to Him — the attributes which kenoticists declare Him to have abandoned.[1] A Godhead to which the minus sign is appended is essentially other than the Godhead which we have to postulate in Christ when we identify His love with the love of very God.

So much by way of summary reply. But a few incidental branches of the argument may well be noticed. It is urged, for instance, that the greatness of the sacrifice which the Son made when He became incarnate is magnified, and becomes more effectual as an exhibition of pitying love, when we acknowledge that He abandoned divine powers and prerogatives in order to identify Himself with us. Our answer is twofold. In the first place the cost of His identification with us does not depend upon such abandonment, but upon the reality of His submission in the Manhood to our painful conditions and limitations. The Manhood had become by His condescension as truly His as was the Godhead. Its conditions became His conditions, that is, very God's conditions, and the amazing con-

[1] Prof. Godet, in an inadvertent moment no doubt, says, "He had been loving with all the force of a perfect, infinite love, and this kind of love He exchanges for one which implies progress both in respect of intensity and of comprehension." *New Test. Studies*, as quoted by H. C. Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 3.

descension involved in this fact is not enhanced by ascribing the limitations which He thus accepted to His Godhead. Indeed, and this is our second point, to do this is to nullify the redeeming value of His humiliation. If it was not full God who was submitting to temptation, suffering and death in that Manhood, we cannot ascribe a full divine value to His sufferings.

It is true, as kenoticists urge, that the perfect sympathy of Christ grew out of His full participation in our conditions, sin excepted, we add; but the supposition that such full participation required a real kenôsis of the divine in Him is an *à priori* assumption which has already been shown to be unwarranted.[1]

The bearing of true doctrine concerning Christ's Person on the value and meaning of His example is a large subject, one which will receive some attention in our next chapter,[2] but two anticipatory remarks seem to be desirable at this stage. The onesided manner in which our Lord's moral identification with us is being urged in some quarters encourages a very dangerous error. If His battle was in all respects like ours, then He had to contend with sinful propensities within Himself, and the need of repentance was one of His needs. It is obvious that His perfect example cannot be explained without acknowledging His possession of resources

[1] Cf. § 5 of this chapter. [2] Cf. also ch. iv. § 11, above.

which our nature cannot supply. Our second remark is that Christ confessedly came to reveal divine righteousness in human terms. But the righteousness of a depotentiated Person is not *in se* the righteousness of God, and Christ must have been all that very God is, if His righteousness is properly speaking to be attributed to very God.

§ 8. There remains the keenly felt difficulty that an immediate juxtaposition of divine attributes and human conditions appears to reduce the reality of the latter. How, it is asked in substance, can infinite majesty and human lowliness be immediately combined without the lowliness being swallowed up in the majesty?

This difficulty, so far as it is distinct from the problems already discussed, seems to arise from confusing a juxtaposition of predications in our descriptions of Christ with an assertion that the divine attributes thus predicated of Christ are brought into open combination with the human in one conscious experience. The juxtapositions in question have no such implication. Their true meaning is that, although pertaining to distinct natures, and although actualized in manners which preclude an invasion of human experience by divine operations, divine and human attributes have one centre and belong to one Self, the Word-incarnate. In brief, these predications are placed in juxtaposition simply in order to bear witness to our Lord's being both

God and Man — not less truly God than Man, and not less truly Man than God.[1]

There are two kinds of antitheses. In one kind the aim is to accentuate something by contrasting it with something which is either repudiated or minimized. Such antitheses have to be employed with caution, for they are very apt to express and to crystallize onesided views. They often caricature what they emphasize and sacrifice what, if done justice to, would preclude such error. But the juxtapositions with which we are concerned belong to a different class altogether. In them the purpose is to synthesize the most opposite aspects of truth in order to avoid onesidedness.[2] The only exaggeration which can be read into them is based upon the mistake above described, of interpreting a close juxtaposition of opposite predications as if it meant closeness of visible connection in the reality thus described. The juxtapositions of catholic Christology are designed to guard the fulness and balance of Christian doctrine, and they have proved serviceable for that purpose. They signify that the truth of Christ's Deity must not be per-

[1] "It is easy to find contradictions if we drop or ignore all the qualifications which saved them from being contradictions." W. Sanday, *Christologies*, p. 44.

[2] It is a merit, rather than a matter for adverse criticism, that the Council of Chalcedon combined in one declaration the opposite aspects of the Person of Christ, thus warning believers against onesided positions. The Council was not summoned for the solution of problems, but for the definition of credenda.

mitted to obscure the truth of His Manhood, and that assertions as to the reality of His Manhood must not be made at the cost of shortening belief in His Godhead.

Kenoticists are convinced that overwhelming evidences are afforded in the Gospel narratives that our Lord really submitted to human limitations, that the only experiences of Christ which the apostles observed were human, and that divine properties and functions never emerged in His earthly life. We are as fully convinced of all this as they are, and it is unnecessary to repeat their labour in exhibiting the evidence. They have done it thoroughly, and it needed to be done.

Where we fail to be convinced is when these patent limitations of Christ, and the absence of any obtrusion of Godhead and of divine operations within our Lord's human experience, are given kenotic interpretation. We say, on the basis of all the pertinent data available, that Jesus Christ submitted in a real human nature to the limitations of a normal human life, and we mean what we say. On the other hand, on the basis of Christ's own teaching, we believe Him to have been very God while on earth; and this means nothing to us unless it signifies His possession of all that has to be meant by true "Deity." How Godhead and Manhood could thus have the same ego, we have neither the data nor the capacity to determine. But we are saved from feeling troubled by remembering what

has elsewhere been more fully set forth, that the difference between the functioning of Godhead and that of Manhood sufficiently accounts for the non-emergence of the former in our Lord's human life and experience. We do not need to minimize the divine by a kenotic theory, in order to do justice to the uninterrupted human quality of our Lord's earthly life.

III. *New Testament Teaching*

§ 9. In considering New Testament teaching we start with the broad conclusion just set forth, that nothing emerged in our Lord's human experience and consciousness which interrupted or reduced the fulness of His submission in our nature to our limitations — sinfulness alone being excepted, as inconsistent with His Person and with His mission. And lest we should be thought to evade any of the facts, we acknowledge and maintain that His human mind was ignorant in some respects. In particular, He did not know in human terms of the day and hour of His second coming, for this kind of knowledge apparently could not emerge in His earthly consciousness except by revelation.

In this significant sense the Gospels clearly teach that very God for our sakes effaced Himself. In this sense He became poor — by submitting in our nature to the conditions of our poverty — in order that through His becoming poor we might be made

rich.[1] He could not thus have enriched us, however, if His acceptance of our poverty-stricken manhood had involved His impoverishment in the divine riches wherewith He makes us rich — not except on the incredible supposition that His impoverishment consisted in *transferring* His divine wealth from Himself to us, that is, in changing places with us.

§ 10. The classic description of the mystery of Christ's self-effacement is found in St. Paul's *Epistle to the Philippians*[2] — a passage which is used by kenoticists as their primary proof-text. We shall give reasons for thinking that the meaning which they find in it has been unconsciously *read into it* by themselves. Their exegesis is obviously and in any case dependent for justification upon a literal interpretation of the critical phrase, ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν; and it is not wholly free from difficulty even on the supposition that such interpretation is correct. The verb κενόω does have a metaphorical, or rhetorical, as well as a literal use;[3]

[1] 2 Cor. viii. 9.

[2] Phil. ii. 5–8, the context extending from verse 3 to verse 11, inclusive. Cf. *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 57–70. A survey of various interpretations is given by E. H. Gifford, *The Incarnation*, Part II; also by H. C. Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 246–255.

[3] Writing from a kenotic standpoint, A. J. Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 21, frankly says, "A κενοῖν, upon which so much has sometimes been made to turn, does not exactly mean 'to empty' but has passed through various shades of meaning, such as to exhaust (in the natural sense), until it comes to mean something like 'to reduce the force, or significance, or reputation of a thing.'"

and although it is a sound principle of exegesis always to adopt a literal interpretation unless the evidence available forbids this, we are justified in entertaining the possibility that the context in a given case requires a non-literal interpretation.

The phrase in question is imbedded in the middle of a context which is concerned, both before and after its occurrence, with one coherent practical exhortation; and unless evidence appears of a digression at this point, we ought to interpret the phrase in accordance with orderly sequence of thought in the exhortation. By taking the phrase rhetorically we are able to do this; whereas by pressing a literal exegesis we are compelled to suppose that St. Paul interrupted a homily on vainglory by an unrelated, condensed and difficult theological proposition — a proposition which he does not stop to clarify, and which appears to be incongruous with his teaching elsewhere. We proceed to indicate what appears to us to be the real sequence of St. Paul's thought.

He begins by urging his readers to avoid factious and vainglorious behaviour, and to act with lowliness of mind, "not looking each of you to his own things, but each of you also to the things of others." The word also, *καί*, is significant, and expressly excludes the supposition that he was urging them literally to abandon their own things. The thought is that they are not to be absorbed in them with a self-esteem that will prevent their careful thought

for the things of others. To enforce this lesson he illustrates it by the mind and example of Christ, as exhibited in His Incarnation and death on the Cross, describing these mysteries in terms suggested by the lesson with which he is uninterruptedly concerned, and proceeding to show, by mentioning the resulting honour which the human name of Christ acquires, that self-effacement ultimately obtains a reward which is specifically appropriate to itself.

All this thought hangs together if St. Paul's description of the Incarnation illustrates his exhortation, which it does not if he is describing an abandonment by Christ of eternal properties of His Person. Translating with such freedom and parenthetic paraphrase as will punctuate the connection, he says, Although He was in the form of God (that is, entitled to divine honour), He did not reckon His equality with God to consist in grasping[1] (for human repute), but (taking the opposite course) effaced Himself (literally, "emptied" Himself, but in this connection, effaced Himself, by surrendering all anxiety concerning His personal glory), that is, He took the form of a servant, becoming in the likeness of men (a form and a likeness to which no honour was likely to be paid); and being found in fashion as a man (that

[1] It is coming to be realized that ἁρπαγμός is not to be interpreted passively, as equivalent to ἁρπαγμά, but actively. Cf. John Ross, in *Journal of Theol. Stud.*, July, 1909, pp. 573–574; and W. Warren, in same Review, Apr., 1911, pp. 461–463.

is, no superhuman appearances being observable in Him, such as would qualify His self-effacement), He humbled Himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea the death of the Cross. Wherefore also (that is, what follows being clearly in line with His self-effacement) God highly exalted Him (in the Manhood wherein He humbled Himself), and gave unto Him (added something which He did not have before He humbled Himself by taking the form of a servant) the name which is above every name; that in the name of Jesus (in the very name whereby men had known Him only as a man) every knee should bow (that is, the very nature, or things of others, which He had made His own became the identifying medium of the honour among men which He had foreborne to grasp), etc.

§ 11. The rendering of ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν here adopted, "effaced Himself," appears to the writer to be a fairly close idiomatic English equivalent to St. Paul's rhetorical phraseology; and the continuity of St. Paul's argument seems to require some such interpretation.[1] That this is so can be seen when we note the consequences of insisting upon a rigidly literal interpretation. It certainly converts the phrase into a sudden digression, a

[1] This seems better than the translation adopted by the writer in *The Kenotic Theory*, "disparaged Himself." The idea is that He waived the honor to which He was entitled, by "taking the form of a servant," etc. The A. V., "made Himself of no reputation," is true to the idea.

digression which is returned from too quickly to justify itself by sufficient intelligibility. St. Paul has prepared his readers to see in the Incarnation a preference on Christ's part of self-effacing concern for the things of others to a vainglorious concern for His own things; but the literal interpretation of this phrase makes Him describe a very different thing — an *abandonment* of His own things. And since previous to the Incarnation His own things were of the eternal order, He could not have abandoned anything temporal and accidental. He had no such thing to abandon.

Those who insist upon a literal construction have, therefore, to face the question as to what He could have abandoned. The context supplies two possible answers to this question. He abandoned either the form of God, or His being on an equality with God. The former supposition gains few supporters to-day, and is practically equivalent to the radical theory of an abandonment of his Godhead, already seen to be untenable. If we take the other alternative, usually described as an abandonment of His eternal glory,[1] wherein can such abandonment be found? The beloved Son in whom the Father declared Himself to be well pleased was not less glorious in that

[1] A frequent interpretation, *e.g.* by J. B. Lightfoot, E. H. Gifford, etc. Closely considered, this is in reality a metaphorical construction. Glory is not a thing or content to which the term "emptied" could literally apply. It is rather a relation or repute; and to "empty of glory" is equivalent not to a literal emptying, but to "making of no reputation"— in agreement with the A. V.

Father's eyes because of His submission to our conditions. And if the glory referred to was the honour which was due to His Person from men, that glory had never been given Him, but was won subsequently to the Incarnation by His humiliation and victory over death. The metaphysical notion of an abandonment of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, is not supported by the slightest hint in St. Paul.

St. Paul uses the verb κενόω with elastic freedom elsewhere,[1] and this fact confirms our argument from the context that in the text which we are considering he was exercising similar freedom, resorting to an expression which only becomes difficult when we read into it an *à priori* view of what the Incarnation involves which is neither pertinent to the catholic doctrine of that mystery nor discoverable in the text before us. How foreign such a view is to St. Paul's thought is apparent when we consider carefully his saying that in Christ "dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." [2] The

[1] Cf. Rom. iv. 14; I Cor. i. 17; ix. 15; 2 Cor. ix. 3. He nowhere uses it literally. Dr. Samuel Hart, N. Y. *Churchman*, Feb. 26, 1898, p. 308, points out also that the adjective κένος is used 13 times in the New Test. in the metaphorical sense of "vain," and only 4 times in the literal sense of empty. A. E. J. Rawlinson, in *Foundations*, p. 174, n. 1, says, "It is clear from other passages in which the word is used . . . that κενοῦν in late Greek had come to bear a meaning 'to make void,' 'to nullify,' rather than to make 'empty.'" He translates "nullified Himself." Cf. S. N. Rostron, *Christology of St. Paul*, pp. 113-114, note.

[2] Col. ii. 9.

pertinency of this assertion is not disproved by the supposition that St. Paul is speaking of Christ in glory. The point is that he here clearly asserts the union of full Godhead with bodily manifestation in Christ's indivisible Person, and if a real Incarnation is incompatible with the retention of full Godhead, it is as truly incompatible now as during our Lord's earthly life. His body has indeed been glorified, but it has not become infinite, and *finitum non est capax infiniti* is as true in relation to a glorified finite as it is in relation to an earthly one. The whole difficulty of modern thought on this subject grows, as we have seen, out of the misleading postulate that the Incarnation is a communication of divine properties to human nature.

§ 12. Lest the attention devoted in this chapter to adverse criticism of the kenotic theory should obscure the positive doctrine of the humiliation of the Son of God which we have been seeking to maintain, we conclude with a brief statement of it. His humiliation consisted in His real submission, by making His own the form of a servant, to the limitations of human nature and experience. We add the significant phrase, "as touching the Manhood" which He assumed. But as He made the Manhood His own personal property and the vehicle of personal experience, this phrase in no wise reduces either the reality, or the cost of His humiliation by limitations truly felt and by pains and sorrows personally endured.

We refuse to add, "as touching the Godhead," because such an addition implies that the Person who endured our limitations and was "touched with feeling of our infirmities" was not full God, and therefore not the Revealer in human life of what very God submitted to for love of us. Every point of view which we can reasonably assume, without stultifying New Testament teaching concerning the work of the divine Revealer and Redeemer, drives us to this conclusion. Neither a consideration of what God can be thought to be in Himself, nor a faithful maintenance of the ethical value of the Incarnation, permits us to acknowledge that the supremest manifestation of divine and almighty love which the world has experienced was in fact a shortening of what the Lord came to reveal in human terms. To use His submission to our woes as an argument for reducing our estimate of what He was — and this is the real logic of kenoticism — seems to us a very strange manner of accepting the claims by which we are made aware of the greatness of the condescension that He was exhibiting when He made them.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST

I. *His Twofold Operations*

§ 1. No aspect of the mission of Christ is more appealing to the modern mind, and more essential to the true doctrine, than His submission to be "tempted in all points like as we are," in order that by His human victory He might afford an example, the perfection and practical value of which is independent of diversities of race, age and circumstance. The jealousy, therefore, with which moderns regard any doctrine or theory which appears to reduce the reality of our Lord's temptations, and of His moral efforts in resisting them, is not only inevitable but imperatively demands our sympathy.

Two traditional doctrines are thought by many to be inconsistent with the exemplary aspect of Christ's human life: — viz., His coincident possession of two wills, the divine and the human, and His impeccability. Something has already been said as to the necessity that the divine Redeemer should not be liable to moral failure;[1] and more

[1] Cf. chh. iv. 11 and v. 3 (*fin.*), above.

will be said in later sections of this chapter as to the bearing of impeccability on the reality of our Lord's temptation, and on the nature and value of His example.[1] We have first to consider the doctrine of two wills; which cannot be rightly understood, however, except in relation to the larger doctrine of which it is a part — that of Christ's twofold operations in general.[2]

This doctrine was declared by the sixth Ecumenical Council in the following terms: "We also declare that there are two natural willings, θελήσεις, or wills, θελήματα, and two natural energies, in Christ, without separation, without change, without partition, without confusion, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀμερίστως, ἀσυγχύτως, . . . And that the two natural wills are not opposed to each other, . . . but His human will followed, and it does not resist and oppose, but rather is subject to the divine and almighty will." [3]

This doctrine was deduced by the Council from the teaching of the Tome of St. Leo, that each nature of Christ, each *forma*, "does what is proper to itself in communion with the other." [4] It presupposes that the terms "person" and "nature" are distinguished in such wise as to include will within the application of "nature." [5] By "two natural ener-

[1] In § 6 and in §§ 9–12 respectively.

[2] Cf. ch. vi. §§ 2–3, above.

[3] Given by C. J. Hefele, *Hist. of Christ. Councils*, Vol. V. pp. 174–175. [4] In ch. iv. [5] See ch. ii. § 8 (*fin.*), above.

gies" is meant two natural modes of operation, each nature operating after its proper manner.[1] The descriptive adjective "almighty" is used to characterize Christ's divine will, not to imply that His human will was overborne and absorbed by almightiness; and various modern writers have been too hasty in inferring that, if our Lord's human will was always subject to His divine will, its human integrity was nullified. Such an inference involves the indefensible premise that uninterrupted subjection of our own wills to the divine will, an acknowledged mark of Christian perfection, can be achieved only at the cost of losing human freedom. It is a Christian truism that our wills are not completely free until they are thus subjected to the will of God. This subjection must indeed be moral, free from compulsion; but it is essential to a right understanding of the doctrine with which we are concerned to remember that the subjection of Christ's human will to His divine will was a branch of His moral perfection, and not the result of constraint.[2] This perfection was indeed a fruit of the grace of union; but grace enhances rather than reduces moral freedom.

§ 2. We shall be helped in considering the two

[1] Of course the phrase "nature operates" means the *Ego* operates after the manner of Godhead, on the one hand, and after that of manhood, on the other hand.

[2] Cf. J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, pp. 97–98. On various theories of free will, see *Cath. Encyc.*, *q. v.*, by M. Maher; also H. Calderwood, *Moral Philos.*, Pt. III. ch. iii.

wills of Christ by first recapitulating certain points which have already been made with regard to the twofold operations of Christ in knowledge.

(*a*) Being truly divine, Christ must have possessed divine knowledge, or omniscience, in His Godhead, a knowledge which is exercised in manners that altogether transcend psychical functioning.[1] Being also truly human, He exercised in His Manhood the human faculties of knowledge in the psychical manner and under the limitations of the human mind and consciousness. In other words He possessed two knowledges, the divine and the human, and to deny either the fulness of the one or the human limitations of the other is to imperil belief in the precious doctrine that Jesus Christ is both God and Man.

(*b*) The mutual connection between these two knowledges in Christ is not truly described as an open association in one conscious experience, which apparently would cause His divine knowledge to overshadow and break down the limitations of His human experience. Rather it consists in their convergence in a common Ego or Self — this Self transcending human consciousness and not coming within the compass of things open to direct conscious scrutiny.[2] It is in the mysterious domain of self that the divine and human knowledges of Christ meet and interact. Therefore the manner

[1] Cf. chh. v. (§ 6) and vi. (§ 2), above.
[2] Cf. ch. iv. § 2.

of interaction was, on the human side, unconscious, for the contents of His divine knowledge could not be openly apprehended by His human mind, so as to become overshadowing elements of His consciousness, destructive of its natural limitations and of His subjection in our nature to the conditions of human experience.

(*c*) No more adequate phrase is available wherewith to describe the method and illuminating effect of the divine mind's action on the human faculties of Christ than the phrase "grace of union." This grace would seem, normally at least, not to operate after the manner of revelation, or direct intimations, concerning things non-ascertainable by human experience and reflection, but rather by enhancing the spiritual security of its operations. Just as a telescope enables human eyes to examine the heavens more perfectly and accurately, without altering the laws of optics, so the grace of union would seem to have increased the range and accuracy of our Lord's understanding of heavenly things, without altering in His case the laws of human intelligence.

(*d*) The imperviousness of our Lord's divine knowledge to direct scrutiny by His human intelligence is to be inferred not only from the fact that their meeting point is one which transcends human observation, but also from the fact that divine intelligence does not psychologize — does not operate in a manner which makes it susceptible to the kind of observation of which human minds are capable.

Timeless intuition is as adequate a description of divine knowledge as we are able to give. Being infinite and eternal, *qua* divine, it is not a thing of process, proceeding through phenomenal sequences such as can be apprehended by our minds; and it is not subject, as our knowledge is, to the limiting law of exclusive attention to particulars. Its operations and contents have no subjective forms which permit them to emerge within a human consciousness. Accordingly, possession of divine knowledge by the eternal Son did not and could not upset the integrity and laws of human intelligence coincidently exercised by that same Person.[1]

§ 3. Before applying what has been said to an interpretation of the doctrine of two wills, it is desirable to clear away a certain confusion of thought. If what has been said in this volume concerning the theological meaning of "person"[2] and the reality of self,[3] as distinguished from its functioning, is substantially valid, we may not regard will as identified with person in such wise as to make an assertion of two wills necessarily equivalent to an assertion of two persons in Christ. In human persons there can be but one will because in such persons there is but one general mode of functioning, the human. But if in Christ there were two

[1] On divine knowing, and its contrast with the human, see *The Kenotic Theory*, ch. xi; H. C. Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, Bk. I. ch. iv. Cf. *Being and Attributes of God*, ch. xii. § 3.

[2] *E.g.* in ch. ii. § 8 *fin.* [3] In ch. iv. § 2.

general modes of functioning, the divine and the human, we cannot deny that there were two wills in Him except on the mistaken assumption that either divine or human functioning is complete, is possible, without will as constituent and determining element. And will is a particular functioning of self, not the self which functions. As a mode of functioning it is also not a substantial thing; and "two wills in one person" does not signify two mutually external and static things possessed by the person, but two functional modes of determination in action by the person, pertaining severally to divine and human operations. These preliminaries will facilitate an understanding of the particulars now to be set forth.

(*a*) Being truly divine, and functioning after the divine manner, Christ must have exercised these functions in a self-determining manner, that is, voluntarily; and the manner of His will in these functions must have been divine, that is, eternal and transcending the psychical processes which attend and condition human willing. Being also human, and submitting to operate in His Manhood after the human manner, He must also have acted voluntarily in His human functioning; and the manner of His willing in this functioning must have been truly human, that is, subject to processes of deliberation and to motives derived from human experience — a manner widely different from that of divine willing.

(*b*) The meeting point and sphere of interaction between the divine and human wills of Christ, thus functioning in different manners, is His personal Self. The divine will was His will while on earth, and likewise the human will; but their interaction did not and could not emerge within human consciousness at all, except in its indirect effects on his human will, yet to be considered.[1] The divine will did not become a psychical phenomenon — it does not operate in a psychical manner, — and did not therefore become a disturbing and overbearing factor in the conscious process of His human deliberation and volition.[2]

(*c*) The same phrase has to be employed in describing the action and moral effect of His divine upon his Human will which was used in describing the action of His divine upon His human intelligence — the grace of union. In so far as such grace illumined His human intelligence and protected it from spiritual deception, without disturbing the laws of its functioning, to this extent it afforded guiding factors in our Lord's human deliberations

[1] P. T. Forsyth supposes that the initial act of divine will by which Christ accepted human conditions prevented His sinning. He does not face the question, How can a divine act of willing be initial in the sense of coming to an end? But his contention is an acknowledgment that *somehow* the divine will acted on His human will. It is significant that he adds that, since His human mind was ignorant of the preventive power saving Him from sin, therefore His temptation was a felt reality. *Person and Place of Christ*, pp. 341–342.

[2] A. J. Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 66, misses this.

which protected His moral judgments from coming in conflict with righteousness. This grace, judging from the less abundant effects of grace within ourselves, also strengthened His human will in the pursuit of righteousness, such strengthening constituting an emancipation and perfecting of human freedom, rather than an alteration of the laws of human volition and a nullification of the human quality of such functioning. Moreover, there is no warrant for supposing that either the human effort necessary on our Lord's part in choosing and acting righteously, or the sufferings involved in such choice and action, were reduced in degree and moral value.[1] Neither our own experience with grace nor the Gospel accounts of His human experience justify such a conclusion.

(*d*) The imperviousness to human scrutiny of the operations of Christ's divine will could not have been less absolute than that of the activity of His divine intelligence. But His human will, *qua* human, could not be influenced except in two ways, that is, by humanly gained considerations and motives, and by the operations of grace above indicated. These influences could not nullify either the integrity of His human will, His being accessible to human motives and temptations, or the properly human and painful quality of the efforts by which He won His moral victory and persevered in obedience unto death.

[1] Cf. § 7, below.

The doctrine of two wills, as we have imperfectly set forth its contents and bearings, while essential to belief in our Lord's full participation in the natures of God and of man, is not open to the charge most apt at present to be made against it — that of dualism. He who wills in Christ is one, and the distinction of wills is not a disruption of His Person, but a description of His functions — twofold because the self-same Christ is both God and Man.[1]

§ 4. In exercising His human will Christ displayed a character and moral power which, along with the absence of any contrary evidence, constrains us to acknowledge the truth of His claim to be entirely free from sin.[2] In being sinless He was absolutely unique among those who have been born of woman. It is true that a few human saints have attained, after much self-discipline, an approximate freedom from sin; and, according to practically universal catholic opinion, the Blessed Virgin was enabled by grace to avoid at least all mortal sin. But her case belongs to the category of explainable exceptions which prove the rule, and all instances of approximate sinlessness among mere human beings,

[1] On our Lord's two wills, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xviii; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 56; and *Sermons on the Incarn.*, pp. 109–110; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, V. xlviii. 9; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s. v.* "Monothelites," A; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.* § 174; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 204–206.

[2] In the rest of this chapter we shall bring together in coherent sequence certain thoughts which have had to be separately anticipated, in some cases more than once, in the previous chapters.

including her case, are fruits of the grace of Christ.[1] He alone made sinlessness attainable for others through His grace; and in Him alone it was not merely an attainment but also the proper effect and manifestation of a moral invincibility which characterized Him from the very beginning of His experience with temptation. It is true that He was made perfect by what He suffered,[2] but the facts require us to interpret such a statement as meaning that it was through suffering that His initial invincibility developed into the actualized forms of virtue — the forms in which it had to develop in order to have exemplary value and to become the subject-matter of divine approval before man.[3]

The uniqueness of the phenomenon compels us to believe that it cannot be explained except by assuming that our Lord possessed unique resources in meeting temptation. To insist that He began in every respect on our level is not only to disregard the necessities involved in His Person and redemptive mission, but is also to leave unexplained a demonstration of moral and spiritual strength of which we know other men to be incapable. In view of requirements already sufficiently vindicated in this volume, certain lines of explanation have

[1] That what she was represents a fruit of Christ's redemption is acknowledged even in the papal Bull *Ineffabilis*, on the Immaculate Conception.

[2] Heb. ii. 10.

[3] St. Matt. iii. 17; St. Mark i. 11; St. Luke iii. 22. Cf. St. Luke ii. 52.

to be eliminated. Being truly human, and having as vital part of His mission to set a really human example, Christ cannot be thought to have overborne the spontaneous tendencies of His human will by enlisting compulsory influences from His Godhead. The open invasion of His divine volition within His human consciousness we have seen to be impossible in any case. It is equally impossible to suppose that His Manhood was rendered either non-sensitive or less sensitive to the appealing power of temptation. That he was really "touched with the feeling of our infirmities" is a vital truth. Finally, we cannot, in face of the evidence, suppose that Christ was freed from the normal dependence of human beings for moral victory upon strenuous effort and upon the endurance of great suffering. The Gospel narratives show that every fibre of His Manhood was wracked to the last degree in meeting temptation.[1]

No explanation is credible except the ancient one, that the resources of grace in His Manhood were unique. Our own experience teaches us that grace does not nullify either our accessibility to temptation or our dependence upon human faculties and efforts in moral conflict. Its observed effect is to fortify our purpose of resisting temptations and to facilitate our success in resisting them after the human manner. If we were so highly endowed with grace as to be sure of success, the manner and

[1] Especially in the Garden of Gethsemane.

cost of such success would remain unchanged — perfectly human. To explain the moral invincibility of Christ we have to hypothecate such fulness of grace in Him. We are told that the Holy Spirit was given to His Manhood without measure,[1] that is to the full measure of the receptive capacity of a Manhood not previously tainted by sin. This does not mean that His Manhood possessed the actualized virtues of sainthood *ab initio*, but that its successful growth in these virtues was made possible and inevitable — the cost of success being none the less all that attends perfect moral victory in human life on earth.

This impeccability, as His moral invincibility is usually called, was, as we have seen, a legitimate fruit of His fulness of grace. It needs to be added that, in last analysis, the thought of very God sinning, or rendering Himself really liable to sin, is inconsistent with the most elementary conception of the Source and Standard of righteousness.[2]

But Christ's impeccability was not a mechanical necessity. Such a conception is inconsistent with its moral quality and value. Nor is it happily described as inability to sin, for it was supreme ability that made our Lord impeccable — the ability which characterizes emancipation from the weakness and servile limitations of freedom that make us

[1] Cf. St. John iii. 34.

[2] That we needed a morally invincible Christ will be shown in § 8 below.

liable to sin. It was essentially the revelation, in terms of genuine human conflict and effort, of a perfection and moral freedom which Christ enables us also ultimately to acquire, when by His grace we finally outgrow forever the earthly weakness which renders us liable to sin. To this point we shall return.[1]

II. *His Temptation*

§ 5. In discussing our Lord's temptation we begin by insisting upon the postulate that He was "in all points tempted like as we are."[2] This does not mean that He was as helpless as we are in meeting temptations; but it does mean that He was accessible to temptation through all normal avenues, and that He in fact experienced temptations at every accessible point of attack. To avoid erroneous inferences from this postulate we need to consider very carefully what temptation really is and what it necessarily involves.[3] Much hasty generaliza-

[1] In §§ 9, 12, below. On the sinlessness and moral invincibility of Christ, see E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 232–248; Chas. Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 388–400; E. Bougaud, *Divinity of Christ*, ch. iv; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 163–198; D. Stone, *Outlines*, pp. 77–81; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Character of Christ"; C. H. Robinson, *Studies in the Character of Christ;* H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 400–404.

[2] Heb. iv. 15.

[3] On temptation, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, *s. v.* "Tempt, Temptation"; *Dic. of Christ;* Blunt, *Dic. of Theol.;* and *Cath. Encyc.*, *q. v.*; J. B. Mayor, *Ep. of St. James*, i. 1–15.

tion has attended modern discussions of our Lord's temptation.[1]

Strictly defined, "to tempt" is to test. In ordinary application it is to test morally, or to put to moral proof by affording opportunities and inducements to sin. This is the proper extent of necessary meaning which can be ascribed to the phrase. The word "temptation" is used to describe both the process or conditions by which we are thus put to moral proof, and the experience or trial to which such a process or condition subjects us. By a special extension of use men are sometimes said to be tempted when the real meaning is that they are inclined to yield to temptation, but neither an inclination to yield nor even a liability to yield are either contained or necessarily involved in the strict meaning of temptation. All that is required in order that subjection to temptation shall be real is that the person tempted shall be a moral being, and that the test shall be really applicable, and such as will put his attitude towards evil to genuine proof. Provided he is put to moral proof, the genuineness of his temptation is not reduced by his being thereby shown to be morally invincible.

[1] On Christ's temptability and temptation, see Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Temptation (in the Wilderness)"; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s. v.* "Temptation of Christ"; W. H. Hutchings, *Mystery of Temptation*, pp. 116 *et seq.*; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 15; H. R. Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 401–403; A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. vi. § 13; A. C. A. Hall, *Christ's Temptation and Ours;* W. H. Mill, *Temptation of Christ*, esp. Serm. ii.

§ 6. The example of Christ lies in the fact that His being put to proof by our temptations brought to light in Him a moral invincibility which He enables us also ultimately to acquire by self-disciplinary growth in His grace.[1] But because in this world we have not achieved this growth and are universally prone to sin, we generalize from our immediate experience, and regard temptability as equivalent to peccability. In doing so we confuse opportunities and felt inducements to sin with liability to use such opportunities and to yield to such inducements. The former may be clearly perceived and keenly felt — that is, temptation may be fully experienced — by a human agent, whether such experience endangers his righteousness or not. That it does endanger our righteousness is due, not to any intrinsic necessity that temptation, as such, should have this result, but, to that imperfection in us which Christ came to remedy. Temptation proves every one of us to be weak because we are so; but if we were fullgrown, after the pattern of Christ, without ceasing to be real temptation, it would prove our invincibility — an invincibility not less absolute because moral and because acquired after much backsliding.

That in us which opens the doors to temptation, if we except the consequences of previous sinfulness, as we must in Christ's case, is neither sinful itself nor due to our liability to sin. It consists of natural

[1] For fuller statements, see §§ 9–12, below.

appetites and impulses, which become sinful only when we fail to regulate them and to use them righteously. When they are evoked under circumstances which make their gratification sinful, we are tempted, and the acuteness of the temptation is seen in the painfulness of effort required in order to restrain the impulses thus evoked. It is this painfulness of effort that endangers us and makes us liable to sin. But the explanation of our danger lies in our own deficiencies, not in any necessary inconsistency between such painfulness and unconquerable readiness to endure it for righteousness sake.

Impeccability and human nature are mutually incompatible under our existing conditions, partly because unassisted human nature is not equal to the task of achieving human destiny — it was not designed by its Creator to be so — and partly because we have not yet sufficiently grown in the perfecting grace which we were eternally intended to enjoy. Therefore temptation is for us an ever recurring proof of our deficiencies, calculated to admonish us of our need of grace and of self-discipline, or practice in the use of grace. But there were no such deficiencies in Jesus Christ, because He took a sinless Manhood and filled it with grace for the express purpose of revealing the abiding moral perfection which it is His mission to enable us to attain. This perfection necessarily includes moral invincibility.

§ 7. We have been saying that the reality and appealing power of our temptations lies in the efforts and sufferings which we have to make and endure in order to resist them. And these efforts and sufferings become necessary not because we are liable to yield, but because, and just so far as, we do battle and avoid sin. If we were impeccable this would mean that the battle would be fought by us in every case, and therefore that the strain of toil and pain necessary for successful persistence would be fully experienced. The reason is that our natural appetites and impulses are not reduced and rendered less painful to control by invincible determination to control them.[1]

It needs to be remembered in this connection that the straining of human powers in moral conflict, and the sufferings incurred therein, are experienced in proportion to our success in resisting temptation rather than according to our tendency to yield. The impact of a head-on collision far exceeds that of a rear-end collision. The efforts and pains referred to arise from our resistance, not from our yielding, and are intensified in proportion to the absoluteness of our refusal to gratify our natural appetites and impulses.[2]

[1] Practice does indeed make resistance to temptation *morally* easier, but the suffering involved in non-gratification of the impulses to which temptation appeals is not reduced on this account. Cf. Malcolm Maccoll, *Christianity in Relation to Science and Morals*, pp. 140–149.

[2] Cf. A. B. Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, pp. 264–268.

Now Christ was truly human, and therefore possessed to the full the natural appetites which render us accessible to temptation. Abnormal and intrinsically sinful appetites, being the effects of previous human sin rather than proper necessities of human nature, He did not experience. But to control natural appetites, and the impulses arising spontaneously from them, was as painful to Him as it is to us. The difference lay in His moral resolution and fortitude. Just because He resisted temptation with a persistence which is unique in the moral history of mankind, the efforts which He had to make, and the agonies which He incurred in making them, exceeded anything which our easiness of virtue — our failure to meet temptation in head-on collision — permits us to experience. So far from His moral invincibility reducing the brunt of temptation for him, the precise contrary occurred. Paradoxical though the statement appears when not adequately considered, just because He was morally invincible He was touched with the *feeling* of our infirmities to a degree transcending all other human experience. He learned more of what moral victory involves in toil and pain than we have learned, because He achieved perfect victory all along the line,[1] and we recoil from the cost of it.

[1] The catholicity of His experience is well expressed by the *Ch. Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1897, pp. 167–168: "In one life He gained the possession of experiential sympathy with a multitude of other lives of varying circumstances, because the divine attributes which

It is this exhaustive experience of the cost of victory over sin that assures us of His sympathy. If He had not set His face "like a flint," [1] He might have sympathized after the manner of weaker men with the supine regrets of those who seek other comfort than that which comes from help in forsaking sin — the false comfort which moral shirkers so often interchange with each other; — but His sympathy with the struggles and sorrows of those who are seriously striving to become perfect would have been inadequate because of His lack of experience.

Those who would emphasize for themselves and for others the appealing value of Christ's example have need to remember the nature of His example. Christ exhibits the pattern and the human cost of Christian perfection. Having endured this cost He understands as no other participant in our nature can understand what we are asked to endure. He knows why we so often fail, and His suffering makes Him alive to the fact that His victory was due to the fulness of grace with which He was endowed. Therefore His sympathy is patient; and He bears with our weakness while we grow in His grace, a grace which He knows by convincing experience will assure us a full victory, when our growth therein

were His as He passed through His earthly life enabled Him to find in a single set of circumstances contact with and experience of other circumstances, of which these were but typical."

[1] Isa. 1. 7.

is completed. To reduce what we are saying to brief compass, He experienced in our nature both the cost of moral victory and the invincible power of the grace wherewith He was endowed. Therefore being acquainted with our trials, He sympathizes with us; and, having verified the power of grace in resisting and enduring, He knows that we can win by the power which He possesses and imparts to us.[1]

§ 8. In order fully to realize how necessary it was that Jesus Christ should be morally invincible — that is impeccable — we need to remember that the purpose for which He took our nature was not merely to set an example of perfect conduct and character. Had that been the limit of His achievement, wonderful and necessary as His success in that regard was, we should be baffled rather than helped by it, if He had not done something even more marvelous. All men have sinned, and in order that they may even begin to turn to Christ and to grow in His grace, the existing power of sinful tendencies in us has to be broken, and pardon has to be won, by divine redemption. Jesus Christ came to be not only our example but also our divine Redeemer. And there had to be present in Him the

[1] To magnify the power which Christ had at His service in temptation is to magnify the power which, through our union with Him, we also can use when we have learned how by practice, by self-discipline. His use of it in His Manhood was its enlistment for the recovery of our manhood.

ability not only to exhibit our nature in the final and invincible perfection which it is intended by divine grace to acquire, but also to undermine the ancient power of Satan over us, to make full expiation for our sins, and to carry our nature, perfected by suffering, through the very jaws of death into the everlasting life which He came in order to win for us.

If the redemptive aspect of His mission is adequately considered, it can be seen to require for its success a concurrence in the Redeemer's work of perfect human obedience and of the regal authority and almighty power of God. Nor is it possible to separate the two factors, so as to give each its turn to the exclusion of the other. The two aspects are both vital to every stage of a true redemption. Christ's victory over temptation is part of His redemptive work as well as exemplary — affording an effective example because truly charged with the redemptive power and value of a divine work. As representing a truly human obedience unto death, it gives His death a value which is at once human and meritorious. On the other hand, as representing the obedience of very God, it causes the merit of His death to transcend in value that of the death of any individual human saint, however perfect he may be. This infinite merit of Christ's death is due, it is to be observed, not merely to God's taking on Himself the death which we deserve because of our sins, but to the fact that God was agent also in

the human obedience and moral victory from which the meritorious quality of that death is derived.

The mistake involved in isolating our Lord's example from the wider aspects of His Person and mission is not less serious because frequently made. And its consequence is not only to sacrifice truths which are as vital to us as is the truth of His being our example, but also to impoverish the meaning and value of Christ's example itself. If His victory was simply that of a human saint, its uniqueness teaches us its futility as an example by which men in general can profit. It is in that case an exception of genius lying quite beyond the range of possible achievement by ordinary men. But because it is the victory of a God-man, who has redeemed us, and who makes us sharers in His grace, we may reasonably hope to grow in that grace until His perfection becomes our own.[1]

III. *The Goal of Christians*

§ 9. In discussing our Lord's temptation we have had to indicate the chief particulars involved in saying that He is our example; but our task will

[1] In brief, Christ had to be impeccable (*a*) because very God cannot sin under any conditions (cf. § 4, above); (*b*) as condition of divine redemption; (*c*) as revealing in successful exercise the power by which alone we can become perfect; (*d*) as revealing the goal of our development (cf. § 9, below); (*e*) as exhibiting a divine example (cf. § 11, below). We were made after the likeness of God and must imitate God.

not be fully completed until we have recapitulated these particulars in connected order, and with fuller statements.[1]

In the first place Jesus Christ is our Example because His life and character exhibit in human terms the spiritual likeness after which we were made, the perfection which by His grace we are under divinely imposed obligation to acquire. In Him was openly manifested for the first time the goal of spiritual development which God had in view when He made man in His own image and after His own likeness.

The fact that Christ exemplifies in terms of each stage of earthly probation what we are finally to become rather than what is possible for us now to accomplish, affords a chief reason for the absolute uniqueness of His perfection. And this reason helps us to see that the impossibility of duplicating His sinless perfection in this life is not a reason for denying the practical value of His example for ourselves. He reveals what He helps us to become, but this becoming is a long process. It is not within the range of immediate possibilities.

[1] On our Lord's example, see *The Kenotic Theory*, ch. vi; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, chh. i–iv; *Ch. Quarterly Review*, July, 1883, art. iii; W. H. Hutchings, *Mystery of Temptation*, pp. 116 *et seq.*; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Example"; C. H. Robinson, *Studies in the Character of Christ*, chh. iii–iv. Cf. Jerem. xxiii. 6; St. Matt. xi. 29–30; St. John xiv. 6, 12; Rom. viii. 29; xv. 2, 3, 5; Ephes. v. 1–2 (with St. Matt. v. 48); Phil. ii. 5–11; 1 St. Pet. ii. 20–21; 1 St. John iii. 3.

In one sense His perfection lies beyond even future attainment by us. This is so because His example is catholic, including the various types of perfection which are possible for individual men, but transcending every particular one because embracing the perfections of all types. No one, however, is responsible for reaching any other perfection than that which is appropriate to himself, and Christ is a true pattern for each human person because His perfection includes the excellences of character which that person can and ought to obtain by His grace.

The fact that Christ never experienced sin in Himself is a vital part of His being the kind of Example that He is. From the nature of things His life could not exemplify both a life-long freedom from sin and the advance from sinfulness to righteousness which we have to make. But the pattern of perfection which He came to offer — one which was needed and He alone could give — presupposes an entirely sinless life. Accordingly He did not set an example of repentance, although He preached it to others as the initial condition of their following His example, for until sin is repented of, growth in the grace of Christ is beyond our power. He did more than preach repentance, He died, and His death is the ground of forgiveness for penitent sinners; and it is by His grace that His saints afford examples of repentance and of escape from the slavery of sin.

§ 10. In this way the examples of penitent saints are branches of the example of Christ; because it is by the grace of Christ, and by the enlightening influence of His righteousness, that they are able to set us examples of repentance and of recovery from sin. But Jesus Christ never trod what is called the purgative way. He never experienced the sense of sin, and His marvelous humility included no *peccavi*.

The examples of holy penitents are therefore important adjuncts to the personal life of Christ. His example, coupled with His redemption and grace, is indeed all-sufficient, but only because it makes possible and interprets other examples — examples which He had to give indirectly through the lives of His followers. This filling up of His example is similar to the mystery to which St. Paul alludes when he speaks of filling up on his part that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in his (St. Paul's) flesh for the sake of Christ's body, the Church.[1] St. Paul does not mean that Christ's passion was insufficient, but that its beneficial effects are to some extent conditioned by the sufferings of others; and Christian experience proves that this is so. To borrow a figure, Simon had to help Christ in His passion by carrying His Cross up the hill.[2]

The truth which we are enforcing is one that is very widely forgotten in our day, partly, no doubt,

[1] Col. i. 24. [2] St. Matt. xxvii. 32 and parallels.

through reaction from an over-exuberant hagiology and from superstitious saint-worship. But the emphasis now laid by all upon the example of Christ ought to bring with it a recovered appreciation of the part which the lives of the saints play in applying His example to the needs of sinners. Anglicans, in particular, lose an important adjunct of Christ's example by their frequent failure to profit by the help which He affords through the penitential victories of His saints.

§ 11. Our Lord's example is divine as well as human, and its being divine is not only vital but even primary. We do not mean that its being truly human is less vital, but that the perfection of man lies in His success in assimilating on human lines the moral perfection of God. Our Lord summarizes the lessons which He gives in the Sermon on the Mount by the phrase, "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." St. Paul exhorts his readers to be imitators of God, going on to describe Christ's example as revealing what such imitation involves.[1] We are not to think that this means merely that we are to be as perfect after the human manner as God is after the divine manner. It means that there is a spiritual likeness in God which we are to appropriate, for we have

[1] St. Matt. v. 48; Ephes. v. 1–2. Cf. *The Kenotic Theory*, pp. 126–128; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Example," B. 1; E. H. Gifford, *Incarnation*, pp. 101–102; *Ch. Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1897, p. 168.

been made in the image of God with a view to our development after His likeness. The biblical name for human perfection is godliness, and the glory of a perfect man is that he is godlike.

Christ affords an example of human perfection because He exhibits the character of God in human terms, and the fact that His character is the character of God is the determinative fact — the element in His example which makes it, as it is, the supreme objective standard of our righteousness. He translated divine character into human terms because His Incarnation is an entrance of very God into the conditions which made obedience to the law for man the manner of divine righteousness. The life of Christ is the life which God leads when He condescends to take our nature; and therefore it is a true laying bare of divine perfection, and of the goal of spiritual growth which our created nature and divinely appointed destiny set before us.

Our appointed destiny is to become the friends of God.[1] The essential condition of such friendship is mutual love; and the only basis upon which this love can acquire an abiding value is the development of complete mutual congeniality. But congeniality between personal beings requires, in fact means, their possession of common joys — an impossibility unless there is a real community of character. Community of character between God and man can be

[1] Cf. St. John xv. 14–15; St. James ii. 23; Isa. xli. 8; Exod. xxxiii. 11.

developed only by the assimilation of human character to the divine. That this is so needs no arguments to prove. It is true that God loves us while we are yet sinners, but the reason lies in the potential basis of growth out of sin into righteousness which divine grace can convert into actuality. It is because of this potential and prospective element in sinners that God was willing to pay the price of death on the Cross in order to convert what is potential into actuality. Just as a mother loves a troublesome child for the man whom she sees to be incipient in him, so God loves His sinful children for the fullgrown imitators of Christ whom He is helping them to become.

Unless what we have said can be shown to be false, and it cannot be refuted, the habit of insisting exclusively upon the human quality of Christ's example is based upon serious error; for unless Christ came to reveal the character of God, His example does not possess the absolute finality and determinative authority over our lives that Christians rightly believe it to have. And what we are saying in this section reinforces on irrefutable grounds the contention we have been making that the moral invincibility of Christ — His impeccability — is a necessary characteristic of the example which Christ came to afford. To suppose that divine character is not invincibly righteous is to suppose a very incredible thing indeed.

§ 12. The example of Christ has no value for us

unless it can be imitated; and the fact that the imitation of Christ is possible — under the conditions, and with the helps, which He has made available — is a vital part of the doctrine of His example. But we need to realize that our imitation of Him can never assume the form of an external duplication of His actions and words. We err grievously, if we think that we ought to do what Jesus Christ would do under our circumstances. We are privates in the ranks, whereas He is the Lord of all and the Head of our race. Duties and responsibilities fell to Him, and determined His words and actions, which can never fall to us. It is His character that we are to assimilate, and not the accidents of His mission. An external imitation of Him, such as we are speaking of, would be presumptuous in the extreme.

Furthermore, our imitation of Him cannot consist in an *immediate* assimilation of His perfect character. The terrible fact of sin absolutely precludes a sudden achievement of this kind. Life-long self-discipline, based for its value upon what Christ has done for us, conditioned at every stage by repentance, and made effectual by the grace of Christ, constitutes the only possible method of our imitation of Him. There is indeed such a thing as instantaneous conversion; but this consists in a contrite change of life-purpose. It does not include a full achievement of this life-purpose, which is accomplished only by a progress to which, in most

cases at least, even death does not set the term of duration. In this life we are enabled and required to initiate the process of growth toward Christ, but the satisfaction of awaking after His likeness [1] can be enjoyed only as a result of processes completed beyond the grave.

But because the victory of Christ was not merely an unexplainable triumph of exceptional human genius for righteousness, but signalized the enlistment of divine resources — resources which Christ was to make available to His followers — therefore we are assured that the most ordinary men of every race and condition can follow Him, and in the end can have part in His victory and in His glory.

[1] 1 St. John iii. 2; Rom. vi. 5.

CHAPTER IX

THE OFFICES OF CHRIST

I. *His Prophetic Office*

§ 1. The sending of the eternal Son into the world, the fact that He came rather than either the Father or the Holy Spirit, is explained partly by His eternal relation to the Godhead as Son, Image and Word, and partly by the relation of creatures to Him as one through whom they are made and in whom they consist. These relations constitute Him the proper Mediator between God and creation at large, especially between God and man.[1] In Him as Logos are the patterns of things, and He is the Image in which men were made, in order that in Him they might become children of God by adoption and grace. Consequently it is due to the fundamental nature of things that the Son should declare to men the God whom no man can see,[2] and that He should be the Representative both of God to men and of men to God.[3]

[1] St. John xiv. 6; Rom. v. 1–2; Ephes. ii. 13–18; 1 Tim. ii. 5; Heb. ii. 17; ix. 15; x. 19–20; xii. 24. Cf. Job ix. 33.

[2] St. John i. 18.

[3] On the mediatorial functions of Christ, see chh. iv. 10; vi. 9, above; and St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xxvi; H. P. Liddon,

It can be seen that the mystery of mediation grows out of the fact of creation, and is permanent. The fact that such a creature as man exists carries with it his dependence upon God, and the relations to Him with the cultivation of which religion is concerned. Sin disturbs these relations and necessitates the redemptive part of mediation, but the need of mediation of some kind would have been a permanent element in human experience, even if man had never sinned.[1]

This mediation has three obvious and natural branches, the prophetic, priestly and kingly. The prophetic office has to do with making known to men the nature, purpose and laws of God. The priestly office is concerned with bringing about and maintaining vital communion and acceptable relations between God and man, relations which are partly individual on man's side, but also social and corporate. Man is essentially a social being, and His relations to God are vitally affected by this fact.[2] The kingly office is that of divine vicegerent, representing God in sovereignty and judgment. The controlling principle of human conduct is

Some Elements of Religion, cheaper ed., pp. 228–231; Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 92–104; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible* and *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Mediator"; P. G. Medd, *The One Mediator*.

[1] Heb. vii. 15–17, 24–25, viii. 1–2; xiii. 8. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxii. 5–6; P. Freeman, *Principles of Divine Service*, Vol. II. pp. 142–145; P. G. Medd, *op. cit.*, §§ 10–14, and Lec. iv; B. F. Westcott, *Ep. to the Heb.*, i. 2; vii. 16.

[2] Cf. *Creation and Man*, ch. vii. § 7.

responsibility for obedience to the will of God in general, and in particular for fulfilment of the purpose and destiny with reference to which man was made.[1]

In human history these mediatorial offices are fulfilled in dispensational ways. There has been a series of divine dispensations or covenants,[2] each embodying divinely imposed conditions and laws of mediation adapted to the existing stage of progress in the dealings of God with men. The order and distinctive peculiarities of these dispensations are in general determined by man's need of salvation from sin, and of mental and moral preparation for its achievement in the fulness of time. The primitive dispensation of innocence and grace being nullified by human sin,[3] it was succeeded by a series of patriarchal dispensations, introductory to a more permanent legalistic covenant, whereby a chosen race was trained by statutes and judgments to receive the Gospel of salvation and to become vessels of salvation to the rest of mankind.[4] The Christian dispensation is final for this world, because in it the Mediator reveals Himself, bringing to men the fulness both of grace and truth, and enabling them to enter effectively into the vital relations

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 229–230.

[2] On divine covenants, see E. B. Davidson, in Hastings, *Dic. of Bible, s. v.* "Covenants," ii–v. Cf. *Creation and Man*, ch. vii. § 3.

[3] *Creation and Man*, ch. viii.

[4] *Creation and Man*, ch. x. §§ 3–5.

with God wherein the life of the world to come consists.

In each dispensation the one true Mediator operates, whether by figure or precept, law or prophecy, until He finally manifests Himself in flesh, and after perfecting His flesh by suffering and victory over death, makes it the medium of His grace to us and of our access through Him to God. In external aspects, what is prefigured in older dispensations the Redeemer fulfils and the new covenant applies, the carnal signs of the old giving way to spiritually effective sacraments in a new dispensation of saving and sanctifying grace.

§ 2. The prophetic office [1] is to speak for God to men, and to interpret the will and purpose of God. All that is involved in such function is included in prophecy, of which predicting the future is a very secondary element. And all true prophecy, even when ministered by purely human agents, is mediated from God through His eternal Logos.[2]

He is the true Light, "which lighteth every man coming into the world," [3] the immanent Reason of the whole creation. "In Him were all things created, . . . through Him and unto Him." [4] Accordingly

[1] On Christ's prophetic office, see H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, pp. 169–172; and *Some Words of Christ*, i; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. vii. 8; H. C. Powell, *Principle of the Incarnation*, pp. 206–220; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Prophet."

[2] Wm. Lee, *Inspiration of Holy Scripture*, Lec. iii.

[3] St. John i. 9. Cf. verses 4–5.

[4] Col. i. 16.

natural revelation comes from Him, and the meaning of creation is His meaning. It constitutes the preamble of His prophecy; and when we correctly interpret nature, we think His thought after Him. So it is that "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language. Their voice cannot be heard." Yet, "their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world." [1] And if when "the Light shineth in the darkness, . . . the darkness apprehended it not," this is because men "hold down the truth in unrighteousness." None the less "that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of Him since the Creation of the world are clearly seen" by reason of the Logos in which we are created to have share, "being perceived through the things that are made, even His everlasting power and divinity." [2]

Similarly what is called supernatural revelation pertains to the Logos. He is the Revealer in Holy Scripture of all that the Holy Spirit inspires human writers to perceive and proclaim. The written Word is from the eternal Logos. In the Old Testament we have records of how God of old time spake unto the fathers in many portions and in many manners, thus preparing His chosen people for the

[1] Psa. xix. 1–4. [2] St. John i. 5; Rom. i. 18–20.

time when He should speak directly in His Son-made-flesh.[1] But every speech of God is mediated through the Son, who alone declares Him whom men cannot see.[2]

So it was the Son who revealed the true God in theophany and by angel to our first parents and to succeeding patriarchs. It was He who revealed Yahveh to Moses at the burning bush,[3] and it was He who taught the law from Mount Sinai. All the statutes and judgments, and all the signs from God which Israel received, were mediated through Him; and the Word of God through the prophets was His Word. Moreover it was through Him that the old covenant ritual, an expurgated development of pre-existing usages, obtained prefigurative value, and that Israel's entire history was marked by a frequent emergence of types and parables pointing on to His final self-manifestation in flesh and to the setting up of His everlasting kingdom.

Nor was the sphere of His prophetic office confined to the chosen people. All truth comes from God through the Logos; and amid all the vagaries and superstitions which differentiated ancient religions from that of Israel, even at its lowest, these religions preserved, and gained their power of persistence from, truths which came from the Logos — these truths being saved from utter extinction in pagan minds by the hidden operations of His Holy Spirit.[4]

[1] Cf. Heb. i. 1–2. [2] St. John i. 18. [3] Exod. iii. 1–6.
[4] *Creation and Man*, pp. 224–226; J. H. Newman, *Arians*, ch.

§ 3. In the fulness of time, the "many portions" of earlier prophecy were fulfilled, recapitulated, fused into coherent unity, objectively embodied, and directly proclaimed, in and by the Logos-incarnate, Jesus Christ. All prophecy had pointed to Him, and His self-manifestation was both its completion and its ultimate explanation. From Him the many broken lights of ancient religion proceed, and in Him they unite in ineffable splendour, never to be extinguished. All subsequent interpretation of prophecy — correctly made in its definitive elements [1] by the Church of early centuries under the promised guidance of the Spirit, but never completed — becomes an ever-growing interpretation of Jesus Christ, the God-Man.[2]

The immediate form of our Lord's teaching was a proclamation of His kingdom, and a more or less parabolic and guarded exposition of its mysteries.[3] In connection with this teaching He called men to repentance; and, in terms sometimes designedly paradoxical,[4] as well as by example, He set forth

i. § iii. 5; Chas. Bigg, *Christ. Platonists of Alexandria*, pp. 47–49; *Cath. Encyc.*, *s. v.* "Paganism," VI; H. P. Liddon, *Essays and Addresses*, pp. 32–39.

[1] That is, the Christological doctrines of the Ecumenical Councils.

[2] On the development of doctrine here referred to, see *Authority, Ecclesiastical and Biblical*, ch. ix.

[3] See § 11, below.

[4] The theory of an *interimsethik* is not required to explain the impracticabilities of some of the precepts in the Sermon on the Mount. They are purposely paradoxical, because intended to enforce principles rather than to enact rules. To give an example,

the elements of righteousness which pertain to life in the kingdom. But He came to reveal Himself.[1] He gave this revelation in terms of His relation to the Father, because no other terms would have preserved the already established doctrine that God is one. Unless He had declared Himself in what we call trinitarian terms, the revelation of His Person would have seemed to be a reversal, instead of an amplification, of monotheistic doctrine.[2] His self-manifestation was also determined in form by what He came to do. The necessity that He should humble Himself even to the death on the Cross forbade the kind of self-assertion which might otherwise have been permissible; and therefore His true majesty became apparent even to His disciples only after His resurrection from the dead.[3] But His declaration of Himself was none the less the determinative content of His prophecy — the content which explains all His teaching.

This teaching included in its range the redemptive work which He came to achieve and the Church which He came to organize in an apostolic nucleus; and these particulars were proclaimed even more by what He did and experienced than by what He

Christ does not require us always to "turn the other cheek also," but to be loving enough to do so, if a wisely applied love requires it. Cf. E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 163–167; C. W. Emmet, in *Expositor*, Nov., 1912, art. IV.

[1] See P. T. Forsyth, *Person and Place of Christ*, Lec. iv.

[2] See *The Trinity*, pp. 139–140; and in this vol., ch. iv. § 6, 3rd paragraph.

[3] Cf. ch. iv. § 7 *fin.*, above.

formally declared. The reason is that until He had finished what He came to do — things which were interpretative of His Gospel — the conditions did not exist under which fuller proclamations could be understood by His disciples. Therefore the mysteries which they were unable to receive until they had become witnesses of His resurrection and ascension became apparent to them through the enlightenment of their minds by the Spirit, after the pentecostal descent.[1] When they did become apparent, and when the primitive believers had had time to co-ordinate their traditions and adjust their mental perspectives, our Lord's Virgin-Birth, humiliation, example, death, resurrection in flesh from the dead, and ascension, became vital parts of the Gospel of Jesus Christ which they united in proclaiming.[2] With these interpretative facts they co-ordinated the working system of the Church, believing that Christ had organized it with a view to its being made His Body by the Spirit, and using its sacraments as Christ's appointed means of spiritual quickening, remission and sanctification, until His coming again in glory to judge the world and to receive His faithful ones to Himself. The doctrine of this second coming[3] completed what the apostolic witnesses believed to have been the prophetic teaching of Christ.

[1] St. John xvi. 12–13.

[2] The author's *Doctrine of Man and of the God-man*, Q. 95, §§ 2–3.

[3] See § 11 of this chapter.

§ 4. The work of the Spirit does not bring our Lord's prophetic office to an end, but ministers to it, by enabling the Church rightly to apprehend the truth. But Christ's withdrawal from earthly contact with His followers, and the establishment of His Church, have modified its methods. Moreover, the accomplished fact of the Gospel revelation, wherein is proclaimed a body of truth sufficient for man's spiritual guidance so long as this world endures, changes the scope of prophecy within the Church, which has become interpretative and applicatory instead of revelational. The faith has been once for all delivered, although we can never fully exhaust its applications and bearings.[1]

Before leaving them Christ gave to His chosen apostles a ministerial share in His own office, using terms which plainly implied that their ministry was to be perpetuated until the end of the world. "As the Father hath sent Me, even so send I you." "Go ye . . . and make disciples of all the nations, . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end

[1] Much confusion and prejudice has arisen from not distinguishing between "saving" doctrines, the substance of which neither grows nor diminishes, and the wider body of spiritual knowledge and opinion which ministers to an intelligent and effective application of such doctrine to human life. It is this wider body of truth that grows, and by its growth continually modifies the manner in which necessary doctrines are set forth. Cf. *Authority, Ecclesiastical and Biblical*, chh. viii (5–8) and ix.

of the world."[1] The earthly method of His prophetic office — and of His priestly and kingly offices as well — has therefore become ministerial and sacramental, being exercised through the Church which He organized to be the visible embodiment of His kingdom. The teaching of the apostolic ministry was thus given derivative authority — His authority delegated to it — and the faith of the members of the Church was to become the earthly response to His prophecy as thus perpetuated.

But this prophecy was not to become in this world an instrument of new revelations. It was to be wholly concerned with transmission, preservation, teaching, definition, interpretation and application of what the apostles received from Christ, under the ever-changing conditions of experience, thought and language of succeeding generations. This is the range and limit of the prophetic work of Christ's ministry, and of the definitive or dogmatic office of His Church.[2] And the Church was to be guided by the Holy Spirit into all the truth which He had communicated to it. This did not constitute a guarantee of mechanical infallibility inhering in all ministerial teaching within the Church, nor did it signify that such infallibility would preserve any particular teaching machinery of the Church

[1] St. John xx. 21; St. Matt. xxviii. 19–20.

[2] *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, chh. iii–iv; V. H. Stanton, *Place of Authority*, ch. iv; D. Stone, *Christ. Church*, ch. xiii; T. B. Strong, *Authority*, ch. vi.

from error. But it did give assurance that the Church should always be the home of truth and a sufficient guide of the faithful. The gates of hell were not to "prevail" against her.[1]

Our Lord's prophetic office is fulfilled in the Church sacramentally as well as ministerially. That is, the sacramental institutions of His appointment, the Church herself objectively considered, and her external arrangements — such for example as her weekly and yearly round and her liturgical worship — are embodiments, providentially determined, of the doctrine of Christ which the Church is commissioned to teach and apply. And faithfulness to the "way," of which these things are intended by Christ to be instruments and safeguards, constitutes the method by which alone believers are enabled to enter with adequate assurance and edification into the prophetic mind of Christ.[2]

The Church has also been provided with "required reading," a "divine library," in which are contained memorials of the experience of God's chosen race and Church in being brought to the knowledge of Jesus Christ. The books and documents of this

[1] *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. iii. §§ 10–16.

[2] Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 14; St. John vii. 17. The working system of the Church successfully guides the faithful to all that they must needs know for their souls' health. No conceivable method can secure such knowledge for the unfaithful. Spiritual docility is the most elementary condition of spiritual growth in knowledge. Apart from it scholarship is robbed of its higher fruit, with it scholarship is truth's handmaid.

library, when separately taken, have uneven value, and reflect the various stages of spiritual knowledge and judgment of the ages in which they were severally written. Their authority, however, arises from their place and acquired meaning in the divine library taken as a connected whole. And when the Bible is thus taken, and interpreted by the final results of the spiritual progress of Israel — by Jesus Christ — it is perceived to be "the Word of God," by a devout study of which we become "wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus."[1] But the Bible is the Church's book. It has been committed to her, and its appointed use is to edify and confirm believers in the faith which it is her office to teach and define. She did not derive this faith from the Bible, but directly from Jesus Christ. Yet the Bible is a God-given safeguard and limiting standard, whereby the Church is restrained from teaching doctrines which she has not received; and she has received no doctrine from Christ which has not obtained some record or embodiment in Holy Scripture.[2]

Dogmatic Theology is an unofficial handmaid of the Church, whereby the faithful are assisted in intelligent co-ordination of the teachings of Christ

[1] 2 Tim. iii. 15. Cf. *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. vi; and a pamphlet by the writer, just published by the Young Churchman Co., Mil., U. S. A., *The Bible and Modern Criticism.*

[2] The rule of faith is "the Church to teach and define, the Bible to confirm and illustrate." See *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. viii.

and in correlation of them with human experience, thought and knowledge at large. It is necessarily human and progressive, and is subject to correction both by the prophetic mind of the Church and by widening knowledge. It has no higher authority *in se* than that of a human science.[1]

In every branch of teaching from God, the prophet is Jesus Christ, and all true prophecy is from Him. Whatever authority it has, whether immediate or remote, this authority comes ultimately from Him. All other prophetic authority is derivative, and limited by the necessity that it shall minister to His doctrine and precepts.

II. *His Priestly Office*

§ 5. The priestly office is that in which the function of mediation obtains formal and transactional effect. It is concerned with establishing and perpetuating the relations which ought to be maintained between God and man.[2] Inasmuch as

[1] The work of "reconstruction," that is, of adjusting the statement of spiritual truths to new forms of thought and language, is the work of Dogmatic Theology, which could well be called "Constructive Theology." The neglect of Dogmatic Theology at a time when "reconstruction" is so widely demanded as now is an ominous circumstance.

[2] On Christ's priestly office, see Heb. v; viii–ix and *passim* (cf. Psa. cx. 4); St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xxii; Wm. Milligan, *Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood*, Lecs. ii *et seq.*; Geo. Milligan, *Theol. of the Ep. to the Heb.*, chh. vi–vii; R. C. Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood*, pp. 244–249; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, chh. vii–xi; M. F. Sadler, *One Offering*, chh. vii–ix.

such relations have always to be maintained, the priestly office is permanent, and Jesus Christ is Priest forever[1] — from the beginning of human history, in every divine dispensation, and in all the life of the world to come. It is true that in historical relations Christ's priesthood obtained formal status only in the fulness of time, His death on the Cross constituting His consecration, and His entrance in flesh into the heavens initiating His exercise of the priestly office in its permanent form.[2] But from the beginning the eternal Son was mediating between God and His people; and the prefigurative ritual of the old law, imperfect and provisional though it was, constituted a part as well as a figure of priestly functioning instituted by Him — obtaining such efficacy as it had by virtue of the great sacrifice of the Cross to which it pointed.[3]

The priestly office is twofold, to bring men to God, and to afford divine grace to men; and these functions are necessary for man's welfare independently of sin, because man is made for God, and is by original nature dependent upon the relations to God which priestly offices secure, both for his present needs and for his future enjoyment of the life with God for which He was made.[4] But

[1] Cf. Psa. cx. 4 and various passages in Ep. to Hebrews.

[2] Heb. v. 5–10.

[3] Heb. ix. 8–15; x. 1–14.

[4] P. Freeman, *Principles of Divine Service*, Pt. II. pp. 142–145; P. G. Medd, *One Mediator*, §§ 10–14; B. F. Westcott, *Ep. to the Heb.*, on i. 2 and vii. 16; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xxii. 5–6.

sin has raised a barrier between God and man, and our Lord's priestly office therefore includes, as its most conspicuous earthly element, the removal of this barrier by His own redemptive suffering and death.

Inasmuch as man's nature is composite, and he is unable either to receive or to express what is spiritual except by external media, the manner of the priestly office is accommodated to this necessity and is sacramental. That is, external transactions and physical media are employed. These are gathered into focus and given formal significance and effect by sacrifice — the offering of duly appointed material gifts to God — whereby men signify and achieve a formal oblation of themselves to their Creator, and pay to Him the homage which as creatures they owe to Him. When this devotion is sincerely offered, God accepts it, and by means of His own appointment bestows upon His creatures the spiritual blessings that they are able to receive.[1]

But by reason of sin human oblations cannot gain acceptance except through the shedding of Christ's blood on the Cross, and until this condition had been historically fulfilled, the manner of sacrifice had to be such as to bear witness to, and acknowledge, the law that without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin. Therefore, previously to

[1] *Creation and Man*, ch. vii. § 2 (*j*). The subject will be treated of in Vol. VIII of this series.

the death of Christ, it was necessary that men's sacrificial oblations should include, or at least be connected with, the slaughter of animal victims — a symbolical acknowledgment of sin, and a provisional condition of divine acceptance, until true redemption should be achieved. Even after it had been achieved, men were required in their oblations to symbolize before God by sacramental ritual the previous shedding of Christ's blood, upon which their acceptance continued to depend. But the symbol no longer includes an actual shedding of blood, because the death of Christ, once achieved, forever satisfies this need, and gives efficacy to all eucharistic oblations which are contritely and rightly offered in the Church of God.

§ 6. In the old covenant there were two classes of ritual performed by the Aaronic priesthood — a provisional ministry of Christ, adapted to the conditions existing previously to His redemptive self-manifestation. The first class had to do with entrance into the covenant and the bestowal of various divine blessings. Of this class circumcision was the primary example. The other class was sacrificial, and the sacrifices constituted the central and determinative feature of the working system of Israel's religion. That is, they occupied the place in the old law which is filled by the Holy Eucharist in the new.

These sacrifices were very ancient, representing

pre-Mosaic developments, common to Semitic peoples. But in the covenant which God established with Israel, they were purged of polytheistic elements, and were given higher meaning, becoming figures of the one true sacrifice of Christ, and representing various aspects of that sacrifice. When thus interpreted they are seen to constitute a unified system, having three principal branches: the sin or trespass offerings, the burnt offerings and the peace or thank offerings. The primary elements offered were fruits of the earth, as modified and made man's own by his labour — *e.g.* bread and wine — these gifts signifying men's self-surrender to God. But because of sin and of the necessity of making propitiation, the shedding of blood became a dominating feature of sacrifical ritual.[1]

(*a*) The sin and trespass offerings were in this respect most fundamental, and were wholly concerned with propitiation and the covering of guilt. Therefore the shedding of blood was their dominant feature. Various offerings of this kind had reference to particular sins, both of ignorance and of knowledge. But the chief sin offering was made annually, on the Day of Atonement,[2] and served once for all

[1] W. J. Gold, Lecs. i–ii (a very important book); E. F. Willis, *Worship of the Old Covenant;* L. Ragg, *Aspects of the Atonement, passim*; *Cath. Encyc., s. v.* "Sacrifice," I. 7 and II; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible, q. v.*; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites;* J. H. Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of the Old Test.*; A. Edersheim, *The Temple.*

[2] Levit. xvi. Cf. A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, ch. xvi.

to sanctify Israel's sacrifices for the whole year — the yearly round becoming symbolical in Christian interpretation of the entire temporal round of human approach to God. Through this offering access was gained to the Holy of Holies, and the sprinkling of blood on the Mercy Seat consummated for the year the ceremonial conditions, prefigurative of Christ's death and heavenly intercession, which made Israel's sacrifice provisionally acceptable to God. In brief, this ritual pointed directly to the death of Christ and His entrance into the heavenly holy place, not without blood, in order to gain for us acceptable access to God.[1]

(*b*) The burnt offerings, wholly consumed by fire, and connected with the perpetual exhibition of shew-bread within the Holy Place, constituted the normal and daily oblation whereby the Israelites offered themselves wholly to God.[2] The twelve loaves of shew-bread[3] represented the tribes of Israel, placed before God; and the consuming fire signified on the one hand the completeness of self-oblation, and, on the other hand, God's acceptance of the sacrifice. But an animal victim was offered, and its blood was poured out as a daily, that is constant, memorial before God of the Day of Atone-

[1] Heb. ix. 1–17.

[2] Exod. xxix. 15–18; Levit. i, etc. See A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, chh. vi–vii.

[3] Levit. xxiv. 5–9; Exod. xxv. 30. See A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 181–187; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, *q. v.*

ment. Thus the propitiatory aspect was never allowed to be forgotten.

(*c*) The peace offerings [1] contained what to the ancients was a vital aspect of sacrifice, communion with God by feasting at His board on food ritually identified with Him — the food of God. Thus the ancients related themselves to God in a vital communion, whereby their self-oblations were given vital effect, and with joyful thanksgiving celebrated their peace with God. The annual Paschal Feast constituted Israel's chief peace offering. Bread and wine were consumed, but the propitiatory element was not omitted; for they also consumed a lamb, the blood of which was shed within the sacred enclosure. This symbolized to them the deliverance from Egypt, but in Christian reference it comes to be a memorial of the Day of Atonement.

The meaning of Jewish ritual and sacrifices here imperfectly indicated is not that of which the Jews were conscious, but that which the sacrifice of Christ has imparted to them. It is therefore their divine meaning. It cannot be expected that children in a kindergarten school will adequately understand the school-ritual in which they take part, and whereby they are prepared for higher courses; and the old law constituted God's kindergarten school, wherein Israel was educated for his reception of the Gospel of redemption. It also constituted the pro-

[1] Exod. xxix. 19–22, 31; Levit. vii. 11–15, 18; etc. See A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–136; and chh. xi–xiii.

visional method of Christ's priestly office on earth, pending His self-manifestation and death on the Cross.

§ 7. When Christ appeared He became the focus wherein all the broken lights and figures of the old ritual were united and given their proper value and meaning. For He is the one true Priest and Victim, and His offering of Himself, by obedience to the Father's will and by meritorious death, is the mystery from which every derivative and ministerial priesthood and sacrifice, whether prefigurative or effectively participative, obtains such validity as it has.

The first Good Friday is the true Day of Atonement, and Christ's death, followed by His entrance, not without blood, into the true Holy Place,[1] in order to appear for us,[2] is the one only effective propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. And it is valid for all time,[3] giving to the old sacrifices the provisional and promissory value which they had, and making effective the Christian rite by which we participate in His death — the eucharistic sacrifice. Of it they are all dependent adjuncts,[4] and it has been offered once for all, a full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice.

By reason of Christ's victory over death it is a living sacrifice, and consecrates a priesthood which lives on in effectual functioning forever. And

[1] Heb. ix. 7, 12. [2] Heb. ix. 24. [3] Heb. ix. 25–x. 4, 11–14.
[4] A. P. Forbes, *Thirty-Nine Arts.*, xxxi.

because complete, it sanctifies and fulfils every aspect of sacrifice. His appearing for us becomes a perpetual burnt offering, in which we are offered to God in Him, and in which the glorious tokens of His death constitute an abiding propitiatory memorial. He is the heavenly shew-bread wherein we are placed before God to dwell in His Holy Place forever. And He has become our peace-offering, for He is the food of God, "the bread which came down from heaven," by feeding on which we gain eternal life,[1] and enjoy the vital communion with God for which we were made.[2]

This branch of the mystery constitutes the connecting link between the Godward and the manward branches of Christ's priestly office. In manward aspects it is His office to quicken us with His own life, and to impart God's gifts of grace to us. To this end He assumed our nature, and by suffering, death and resurrection He has fitted it to become our food, and the vehicle of life and grace to us, in a sacramental regimen adapted to our nature and condition.

§ 8. The death of Christ, it can be seen, brought the need of the bloody sacrifices of the old law to an end, and profoundly modified the priestly elements of true religion. The true Priest had been

[1] St. John vi. 32 *et seq.*

[2] On Christ's Heavenly Priesthood, see W. Milligan, *Ascension*, etc., Lecs. ii–iv; M. F. Sadler, *One Offering*, chh. vii–ix; Geo. Milligan, *Theol. of the Ep. to the Heb.*, ch. vi–vii.

revealed, and His sacrifice had been historically perfected, achieved and consecrated once for all as an abiding and living mystery, the Holy Place of which was changed from earthly Jerusalem to the heavenly abode of Christ's glorified Manhood. Thus the priesthood was released from racial limitations, and made equally effectual for every nation under heaven.

But the need of participation by men in the sacrifice is a permanent one, and therefore there never ceases to be an earthly ritual, sanctioned by God, whereby this participation can be made effectual. And sacramental means of grace have been provided, whereby men receive the benefits which Christ's death has won for them — benefits which are far wider in range and reference than the remedy of sin. In view of these necessities and provisions an earthly ministry continues to be employed, whereby the performance of Christ's priestly office is accommodated in its earthly reference to temporal and local conditions of human life in this world. That Christ did not exclude priestly functions from the range of commission which He gave to His apostolic ministry is shown not only by the absence of qualification in His language, "As My Father hath sent Me even so send I you," [1] but also by the specific offices which He charged them to fulfil. They were to baptize and to forgive sins in His name,[2] and the eucharistic memorial of

[1] St. John xx. 21. [2] St. Matt. xxviii. 19; St. John xx. 22–23.

His death which they were charged to perpetuate occupies a place in the Christian dispensation corresponding, according to St. Paul's comparison, to the sacrifices of the religious systems previously existing, whether Jewish or gentilic.[1] Thus the Christian congregation, as organized and officered by Christ's arrangements, became a "holy priesthood."[2]

But while Christ continues to use ministerial priests and derivative sacrifices on earth, an important change has taken place in both the form and effect of these ministrations, because of accomplished atonement. In the old sacrifices the true sacrifice of Christ was prefigured by bloody rites, and its benefits were promised, so to speak, to those who rightly offered them; but they could not put away sin. They did not effect what they figured; but were carnal ordinances, adapted to the conditions of those who were waiting for redemption.[3] The Christian sacraments, on the other hand, are efficacious means of sanctifying grace, and because they truly apply the spiritual benefits made available by Christ's death, they are spiritual. They effect what they figure, and bring interior sanctification to those who rightly receive them.

The Christian Eucharist, in particular, like the Jewish sacrifices, is a derivative sacrifice only, and has

[1] 1 Cor. x. 14–21.

[2] 1 St. Peter ii. 5, 9. On Christian priesthood, see R. C. Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood;* T. T. Carter, *Doctr. of the Priesthood.*

[3] Heb. ix. 8–15; x. 1–14.

no value or meaning except in relation to the Cross. But unlike the ritual which it displaces, and without shedding of blood, it truly represents and effectively applies the sacrifice of Christ. By means of it men are enabled to participate with Christ in offering His sacrifice, and with Him to enter the Holy Place, through the veil of His flesh, and to sprinkle His blood, which has been once for all shed, on the heavenly mercy seat.[1] In brief, the Eucharist effectively represents under earthly conditions, and for our participation in the mystery, the sacrifice which Christ perpetually presents in heaven by His appearance for us.[2]

The new dispensation was created within the womb of the old, and many who accepted the new continued for a time to be priests of the old ritual.[3] Therefore the Christian ministry and Eucharist did not fully appropriate the terminology of priesthood and sacrifice until the destruction of Jerusalem brought the old ritual to an end.[4] But the sacerdotal

[1] Heb. x. 19–22.

[2] The Euch. Sacrifice will be treated of in Vol. VIII of this series. But see the writer's *Theol. Outlines,* Vol. III. Qq. 150–151; M. F. Sadler, *One Offering;* Geo. R. Prynne, *Truth and Reality of the Euch. Sacrifice;* J. R. Milne, *Doctr. and Practice of the Holy Euch.;* D. Stone, *Holy Communion*, chh. v, vii; Chas. Gore, *Body of Christ*, ch. iii; Archd. Wilberforce, *Holy Euch.*, ch. xi; Wm. Forbes, *Consid. Modestæ* (Ang.–Cath. Lib.), Vol. II. pp. 562–613.

[3] Cf. Acts vi. 7.

[4] But all the elements connoted by priesthood are there. Cf. in particular the terms λειτουργὸν, ἱερουργοῦντα and προσφορά, in Rom. xv. 16. See R. C. Moberly, *op. cit.*, pp. 263 *et seq.*; T. T. Carter, *op. cit.*, ch. xi.

nature of the new ministry was at once apparent, and a sacrificial interpretation of the Eucharist gained inspired authority. Accordingly, as soon as the old ritual ceased to complicate the situation, priestly and sacrificial terminology became commonplace in the Christian Church.[1]

But the Christian priesthood is Christ's priesthood, wherein He graciously enables His members, in their several relations, ministerial and lay, to have a share. And this participation enables men to perform, through Him, their creaturely obligation of formal, corporate, effective and acceptable self-oblation to God. This self-oblation and will-surrender is the permanent and essential thing in true sacrifice — the function which priesthood is appointed effectually to fulfil.

III. *His Kingly Office*

§ 9. Jesus Christ is the only begotten Son of God, His eternal Logos. Therefore, by virtue of His abiding relation in the Godhead, He is God's vicegerent, through whom all dominion and authority is exercised. He constitutes the reason of all that God ordains, and the prophoric Word, λόγος προφορικός, through whom the sovereign will and law of God is made manifest and given effect. It is the Father's eternal will that in all things He

[1] R. C. Moberly, *op. cit.*, pp. 272 *et seq.*

shall have the preëminence.[1] The kingdom of God is His kingdom, a kingdom to which the whole creation is subject. All authority ultimately proceeds from God through Him;[2] and the powers that are ordained of God, whether heavenly or earthly, natural or supernatural, civil or spiritual, are ordained by Him, for He, and He alone, is the Mediator between God and the creature, the Person in whom all things consist.[3] He is the King of Kings and Lord of Lords.[4]

The authority of Christ is indeed derivative, because it comes from the Father, but this derivation is part of the mystery of the triune subsistence of God, and is eternal.[5] Accordingly, although in the final consummation of things the Son will be subjected to the Father, that God may be all in all,[6] this subjection does not signify an abolition of His vicegerency, but an open manifestation of its eternally derivative nature. The Kingdom of Christ

[1] Col. i. 18.

[2] Cf. St. Matt. xxviii. 18. [3] Col. i. 17.

[4] Revel. xix. 16; xvii. 14; Psa. xlv. 3–7; lxxii. 5, 8, 11; Isa. ix. 6–7; Jerem. xxiii. 5–6; Dan. vii. 13–14; Zech. ix. 9–10; St. Matt. ii. 2; St. Luke i. 32–33; x. 22; St. John iii. 31; xviii. 36–37; Rom. ix. 5; Ephes. i. 20–22; Phil. ii. 9–11; etc. On Christ's kingly office and kingdom, see Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, Vol. I, p. 477, and *s. vv.* "King" and "Kingdom of God (or Heaven)"; *Dic. of Bible*, *s. v.* "Kingdom of God;" St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* III. lix; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, VIII. iv. 6; H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, Bk. III. ch. v.

[5] Cf. *The Trinity*, ch. viii. §§ 1–4.

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 24–28.

is an everlasting Kingdom and His dominion can have no end. It indeed undergoes changes, but they consist of modifications of earthly dispensations, or adaptations of the external machinery of divine government to the changing conditions of mankind, and to the several stages in the fulfilment of God's redemptive purpose. In every dispensation, even previously to His personal self-manifestation, the eternal Son is the King, and the machinery of government is His machinery.

Divine government is twofold, cosmic and moral. In relation to the cosmos the Logos is the immanent Sustainer and Controller of every element and process of nature.[1] Its laws are His laws, its meaning is His meaning, and its purpose is His purpose; which gains ever clearer manifestation with the creative push of life which He supplies,[2] and with the evolution of the varying forms of the organic world. The moral government of God is carried on through creaturely agents, who are admitted to a certain ministerial participation in the control of nature,[3] but who are themselves subjects of God and therefore of His eternal Son. He it is who "has constituted the services of angels and men in a wonderful order," [4] and who exercises the supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority in all

[1] Col. i. 15–20.
[2] A figure borrowed from H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution.*
[3] *Creation and Man,* ch. iii. §§ 4–5.
[4] Collect for St. Michael and all Angels.

successive dispensations and covenants between God and man, in accordance with the eternal will of the Father.

§ 10. In pre-Christian dispensations Christ's kingly office had not been declared except in the somewhat enigmatical terms of messianic prophecy, and as something yet to be openly manifested. But it was exercised in the establishment of each succeeding covenant, in the legislation connected therewith, in the interventions by which the fortunes of Israel and of other nations were modified, and in divine judgments. Thus both the moral and the ceremonial law of the Mosaic covenant came from the eternal Logos, both being accommodated to the degraded imaginations and hardened hearts of Israel, but both together constituting an educative system which was to give way to better ordinances when its work was done.[1] In the meantime prophets were raised up, who led the way in pointing to the deeper principles of divine government and human righteousness of which the carnal Jewish ritual was divinely symbolical.

These prophets also gave forth a series of messianic prophecies, whereby the prospective manifestation of Christ, and the ultimate triumph of His Kingdom over all hostile powers, were declared with increasing clearness and confidence.[2] The result was that

[1] Cf. *Creation and Man*, ch. x. §§ 3–5.

[2] On messianic prophecies, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, *s. v.* "Messiah" and "Prophecy and Prophets," C. ii. 2; Franz Delitzsch,

the messianic hope became a dominant element in the Jewish outlook. Yet it was not possible to bring the Jews as a body to a realization of the spiritual nature of the messianic rule; and only a remnant was ready to recognize the Messiah, Jesus Christ, when He finally manifested Himself in the guise of a self-effacing and suffering Saviour of mankind.

§ 11. Although for the purpose of salvation Christ came to humble Himself, submitting to human conditions, to rejection and to the death of the Cross, the burden of His preaching was His own Kingdom. It was to be a kingdom of righteousness, and therefore the proclamation of its coming was accompanied, both in His own preaching and in that of His fore-runner, by a call to repentance. He proclaimed Himself as the King. There can be no question that He had in view from the outset of His public ministry thus to proclaim Himself, whatever reserve and economy of teaching He may have employed at first and in dealing with the incredulous and carnal minded. He indeed condescended, in the nature which He assumed, to subject Himself to the limitations of human consciousness; and therefore in our nature His messianic consciousness was subject to growth. But His mind was too richly endowed, and too fully guided by the grace of union and by the Holy Spirit, to grow aim-

Messianic Prophecies; Cath. Encyc., s. v. "Messias"; A. T. Kirkpatrick, *Doctr. of the Prophets.*

lessly and blunderingly in relation to so central an element in the purpose for which He became incarnate.[1]

In revealing His kingdom He took over the messianic terminology of His age and race, but filled it with a more spiritual reference than the rulers of His people could understand. He proclaimed the kingdom in eschatological terms; and appropriating to Himself the messianic title, Son of Man, declared that the final triumph of His kingdom would be signalized by His coming in glory in the clouds of heaven to judge all mankind. Refusing to declare the time of this coming, a particular not present to His human mind,[2] He merged into one perspective of prophecy three several things: (*a*) the coming of His kingdom with power, through the descent of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost; (*b*) the destruction of Jerusalem; (*c*) the signs of His coming to judge mankind at the end of the world. It is evident that, owing no doubt to the purposely enigmatical and more or less symbolical nature of His predictions, the Gospel writers have not been able to preserve for us His *ipsissima verba*, and that they have obscured His time references.

[1] On our Lord's messianic consciousness, see E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 248–285; C. F. Nolloth, *Person of Our Lord*, ch. vi.; H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 14–19; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Eschatology," B. 2.

[2] St. Mark xiii. 32; St. Matt. xxv. 13.

At all events, His explicit disclaimer of knowledge of the day and hour of His second coming for final judgment seems to justify our reconsidering the reference of His saying that the then existing generation should not pass away until all His words had been fulfilled. The things of which He spoke, including the "signs" of His second advent, were fulfilled in that generation, the signs in every succeeding generation also; and it is obviously an error to interpret these signs as indicating immediacy of His return, that is, according to our time measures. It would seem, therefore, that our Lord was setting them forth as signs of *the sure movement of history towards* the end, rather than of its "day and hour." From His prophetic standpoint the end is always impending, and He was declaring the signs which in every generation, and therefore in that generation, would reveal its ceaseless and sure approach. These signs were fulfilled — really happened — as He said they would, and we need not think that "all these things" included the date of the second advent in their reference. Prediction as to when the end would come was foreign to His purpose, and inconsistent with His disclaimer of knowledge. His real aim was to admonish men of the need of watchfulness and readiness for judgment. Therefore He laid bare in sign language the laws of history, so that His followers might ever be reminded by the nature of passing events, as interpreted by Him, that the end is steadily approaching.

The current eschatological theory, which makes Him to have erred in His predictions, and to have died with expectation of an immediate consummation of the final cataclysm,[1] requires some manipulation of the synoptic Gospels, and an entire disregard of Johannine testimony and of the impression concerning Christ's teaching which was retained in the pentecostal Church. It also reduces the divine Revealer to a blundering prophet, one to be pitied rather than to be adored.[2]

Christ not only preached His kingdom, but made provision for its earthly organization, by calling, training and ordaining His apostles, to whom He delegated His own mission to make disciples and to build His Church. The Church, indeed, equipped with sacramental means of grace of His institution, was to be the earthly machinery of the kingdom when it came with power through the descent of the promised Spirit. Its coming had to be delayed until His own departure from this world and the enthronment of His perfected and glorified Manhood in heaven. This was so because the power of the kingdom on earth was to flow from a vital union to be achieved by the Spirit between the Church

[1] Set forth by A. Schweitzer, *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, chh. xix *et seq.*, and *Sketch of the Life of Jesus.*

[2] Of recent discussions of the eschatological problem, see E. D. la Touche, *op. cit.*, pp. 151–205; E. C. Dewick, *Primitive Christ. Eschatology;* E. W. Winstanley, *Jesus and the Future;* L. A. Muirhead, *Eschatology of Jesus;* and in Hastings, *Dic. of Christ, s. v.* "Eschatology," B. 3; F. W. Worsley, *The Apocalypse of Jesus.*

and His glorified body — a union which makes the Church the mystical Body of Christ.[1]

Redemption also had to be achieved before the kingdom could be established, and this meant that Christ had first to die and rise again. The immediate cause of His death was a rejection of His messianic claims by the rulers of His people, but the complacent and ignorant irony of the Roman governor caused the truth to be recorded above His head on the Cross, "This is Jesus the King of the Jews."

§ 12. The kingdom came with power on the day of Pentecost which followed the King's ascension into heaven. Its full triumph was indeed to be delayed for many weary ages of waiting; but when the apostles were clothed with power from on high,[2] the earthly and sacramental machinery of the kingdom began to operate for the incorporation of penitent souls into the kingdom, for their regeneration and for their sanctification. The Church became the meeting point between the King and His faithful subjects, and to refuse to hear the Church became equivalent to a refusal to hear Him.[3] To the Church was given the keys of the kingdom and the power of binding and loosing. Her precepts are precepts of the kingdom and her ministers are Christ's ministers in the earthly administration

[1] Fuller treatment of this will be given in Vol. VIII of this series; but see W. Milligan, *Ascension*, Lec. iv.

[2] St. Luke xxiv. 49.

[3] St. Luke x. 16. Cf. St. Matt. xviii. 17.

of His kingly office. But the kingdom is spiritual, and the Church may not use coercive jurisdiction or carnal methods of government. The kingdom is to be extended by persuasion, and not until the second coming of Christ Himself may any other than spiritual means of discipline be employed. Excommunication, or exclusion from the spiritual priveleges of the kingdom in this world, is the extremest means which she may rightly employ. But within her appointed sphere, her authority is the authority of the King, and her administrations are those of His kingdom. The Church is not the kingdom, but she is charged with its earthly administration.[1]

But in its fullest actualization the kingdom is still to come — an eschatological mystery to be revealed at the end of days. Only then will all alien elements be excluded and all hostile forces be put down. And only then will the reign of God, through Jesus Christ, attain its destined perfect triumph in righteousness forever. The day of that coming cannot be known beforehand. It is indeed heralded by signs, but these signs appear in every age; and they declare, not the moment of the consummation, but the divinely controlled flow of events towards the inevitable end. As we have seen, this is the true meaning of the signs. They are designed to form our minds in readiness for the second advent, and to enable us to see that it is

[1] Cf. St. Luke, xxii. 29–30.

indeed approaching. When they are otherwise regarded, and when men are distracted from the duties of every-day life by seeking to gain more precise information from them, their meaning is misconceived, and many spiritual evils result. It is not good for us to know, or to seek to know, "the day and the hour." We are always to watch, which means that we are always to be living in such wise as to be ready; and we are always to pray, "Thy kingdom come."

CHAPTER X

OUR LORD'S EARTHLY LIFE

I. *Methods of Treatment*

§ 1. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the effect of catholic doctrine, as set forth in this volume, on our conception and treatment of the earthly life of Christ. Some statements bearing on this subject have been incidentally made in previous chapters, but this volume will not be complete unless a separate chapter is devoted to it. We take up the subject last, because what we have to say will be best understood after our Christological standpoint has been fully explained.

In the New Testament the life of Christ is described in the interest of the primitive faith of Christians concerning Him, and as part of the Christian propaganda. This propaganda was initiated by those who were witnesses of His resurrection and ascension, and whose interpretation of His life was dominated by the thought of His being their glorified Lord. The historical interest, as we understand it, was not felt. This appears conspicuously in the Epistles of St. Paul, whose teaching concerning Christ, even when based upon the

testimony of eye-witnesses, is somewhat exclusively concerned with the facts of His death and bodily resurrection, and with the doctrines which he deduced therefrom — especially of His divine Person and of the redemption achieved by Him.

It was of course inevitable that a desire should arise at an early date for connected accounts of Christ's earthly life, and the need of preserving a true knowledge of His more significant words and works must have been evident to many. But the grounds of this desire were religious rather than historical; and when the Gospels were produced they were written for the enlightenment of believers, and for the preservation of existing Christian conceptions of the Redeemer. This does not mean that the facts were insincerely dealt with, and that the Gospels are historically untrustworthy; but that they were not written after the manner of modern lives, and leave many unsolved problems for those who seek to investigate the sayings and doings of Christ in their historical sequences and connections. Moreover, the Gospels betray mutual inconsistencies of detail, such as are inevitable in human testimonies. We are not always able to learn from them the *ipsissima verba* of Christ, and various insoluble problems as to the precise sequences, connections and details of events continue to baffle Gospel students. In brief, the Gospels are Gospels rather than biographies; and while their trustworthiness and value as Gospels, and

as affording evidence of such facts as are vital to Christian faith, have been abundantly established, their value for biographical science is limited.

Modern criticism has overthrown the assumption of earlier Christian apologists, that the four Gospels represent so many entirely independent testimonies to the facts to which they give common witness. According to the prevailing view, the synoptic Gospels are mainly derived from two sources — an original Marcan document and a collection of sayings of Christ, called Q. The writer of the third and first Gospels, taken in this chronological order, are said to have heightened the miraculous narratives of the second Gospel; and the elements which they have in common, other than those found in, and thought to be derived from, the Marcan document, are supposed to be taken from Q. But other materials appear in these Gospels, in particular the narratives of our Lord's nativity and childhood, which obviously have independent sources; and we cannot admit that the synoptic writers were limited for their means of information to the pre-existing documents which they used. Their manner of copying was that of writers who had other information; and when they wrote, many eye-witnesses of Christ were still living. There must have remained in the Church much common knowledge of Christ's words and doings which was independent of documents. Accordingly we cannot truly admit that the concurrent testimonies of the

synoptic Gospels have no mutually corroborative value whatever.[1]

The fourth Gospel is acknowledged by careful critics to contain evidences of a familiarity with Palestinian conditions during our Lord's life which could not have been possessed by one who had not come in personal and contemporaneous contact with them. Whether written by the apostle whose name it bears or not, it exhibits the appearance of having been produced by a personal witness of Christ. Therefore the habit of totally disregarding its testimony as unhistorical cannot be justified by the state of the Johannine problem. That it was written somewhat late in the first century, sufficiently late to leave room for occasional lapses of memory, may be acknowledged. And that it was written with doctrinal purpose is clear from the testimony of the writer himself.[2] But its Christology is that of the synoptic Gospels, although more definitively expressed; its spiritual level is too lofty to permit the supposition that its writer manipulated facts in partisan interests; and the writer's information concerning matters susceptible of verification has been found to be reliable. There are some reasons for thinking that where the fourth Gospel modifies narratives given in the synoptic

[1] On the synoptic problem, see L. Pullan, *The Gospels*, ch. iii.; W. Sanday (Edit.), *Studies in the Synoptic Problem;* Sir J. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ;* V. H. Stanton, *The Gospels as Historical Documents*; etc.

[2] St. John xx. 31.

Gospels, its testimony is more accurate than theirs. In spite of the fact that the most amazing miraculous narratives are contained in this Gospel, its witness to the real Manhood of Christ is vivid and convincing. The reasons for its rejection by many modern critics are to be found chiefly in their presuppositions: that certain miracles which it describes could not happen, and that the lofty personal rank in being assigned therein to Jesus Christ is false. We believe that if it were not for these presuppositions, the historical value of the fourth Gospel would be acknowledged by all sincere and competent critics. Inasmuch, as we do not accept them, we have not hesitated in this volume to rely on all four of the Gospels as among the most trustworthy narratives of fact that ancient literature contains.[1]

§ 2. Their trustworthiness, and the sober sincerity of their writers, appear in sharp relief when we compare them with the so-called apocryphal Gospels, which are disfigured with obvious exaggeration of the miraculous and with oblivious disregard of spiritual likelihoods of works performed by such a perfect person as Jesus Christ. Their method is to consider somewhat exclusively the divine power of Christ, and to assume that, being divine, He

[1] On the Fourth Gospel, see W. Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel;* Jas. Drummond, *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel;* Theodor Zahn, *Introd. to the New Testament;* Ezra Abbott, *Crit. Essays;* J. B. Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, i–iii; L. Pullan, *op. cit.*, chh. viii–ix; O. D. Watkins, *Bamp. Lectures.*

would display His power in the most startling ways, regardless of spiritual values and of the self-effacing purpose for which He became Man. In them the human and ethical aspects of the Incarnation are ignored, and vain-glorious and grotesque demonstrations of power over nature are described in obedience to a carnal tendency to mythical invention.[1]

The same tendency to assume that very God could not submit in full reality to the conditions of human life appears in milder forms in much mediæval literature. It is true that Christian writers of this period accepted the inspired authority of the canonical Gospels, to the exclusion of apocryphal literature, and that they were far from intending to manipulate them. Moreover, there was no lack of emphasis upon the sufferings of Christ, which indeed could not be minimized without patent disregard of Gospel testimony. But oncsidedness appeared in several ways. Our Lord's miracles were apt to be treated exclusively as demonstrations of power, and as patent revelations of Godhead, instead of as works of mercy and as spiritual signs. The sparingness with which they were resorted to, and the justifying conditions under which they were performed, were overlooked; and the conception of an almighty Wonder-worker came to overshadow the Gospel portrait of a self-effacing

[1] See Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, *s. v.* "Gospels (Apocryphal)"; and *Encyc. of Religion*, *q. v.*

Man of Sorrows. Various indications of Christ's human limitations were explained away. In particular, His confession of ignorance as to the day and the hour of the final judgment was interpreted as an accommodation of speech, an economy which is really inconsistent with perfect truthfulness.[1] Again, our Lord's victory over temptation came to be regarded not only as inevitable, but as proceeding directly from omnipotence, instead of being the result of heroic and painful moral effort, made successful by grace.

§ 3. "Lives" of Christ, in the biographical sense, became for the first time an important branch of Christian literature in the eighteenth century, but on a rationalistic basis. Early in that century the Christological emphasis was shifted among protestant scholars from the divine to the human; but unfortunately the change was reactionary, and even more onesided in its results than the previous emphasis upon our Lord's Deity. First came the *Aufklärung*, which practically abandoned all Christology, and refused to regard Christ's Person as having any place in doctrine. His moral teachings and example were considered to constitute Christianity, and all supernatural elements of the Gospels were rejected. To write a life of Christ meant to the older rationalists to disparage His religious importance, and a purely humanitarian biography

[1] Instances are given by H. C. Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 429–432.

was regarded as an adequate description of His Person and of His life.

Schleiermacher appealed to the personal experience of believers as requiring a higher estimate of Christ, and insisted that His advent constituted a divine intervention in human history, a redemptive mystery; but while he directed fatal blows against the uninspiring *Aufklärung*, he could not recover the full doctrine of Christ's personal Godhead. The life of Christ gained religious significance; but what He achieved, rather than what He was, determined its treatment.

The Hegelian philosophy, while accepting orthodox language concerning Christ, gave the ancient terms a neologian twist, and reduced Christ to a symbol of a metaphysical idea — the world-process of God's self-realization in history. Thus the historical reality of Christ assumed secondary importance, and David F. Strauss pressed this aspect of Hegelianism to the point of a mythical interpretation of the Gospels in his *Leben Jesu*, published in 1835. The indirect effect of this challange was to give the life of Christ a far greater importance in Christological study than it had ever before obtained. Since his day a constant stream of "Lives" has appeared. The mythical interpretation could not, of course, hold its own, and its momentary revival in our own time constitutes only a passing vagary of rationalistic speculation.[1]

[1] On modern lives of Christ, see A. Schweitzer, *Quest of the*

Incidently the historical method has been elaborately developed, and constitutes a controlling factor in modern investigation. Of the value and importance of this method, rightly employed, there can be no serious question. As applied to the earthly life of Christ it assumed that His self-manifestation, so far from being an isolated flash from the heavens, was vitally connected with the history of His age and race. His earthly life, therefore, must be investigated in this light, and the mental, moral, social and political conditions under which He lived must be fully allowed for in interpreting the data that are available. In short, His life was not an unrelated life, but was conditioned at every point by the circumstances, and by the forms of thought and language, of the Jews in the early part of the first century of our era.

This cannot be denied, and no catholic interest can be served by neglecting to acknowledge the debt which we owe to those who have given the historical method a permanent place in Christological enquiry.[1] And this method has justified itself by throwing much new light on our Lord's human life. This does not, however, require us to accept without scrutiny all the conclusions which have been advanced by modern advocates of the historical method, which has often been employed without

Historical Jesus; W. Sanday, *Life of Christ in Recent Research*; E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, Lec. ii.

[1] Cf. ch. i. §§ 7–8, above.

regard to its limitations and on the basis of rationalistic postulates. In so far as Christ was human, and truly submitted to the conditions of human life while on earth, we cannot intelligently neglect the historical method in studying His life. But the fact that His Person transcended the conditions to which He submitted, and the further fact that His earthly life represented the manifestation and achievements of a divine Redeemer, require us to hypothecate factors in that life which do not admit of adequate investigation by the historical method. It is a somewhat widespread failure to acknowledge and allow for this that deprives many modern lives of Christ of the value which they might have had, if sounder postulates had been adopted.

§ 4. In the ordinary sense of the word a true "biography" of Christ cannot be produced. In saying this we are not thinking of any alleged inadequacy of the Gospel data, but of the presupposition of "biographies," that the factors of the life considered are all human, and that all its data are susceptible of adequate treatment by the historical method. Unless the historic faith of Christians in the Person of Christ is fundamentally erroneous, the life of Christ was not that of a mere man, but that of God-incarnate. Its meaning cannot be determined in its more significant elements by purely human estimates, or by the historical method exclusively employed. Christ neither ceased to be God nor lived the manner of human life that He

would have lived if He had not been as truly divine as He was really human.[1]

With all their failure to do adequate justice to the limitations of Christ, mediæval writers were right in treating the incidents of our Lord's earthly life as mysteries, as revelations of a divine Person and of divine intervention in human history. In doing this they came closer to the fundamental meaning of the Gospels than the modern triumphs of the historical method enable scholars to come, when they disregard the superhuman factor in the divine Redeemer's earthly life, conversation and experience. We have taken pains to acknowledge that our Lord's self-manifestation was wholly in human terms, and that no open obtrusion of Godhead disturbed the uninterrupted humanness of the Gospel drama. But the manner of the human in His case was absolutely unique, and is insusceptible of reasonable interpretation unless the historical method is supplemented by the theological. The Gospel drama is a human drama from end to end, but in its deeper aspects it is also, and preeminently, a theological drama, requiring theological interpretation to be adequately understood. The hypothesis that very God, remaining full God,

[1] The late J. B. Mozley says, *Augustinian Doctr. of Predestination* (8vo. ed.), p. 99, "The doctrine of our Lord's divinity modifies the truths connected with Humanity in this way, that He who was both God and Man cannot be thought of even as Man exactly the same as if He were not God."

submitted to what Christ submitted to, and experienced what Christ experienced, is indispensable to valid conclusions concerning the meaning, ethical and other, of the events of His human life.

The theological method differs from the Gospel method in this, that its immediate purpose is scientific. The Gospels, as we have seen, pertain to a propaganda of saving truth. True theology also ministers to this propaganda, but its distinctive aim in relation to the facts of Christ's life is to co-ordinate these facts with other theological data, and to interpret them as significant and determinative elements in our general knowledge of God and of His redemptive purpose in becoming incarnate.

II. *Postulates and Principles*

§ 5. The interests of sacred study require the writing of better lives of Christ than have yet been published, and the conditions are ripe for this production. We are not speaking of devotional lives, which also have an important place, but of lives written for the purpose of furnishing, so far as our knowledge permits, historically connected accounts and sound interpretations of the several earthly acts and experiences of Jesus Christ. It is worth while to recapitulate some of the postulates and principles which need to be adopted and observed in meeting this need.

In the first place, no life of Christ can be regarded

as a serious contribution to sacred learning unless it treats His earthly career as properly human, and makes full use of the historical method in order to connect the facts given in the Gospels with the conditions and circumstances under which Christ acted, taught and suffered. We have been maintaining this in previous pages, and it constitutes a truism among those who have kept abreast of modern investigation. But the point will bear emphatic reiteration, partly to put the position adopted in this volume beyond question, and partly because there are still many catholic scholars who have failed fully to realize the importance of the historical method in this connection. Their failure is due, no doubt, to the fact that this method has been developed in the first instance by rationalists, and has been exploited by many in the interest of destructive criticism. This use of it is of course a misuse, made plausible only by presuppositions which cannot bear intelligent scrutiny; and unsound presuppositions will vitiate any method of investigation. The historical method is indispensable for adequate study of our Lord's human life, and the remedy for its misuse is its abundant proper use.

And modern investigation has brought to light an immense amount of information concerning the circumstances and conditions, mental, moral, religious, social and political, under which Jesus Christ lived, and by which the facts given in the Gospels can be more intelligently understood. The

messianic ideas then prevalent among the Jews, the forms of thought and language which were available for Christ's use, the preconceptions which determined His conversation, whether He was Himself hampered by them or not, the schools and parties to which He addressed His questions and answers, the political conditions that affected the reception of His messianic claim, the eschatological conceptions which conditioned His preaching of the kingdom, the geography of Palestine, and the social customs to which the Gospels make allusions: all these and many other branches of knowledge bearing on the historical interpretation of the Gospels have become more fully available than in any age since apostolic days.

The recent development of psychological science has added to our facilities in studying our Lord's mental life — that is, His human consciousness. With all its unique endowments, and in spite of His emancipation from the dulness of spiritual intelligence which sin engenders, His human mind was governed by the laws and methods of our intelligence. Therefore the more exact knowledge of these laws which modern psychology affords cannot fail to assist us in studying the mental experience of Christ. In particular, psychological science, as historically applied, helps us to distinguish in the phenomena of our Lord's consciousness between what was normal to human intelligence, under the conditions of that age, and what can be explained

only by special endowments and by His possession of divine intelligence, not openly emerging in His human consciousness, but protecting it from spiritual error.

The perfect naturalness and the historical congruities of His earthly life need to be remembered at every point. This does not require us either to disregard or even to minimize the supernatural factors. They are required to explain many of the facts. But they never emerge as disturbing elements. They explain His uniqueness, but they perfect and enhance the human in Him without either displacing it or destroying its uninterrupted naturalness and conformity to human conditions and laws.[1]

§ 6. We have said that the historical method has limitations. These limitations grow out of the fact that it is exclusively concerned with historical conditions, circumstances and factors — such as emerge openly in human experience. Its validity as applied to the life of Christ is confined to a consideration of the human factors, conditions and circumstances under which it was lived. It cannot be applied either to determine the superhuman aspects of our Lord's Person and resources or to define the possibilities of divine intervention. These transcend historical scrutiny, because they emerge in human experience only in their human effects. To the extent of this indirect revelation we can make

[1] On psychological Christology, see ch. vi. § 6, above.

theological inferences concerning them; but they are not open to direct observation, and neither historical nor psychological science can do more than take note of their inability to explain on exclusively historical and natural grounds the phenomena by which His divine resources were revealed. The superhuman can afford human signs of its presence, signs susceptible of historical cognizance because human; but the factors which these signs reveal cannot be estimated in the terms of history and psychology.

A second postulate is necessary in investigating and describing our Lord's earthly life — the postulate that He was very God-incarnate, entering human history in order to reveal Himself and His kingdom, and to redeem mankind. It is to be acknowledged that the truth of this postulate was not realized by those who saw Christ until after His resurrection and ascension, but when once perceived it necessarily became the interpretative principle of apostolic teaching concerning the mysteries of His earthly manifestation. Previously to their perception of it the apostles had been unable to understand their Master, and those who reject it necessarily labour under a similar incapacity.[1]

[1] The cry, "Back to Christ," in so far as it means an elimination of post-pentecostal Christology, if it could be satisfied, would reduce us to the stupidity with which, the Gospels being witness, His intimates received His teachings when He walked the earth. Cf. § 8 (*d*), below.

It is true of many departments of research that the postulates which are necessary for fruitful study are discovered only after much fruitless investigation and reflection, but when once mastered they are accepted without question by subsequent students, as presuppositions of further study. Any other course would be unscientific, and there is no more glaring violation of scientific method than that which prepares for investigation into the life of Christ by eliminating from consideration the chief clue to its meaning — the divine Person of Christ and the purpose for which He came into the world. Nothing can justify such procedure except a reasonable assurance that the claims of Christ were either not made as reported or erroneous, and that the evidences of their truth, in particular the supernatural elements in His life and action, are to be rejected as unhistorical and invalid. Only on *à priori* and naturalistic grounds — grounds which have no scientific value — can a show of reason be given to warrant such a negative assurance.

§ 7. It is unnecessary to reproduce in this place the arguments which justify a rejection of the naturalistic philosophy and an acknowledgment of miraculous elements in the life of Christ.[1] But

[1] Cf. ch. i. § 3 (where refs. on naturalism are given) and ch. iv. § 7, above. Also § 11 (*d*), below. The modern attack on the miraculous in the Gospels began with "the Enlightenment," or older rationalism, of Reimarus and Paulus (see E. D. la Touche, *Person of Christ*, pp. 56–60; A. Schweitzer, *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, chh. ii.–v.). It has been renewed from time to time, and recently

we may well remind ourselves of a few significant aspects of the subject.

In the first place misleading connotations of the terms supernatural and miracle should be cleared away. Whatever naïve ideas may have gained expression among those who seek to magnify the supernatural, it is wholly unnecessary to suppose an opposition between it and the natural. The supernatural is neither unnatural nor *contra-naturam*. It is a relative term, having reference only to the particular natures which it transcends. Every possible operation is obviously natural to the agent or factor by whose power of operation it is achieved, and no operation in a universe ordered by God can *violate* the natures which it contains. When we speak of Christ's actions being supernatural we mean simply that they require higher factors to explain them than those that are resident in *our* nature. Mere man cannot achieve them without assistance from above. But if Christ was truly divine, all actions were natural *to Him* that are natural to God. An unnatural event, properly taken, would be an event contrary to the possibilities of any nature,

in Oxford by J. M. Thompson (*Miracles in the New Testament*). Still more recently Dr. Sanday has rejected certain of the Gospel miracles as *contra naturam* (in *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*). Of recent replies should be mentioned Thos. B. Strong, *The Miraculous in Gospels and Creeds;* A. C. Headlam, *Miracles of the New Testament;* and *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1914, Art. 1; C. F. D'Arcy, *Christianity and the Supernatural*; J. R. Illingworth, *The Gospel Miracles.*

or at least to the nature from whose resident forces it proceeds.

If we believed that Christ by unassisted human powers achieved works of which such powers are incapable, then we would believe in something unnatural and therefore impossible. The same would be the case, if we attributed to Him works within the visible order which would be inconsistent with the continuity of its laws of causation. But no such works are ascribed to Him in the Gospels; and the distinction made "between events that are *supra naturam* — . . . testifying to the presence of higher spiritual forces — and events . . . that are *contra naturam*, or involve some definite reversal of the natural physical order," [1] cannot be applied to the Gospel narratives.

The Virgin-Birth of Christ, His resurrection in the body in which He died — changed, indeed, but the same in substance — the feeding of the five thousand with a few loaves, the stilling of the storm, the raising of Lazarus, and other miracles of Christ which offend the historical sense of certain contemporaries, none of them require the supposition that any resident force or capacity of the visible order was reversed or stultified. The effects of these forces were indeed manipulated and innovated upon, either by supplementary or by counteracting causa-

[1] Advanced by W. Sanday, *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, pp. 21 *et seq.*, and answered by T. B. Strong, *The Miraculous in Gospels and Creeds*.

tion. But the manipulation of natural effects by voluntary agents is a daily experience. We do not suppose that the force of gravitation is undone when we lift something from the ground, although we plainly alter the course of purely gravitational events. Human power thus to manipulate natural sequences is of course limited; but if we were able to restore life to a dead body, to multiply loaves in a moment and to evoke human birth without human fatherhood, we should be doing nothing more than to introduce higher factors of supplementary and counteractive efficiency. The difference would be one of degree only, and no degree of manipulation of this kind can exceed the power of Him who is the immanent cause of all forces and events.

There is one obvious limit to the argumentative bearing of these considerations. We cannot believe that God would either Himself manipulate nature, or assist His creatures to do so, without adequate reason — reason consistent with the principle of order and with the continuity of events in the fulfilment of His plan in creation. A capricious and unmeaning miracle — having no relation to the general sequence of events — we are constrained to regard as unnatural to God. Therefore, to cite an example found somewhere in the late Thomas Huxley's writings, no amount of testimony would make the tale credible that a centaur had been seen to walk through a London street. It is the co-

herence of Gospel miracles with what we know of the general plan of God, their critical and spiritual significance in relation to that plan, that makes the testimony to them appear credible and convincing.

Unless the Christian view of human history and destiny is wholly false, the Virgin-Birth and the physical resurrection of Christ are the most illuminating and significant events in history. And it is the sheerest dogmatism to describe them as *contra-naturam*. Those who acknowledge that Christ's birth was a true incarnation of God, the entrance of very God into human history, acknowledge an event which stands by itself, and which can be wrought only by higher than physical and human power. Being a unique act of God, who is to dogmatize as to the natural manner — natural to God — in which it is to be achieved? That it was achieved in a fitting manner has already been shown in this volume.[1] No factor of propagation was stultified, but an event usually effected by carnal intercourse was achieved by a higher factor, for reasons which have always seemed to Christian believers to be obvious and adequate.

The same is true of the resurrection. The part which, according to all experience, the human body has to fulfil in man's spiritual functioning, and the requirements of full redemption as exhibited in the New Testament, alike show the congruity of a resurrection of the flesh with the divinely

[1] In ch. iii. §§ 4, 9.

appointed destiny of man. And the resurrection and glorification of flesh do not stultify any natural force or capacity. There is simply the coming in of a higher factor, which produces an effect transcending the native resources of the human frame, but which in no wise subverts any of its natural capacities. Moreover, in view of the modern overthrow of former notions as to the solidity and immutability of material elements, it is extremely precarious to set an *à priori* limit to the spiritual functioning which may be mediated through the human organism by its Creator. So far from being *contra-naturam*, the resurrection of Christ in the flesh is the most illuminating event of history, perfectly natural to its Worker, although supernatural to us.

Finally, as to the other miracles objected to, their credibility lies in their relevance as signs pertaining to the Person and purpose of their Worker. We may indeed be unable fully to explain their reference in detail. This is to be expected when considering so unique and stupendous a drama as the manifestation of God in history. But that they are proper to such an one as Christ, that they harmonize with His mission, and that they represent sovereign and purposeful manipulation of nature's forces by nature's Creator, rather than any destruction of them, is not difficult to perceive, when we escape the meshes of the naturalistic philosophy and take the more comprehensive view

of the place and function of natural processes which the Christian standpoint affords.[1]

Our conclusion is that no life of Christ can be regarded as either adequate or true to fact which is controlled by efforts to explain away the miraculous elements in the Gospels. That they should be critically examined, and their evidence carefully considered, goes without saying. But to treat them as unnatural to Christ because they transcend unaided human power to perform, and because they innovate upon purely physical causation, is to miss the deeper significance of Christ's Person and life. And this conclusion bears upon current naturalistic explanations of our Lord's works of healing. No doubt in these, as in other miracles, He made use of physical forces and laws, and exercised powers of mind over matter which we can exercise in a lower degree. But no interest of truth is furthered by reducing the Redeemer to the level of a mind-healer. His healing was marked by a spiritual resourcefulness and a sovereignty of method which are altogether without parallel in genuine history. The limitations under which He healed the sick grew out of the spiritual nature of His mission, and were such as inhere in divine methods, not such as reduce the miraculous quality of His healing.

§ 8. It is clear that the life of Christ transcends

[1] Cf. ch. iv. § 7, above, on the evidential value of our Lord's Miracles.

all other lives in the fulness and complexity of its personal factors and resources, its relations and meanings. No other life is so difficult to describe and interpret intelligently and adequately. Various methods of investigation have to be utilized and combined, and narrow specialization of method must impoverish and vitiate the results of the most scholarly work. Perspective and constructive proportion have to be looked after with the greatest care, and sympathetic insight has to be cultivated. What is called intellectual detachment becomes inadequate discernment in portraying the self-effacement of very God and the manifestation of redeeming love.

(*a*) The life of Christ was preëminently a spiritual manifestation, which requires spiritual qualifications to portray. To think that one who lacks such qualifications can write a valuable life of Christ is as absurd as to suppose that one who is colour-blind and without æsthetic sense can appreciate a great painting. No degree of acuteness in estimating the draftsman's skill involved in the painter's art can do duty for failure to appreciate in terms of colour and of the beautiful. Similarly, but in greater degree, a just portrayal of the life of such a person as Jesus Christ is beyond the achievement of one who lacks spiritual insight and who does not fully sympathize with the mind and purpose of the Redeemer. Moreover, because the likelihoods of Christ's life which have to be estimated in employ-

ing the historical method are to a determinative degree spiritual, a non-spiritual use of that method cannot but prove misleading. And a truly spiritual estimate of Christ is inevitably devotional, for any other attitude towards Him than that of adoring love affords sure proof of failure rightly to apprehend His personal significance in history. What is called a devotional life of Christ may indeed prove to be defective on its historical side; but it should be acknowledged as a scientific truism that a life of Christ which is not devotional in its atmosphere and temper is imperfect, because it is not true to the deeper qualities, realities and bearings of the facts which require interpretation. A life of Christ which is not an interpretation is of course hopelessly defective.

(*b*) But a careful use of the historical method is also necessary, if the interests of sound learning are to be fostered; and an accurate historical knowledge ministers in important degree to spiritual interpretation. It is what happened and what was said by Jesus Christ that has spiritual meaning for us, and interpretations of His life based upon fiction are not proved to be sound because they may seem to edify the pious and accentuate particular aspects of the Redeemer's Person and work. Fact and devotion must be harmonized if devotion itself is to be protected and rightly developed. The same is true of theological interpretation. A valid Christology must be based upon fact; and while

many minor inaccuracies of historical treatment may leave the truth of fundamental doctrines concerning Christ unaffected, it is very clear that a more accurate knowledge of the facts of Christ's life will enhance the value of a Christology based upon them. Recognizing, as we must, the limitations of the historical method as applied to such a life, we must also acknowledge that apart from an adequate use of this method, the life of Christ cannot be satisfactorily set forth.

(*c*) And the psychological method is also necessary, if we are to understand the human mind and conversation of Christ. As we have been saying, Christ lived a truly human mental life, not less so because His mind was illuminated from within His Person by higher intelligence. He submitted to the human laws of conscious experience, He thought after the human manner, and His mental development was human. The very richness of His mind requires that we should resort to every means open to us in investigating His mental life. We have need, indeed, to take note of super-psychical factors in His intelligence, and to allow for His divine Person. The psychological method has to be supplemented. But the mind of Christ which was observed by His followers, and which emerged in His conversation as described in the Gospels, is one which cannot be adequately studied by one who is unacquainted with psychological science.

(*d*) If, as Christian doctrine teaches, Christ's

life was the revelation of God in human terms, it was a unique and incomparable life, and the primary clue to its interpretation is to be found in itself — in the revelation therein made. And if, as Christians have always believed, the apostles were guided by the divine Spirit into a right understanding of this revelation, their interpretation thereof is the indispensable clue to the problems which beset a student of Christ's actions and words. It is a futile course to waive aside apostolic doctrine in order to escape bias in studying the life of Christ, if this doctrine is true; for its truth makes it the explanation of facts of the Gospel which are otherwise inexplicable. To hark back to Christ without regard to the teaching of the apostolic Church is as absurd as it would be for a beginner to translate a difficult Latin passage regardless of grammar and lexicon. The Gospel narratives are not self-interpreting; and the proof that they are not is seen in the inability of the apostles, with all their close intimacy, to understand what they saw and heard, until the Holy Spirit came upon them. It is the standpoint which they thus acquired that enables us to escape the fallacies of a naturalistic interpretation, and to do justice to the supernatural elements in the Saviour's life.

(*e*) The conclusion to which we are driven is that theological methods must supplement the historical and psychological in rightly investigating and portraying the life of Christ. According to apostolic

interpretation, that life revealed the Only-begotten Son of God, whose entrance into history constituted at once a revelation of the triune God and a mystery of divine redemption for mankind. It was therefore a life of mysteries, of events having divine backgrounds and meanings, apart from which they become baffling enigmas. Accordingly a life of Christ which fails to exhibit these backgrounds and meanings is a thing of shreds and tatters, certainly not true to fact.

An adequate life of Christ — one which is at once truly spiritual, sanely and accurately historical and psychological, based upon the interpretation that the Holy Spirit enabled the apostles to make and applying the theological knowledge thus gained to a right understanding of our Lord's acts and words — would in turn be of the greatest help in enriching and fortifying catholic theology. And such a life cannot be produced until some one appears who unites in himself the manifold qualifications above described, and can utilize them in a devout spirit, with careful skill and just proportion. Such an one will necessarily be a loyal disciple of Christ, and will occupy the catholic standpoint. And he will consciously depend upon the supernatural assistance of grace in his undertaking.[1]

[1] What is here said is not meant to imply a disparagement of all lives of Christ heretofore produced. Some of them have high value. But recent studies have opened the way to the production of a more adequate life of Christ than has yet been written. Among the best

III. *The Mysteries of Christ*

§ 9. We conclude this volume with a rapid survey of the chief mysteries of the divine Redeemer's earthly life. By its mysteries we mean His actions, experiences and conversation, considered as revelations of His Person and mission and of truths connected therewith. But a few introductory remarks seem desirable. We have reason to ascribe either direct or indirect revelational value to every element of the Saviour's life, and to believe that, until the sign-meanings of the Gospel facts are considered, no satisfactory historical account of them can be given. History is more than an accurate account of events. It includes interpretation; and in our Lord's life interpretation involves careful regard for the fact that divine revelation was a pervading and controlling element.

It is, of course, very easy to fail in observing proportion of emphasis, and to treat the phenomena of the Gospels without regard for the naturalness of their connections and sequences. Accidental analogies may be misinterpreted as if they were intentional signs. But we are justified in looking

are A. Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah;* S. J. Andrews, *Life of our Lord upon Earth;* C. J. Ellicott, *Hist. Lectures on the Life of Jesus Christ;* Constant Fouard, *The Christ the Son of God;* J. H. Didon, *Jesus Christ;* W. Sanday, *Outlines of the Life of Christ* (critical); Bernhard Weiss, *The Life of Christ.* The studies contributory to the subject are quite too numerous and varied to attempt even a selective list of them.

for a more general emergence of sign-values in such a life than in any other series of events known to man. And, if the central theological meanings of that life are correctly apprehended and duly regarded, excessive sign-valuations of its particulars — carefully as they ought to be avoided — will prove less prejudicial to the aim of sacred science than an excessively negative criticism.

It is certain that the Gospel writers, in particular St. Matthew, found more fulfilments of prophecy in what they reported of Christ than literal and critical exegesis of the Old Testament can establish. The extent to which they did this neither lies within our competence to determine, nor needs to be estimated in a theological treatise of this kind.

The aim of critical exegetes is, primarily at least, to ascertain the writer's meaning in each passage, without reference to any higher meanings which his language may be thought to contain as a divine prophecy which subsequent events were to interpret. The Gospel writers read into Old Testament prophecy the divine meanings which the events in their narratives appeared to them to unveil. That they did this with critical caution we do not have to maintain. But the contention is spiritually reasonable that they were divinely inspired to complete the Old Testament by stamping undesigned coincidences with formal Christian meanings that were new. The New Testament, in the providence of

God, was designed to complete the Christian Scriptures, the synthetic divine purpose of which is to edify Christian believers in their own faith. Correspondences between the Old and the New, even where they appear accidental, may well arise not only from accident but from overruling providence. We believe that the mystical interpretation of the Old Testament by New Testament writers constitutes a determining element in an adequate interpretation of the Bible in its divinely completed form. And we do not consider that the uncritical [1] treatment of the Old Testament phraseology which is frequently found in such interpretation reduces its significance in a Bible which God has made to be His Word in relation to "faith which is in Christ Jesus." [2]

Fully realizing that this method of regarding the subject is apt to appear unscientific to a purely critical exegete, we are reassured by remembering that such an exegete is liable, by reason of his severe specialization, to under-estimate the working of a larger divine purpose — one which has controlled the selection and editing of sacred documents, and their canonization by the Church, and which explains their remarkable unity in diversity, as constituting one Bible. As in all growing things, the uses and meanings, even the textual contents, of the Bible have undergone the changes which attend develop-

[1] Not individualistic or fanciful, but non-literal.

[2] 2 Tim. iii. 15.

ment; but the goal of the development, the faith in Jesus Christ, determines its meaning at last. It is the complete Bible, rather than separate documents and human intentions of their several authors, which comes to us as the Word of God.[1] A sound theological interpretation of Scripture absolutely depends upon such a conception of its divine unity and transcendent meaning.

Disclaiming finality as to the details of spiritual exegesis which we employ, but convinced as to the general soundness of our method, and as to the truth of our Christological standpoint — that of the Church of Christ — we proceed to give, without discussion, a rapid theological interpretation of the more significant particulars of our Lord's earthly life and work. These particulars can be considered conveniently in three main groups: (*a*) our Lord's nativity, human growth and mission; (*b*) His public ministry; (*c*) The establishment of His kingdom.[2]

§ 10. In the first group we have the conception, the nativity and accompanying signs, the childhood, the Baptism, the descent of the dove, and the temptation.

(*a*) The conception of our Lord by a pure virgin[3] constitutes the Incarnation, or the taking of human

[1] The writer's pamphlet, *The Bible and Modern Criticism*, ch. i.

[2] The mysteries of Christ's life are treated by St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. xxvii–lix. "Modern" lives are mostly non-relevant to the theological aspects as here dealt with, being as a rule purely historical and critical.

[3] On the conception, see ch. iii. §§ 2, 4 (*fin.*), 9, above.

nature by the eternal Son of God, in its historical or physical aspect. The union of Godhead and Manhood in His Person was thereby achieved once for all, although the nature which was assumed had yet to grow after the manner of its kind. Then and there the divine Son began His submission in our nature to human conditions, and these conditions became the sole media of His self-manifestation, teaching and work. The Godhead and His divine functioning continued, as before, to be insusceptible of human observation. His conception was caused by direct action of the Holy Spirit upon the Blessed Virgin, human paternity being excluded. It was a natural event, so far as its divine agency was concerned, but clearly supernatural and miraculous on its human side — properly and fittingly so, because the entrance of very God into history could not otherwise be attested by the sign which is reasonably to be looked for in connection with such an intervention. Moreover, such a method of conception, while it assures us that the nature which the Word assumed was really human, signifies also a breaking of the entail of human sinfulness and a taking of our nature in that perfection which it was intended by its Creator ultimately to have in us.

(*b*) Both the conception and the subsequent bringing forth of the Virgin's Child were events which necessarily threw light upon the enigmas of prophecy. The prediction that Emmanuel should be born of a young woman rightly came to be understood as

referring to Christ's Virgin-Birth.[1] His birth in Bethlehem,[2] and His Davidic descent and consequent royal status,[3] were also seen to fulfil ancient prophecies. The very name Bethlehem, house of bread, fitly identified the birthplace of Him who is the Bread that came down from heaven.[4] The angelic message to the shepherds defined at once the Person and mission of the Saviour.[5] His circumcision initiated both the submission of the Author of the law for man to its requirements,[6] and His shedding of blood, according to the covenant, for the remission of sins.[7] He was properly named Jesus, for He was both Yahveh and the Saviour of mankind.[8] But the name was a common one, and its unique meaning as applied to Him did not appear until by human self-effacement the Saviour had won for it the glory which properly and eternally belongs to Him.[9] His presentation in the Temple as the firstborn suggests

[1] Isa. vii. 14; St. Matt. i. 23. On the nativity, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxv. 7; Thos. Jackson, *Works*, Vol. VII. pp. 296–355; A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Bk. II. ch. vi.

[2] Mic. v. 2. Cf. St. Matt. ii. 6.

[3] 1 Sam. xvi. 18. Cf. St. Luke ii. 4, 11; St. Matt. ii. 2.

[4] St. John vi. 32–33.

[5] St. Luke ii. 10–14; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxvi. 5.

[6] St. Matt. ii. 21; v. 17. Cf. Gal. iv. 4.

[7] Heb. xiii. 20; St. Matt. xxvi. 28; St. Mark xx. 24. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxvii. 1; Thos. Jackson, *Works*, pp. 355–363; H. P. Liddon, *Christmastide in St. Paul's*, xxi.

[8] St. Matt. i. 21. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxvii. 2; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 109–111; Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 69–73.

[9] Phil. ii. 6–11.

the status which He was to acquire as the Firstborn from the dead.[1] His manifestations to Simeon and Anna in the Temple,[2] and to the wise men in Bethlehem,[3] declare Him to be a light to lighten both the Jew and Gentile.[4] Finally, the wise men's gifts of gold, frankincense and myrrh were fitting symbols of His royalty, of His adorable Godhead, and of His coming death for mankind. By a detached critical mind these signs are apt to be regarded as partly mythical. But their congruity with the Incarnation, and their divinely inspired value as parts of the literary tradition of the Saviour's birth, are not open to doubt among those who rightly interpret them.

(*c*) The Child's hearing the doctors in the Temple, and asking them questions,[5] illustrate His submission to the educational conditions of human intelligence, while His astonishing the doctors by His understanding and answers agreed with His being endowed with superhuman wisdom and knowledge. His answer to His mother, "Wist ye not that I must be in the things of My Father?" indicates that He was already conscious of His unique sonship and mission. On the other hand, a gradual development of this

[1] Col. i. 18. [2] St. Luke, ii. 22–39.

[3] St. Matt. ii. 1–11. Cf. Isa. ix. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxvi; H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, xxii; A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Bk. II. ch. viii.

[4] Hag. ii. 6–9. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxvii. 3–4; A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Bk. II ch. vii.

[5] St. Luke ii. 41–51. M. F. Sadler, *St. Luke*, ii. 48–51; A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Bk. II. ch. x.

consciousness seems to be involved in the fact that He increased in wisdom, as well as in stature, and in favour with God and man.[1] That He should thus increase was a necessary condition of true submission in the Manhood to human limitations; and this submission also appears in His willing to be subject to Joseph and Mary. The fact that Joseph was not his real father could not then be openly declared without scandal, and in any case Joseph was putatively His parent.[2]

(*d*) The Church has seen in His Baptism[3] a sanctification of water for sacramental washing away of sin. Christ interpreted His submission to be baptized by John as an element in the fulfilment of righteousness, and not as a response to John's call to repentance. Thus at the outset of His public life, our Lord appears as having no consciousness of sin in Himself. The growth of His human self-consciousness and of His sense of messianic status had now reached its full maturity,[4] and the descent upon Him of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove, combined with the voice which declared who He was, anointed and equipped Him for His royal priesthood,[5] and incidently revealed to the Baptist that He was the Lamb of God which was to take away the sins of the world. We ought not to think that His

[1] St. Luke ii. 52. [2] Cf. p. 93 (note), above.
[3] St. Matt. iii. 13–17. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxviii–xxxix. 4.
[4] Ch. ix. § 11, above; Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, Vol. I. pp. 363–364.
[5] Bp. Pearson, *Creed*, fol. pp. 98–101.

Manhood had not previously been endowed with the Holy Spirit. That Spirit was interior to Himself by virtue of eternal relations, and was the source of a grace of union in His Manhood from the beginning of its moral development. But the Spirit was now given in a formal way, this constituting His ordination to His human ministry, and foreshadowing the sacramental bestowal of the Spirit upon His members in Confirmation and Holy Order.[1]

(*e*) Before entering upon His public work, the Redeemer had to be put to full moral proof, and therefore was led by the Spirit into the wilderness, where, after fasting for a season, He was tempted by Satan.[2] His possession of the normal physical and mental appetites of human nature made His temptations resemble ours, except in His freedom from previous sin; and all students of the subject have perceived that the three temptations which He then incurred are effectually representative of every manner of temptation. He was "tempted in all points," although wholly from without, because of His interior purity. That He might have yielded has already been shown to be incredible, and the result of the temptations was a demonstration of His moral invincibility. Yet, as has also been shown, His victory, both in this and in other moral conflicts, was gained at the cost of far greater human effort

[1] St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxxix. 5–8; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, V. lix. 7–8.

[2] St. Matt. iv. 1–11; St. Luke iv. 1–13.

and suffering than any other person in human history has endured for righteousness' sake.[1]

The theological significance of our Lord's victory over temptation is very important indeed, and is manifold. (1) It gave proof of His moral equipment for a ministry of redemptive sacrifice, and convinces us of His full acquaintance with our difficulties. He was "touched with the feeling of our infirmities." (2) It constituted an initial factor in redemption, partly because it was a truly representative reversal of the first Adam's transgression and a conclusive victory over the devil in our behalf, and partly because it imparts to His death a meritorious quality, apart from which that sacrifice could have no redemptive value. (3) It revealed divine righteousness in human terms — divine righteousness because that of a divine Person, and revealed in human terms because practiced under human conditions and with human faculties. (4) It constitutes Christ our absolute example, and makes imitation of Him the necessary mark of human righteousness. But He is the pattern of our final perfection, rather than one whose virtues we can at once exhibit. To imitate Him is to grow towards Him. The goal is divine righteousness — exhibited in human terms, but that of God, who is the ultimate example for mankind. It is not less human on this account, for the essence of human righteousness is godlikeness. His example does not itself include the element of

[1] Cf. chh. v. 3; viii. 4–8.

repentance, which previous sin necessitates for His followers; but the incentive afforded by His victory, and the power of His grace, supply this element in the examples of His saints, which are in effect branches and adjuncts of His example. (5) Finally, His example is practically effective, that is, we can gradually acquire His virtues and moral invincibility, because the divine power by which He triumphed becomes ours in proportion to our practice in the use of His grace.[1]

§ 11. The mysteries of our Lord's public ministry are chiefly the calling and training of the twelve, His teaching, His signs, Peter's confession, and the transfiguration.

(*a*) The calling and training of the twelve shows that Christ contemplated the organization of an abiding *ecclesia* from the start, and their ministry was to be perpetuated therein until the end of the world.[2] It was to be concerned with a continuation of His own mission on earth,[3] and they were therefore to share in His prophetic, priestly and kingly office. But their part was to be purely ministerial and secondary to His, and all their functions were to be performed in His name. For their guidance they were to receive

[1] Cf. ch. viii. § 9–12, above. On the temptation at large, see W. H. Hutchings, *Mystery of Temptation*, pp. 116 *et seq.* A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. vi. § 13; W. Bright, *Sermons of St. Leo*, n. 15; H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 401–403; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xli; A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Bk. III. ch. i.

[2] St. Matt. xxviii. 20.

[3] St. John xx. 21.

the Holy Spirit, who was to guide them into all the truth which He Himself revealed to them, but which they were not able sufficiently to understand without the Spirit's assistance.[1] They were trained in four ways: (1) by listening to His teaching and conversation, this teaching being accentuated by His works and signs; (2) by observing His methods and His perfect life; (3) by being sent forth on a special and temporary preaching mission, whereby they gained ministerial experience under His direction; (4) by witnessing the mysteries of the passion and glorification of Christ, whereby the revelation of their saving message was completed, and the meaning of their earlier experiences of Him, previously unrealized, was made clear and vindicated.[2]

(*b*) The teaching of Christ was concerned with the mysteries of His kingdom, these mysteries being completed and interpreted by a revelation of His own Person and of His relations to the Father and to the Spirit. He revealed Himself in terms of a divine sonship in which no creature can share. The ethic of His kingdom was set forth partly by precept, but especially by example, and the need of repentance as the initial condition of its requirements for sinful men was insistently proclaimed. The triumph of the kingdom was declared to depend upon His giving

[1] St. John xvi. 12–13. Cf. xiv. 26.

[2] On the selection and training of the apostles, see Hastings, *Dic. of Christ, s. v.* "Apostles"; A. B. Bruce, *Training of the Twelve;* H. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum.*

His life "a ransom for many." [1] His Church, with the institutions of His appointment, was to constitute its earthly machinery, this Church being impregnable against the gates of hell, and entitled to be heard by such as would not be shut out from Christian privileges.[2] The kingdom was to come with spiritual power during the lifetime of His listeners; [3] but its eschatology included His return in glory, at the end of days, to judge mankind, His coming being anticipated all along by signs which He described in terms intentionally symbolical and enigmatical. With this second advent the kingdom was to be fully consummated forever.[4]

His method of ethical teaching was to a degree paradoxical, this method agreeing with His design of setting forth principles of conduct rather than legalistic rules.[5] The mysteries of His kingdom were proclaimed to the populace in parables, in order at once to protect the truth from desecration by the profane and successfully to convey it to spiritual minds. These methods of teaching were supplemented by miraculous signs, the true meaning of which is foreign to any capricious or vainglorious display of power.

(*c*) His miracles [6] were natural to his Person,

[1] St. Matt. xx. 28; St. Mark x. 45.
[2] St. Matt. xvi. 18; xviii. 17–18.
[3] St. Mark ix. 1.
[4] On His preaching of the kingdom, see ch. ix. §§ 3, 11, above.
[5] Cf. ch. viii. § 3 (2nd paragraph), above.
[6] Cf. chh. i. (§ 3), iv. (§ 7), and x. (§ 7), above.

proper ἔργα[1] of His redemptive mission. They necessarily challenged amazement, and were described as wonders, τέρατα.[2] They were also demonstrations of superhuman power, δυνάμεις;[3] and that they were intended to afford evidence of His Person and mission is clear, although He refused to perform them in response to profane challenge. This was because His appeal was to spiritual intelligence, to which alone they appear in their true meaning. Accordingly, in their primary aspect, they were signs, σημεῖα,[4] and they are most frequently given this description in the New Testament. They were important means of His teaching; and in certain critical instances, especially the Virgin-Birth and the resurrection, they constituted necessary steps in the work of redemption, "moments" in the history of mankind, transitions to new scenes in the divine drama.

Most frequently they were works of physical healing. It is erroneous, however, to regard these works of mercy as due merely to the promptings of compassion at the sight of bodily suffering; and we may not suppose that God becomes more merciful by taking our nature. Nor can they be rightly explained as exemplifying in high degree the power of

[1] Cf. St. Matt. viii. 27; St. Luke xxiv. 19.

[2] St. Matt. xxiv. 24; St. Mark xiii. 22; St. John iv. 48.

[3] St. Matt. vii. 22; xi. 20; St. Mark vi. 14; St. Luke x. 13; Acts ii. 22; xix. 11; Gal. iii. 5.

[4] St. John iii. 2; vii. 31; x. 41; 2 Cor. xii. 12. Cf. Rich. Trench, *Notes on the Miracles of our Lord*, ch. i.

the human mind over disease. They were spiritual signs of His saving mission, and are to be interpreted in relation to it. The more startling miracles, mistakenly described as *contra-naturam*, revealed His sovereignty over the natural order, and signified to spiritual minds the transcendence of His Person. The limitations which circumscribed His power to heal, in particular the need of faith in those who appealed to Him, were spiritual, and grew out of His faithful adherence to the laws of divine working.

(*d*) The argument that Peter's acknowledgment that Jesus was the Christ, the Son of the living God, was due to Christ's transfiguration on the mount, alleged to have preceded his confession,[1] is not convincing. It is more in accord with Christ's method of teaching that He should have waited for His disciples to discover His messianic status through their every-day experience of His life, work and teaching, before establishing their faith by such a manifestation. The transfiguration [2] was the reward of their faith rather than its cause, as is shown by its observation being confined to those who had most fully assimilated His teaching. It was also the initiation of more difficult teaching, teaching which thenceforth became prominent, that of His surrender

[1] By A. Schweitzer, in *Sketch of the Life of Jesus.*

[2] St. Matt. xvii. 1–13; St. Mark ix. 2–13. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xlv; R. C. Trench, *Studies in the Gospels*, Essay viii; A. Edersheim, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV. ch. i; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible;* and *Dic. of Christ, q. v.*

of life as a ransom for many. That a prophet should sometime die was not incredible, but that the Messiah, now acknowledged to be such by His intimates, should have to die in order to reign in His kingdom, was a mystery which had to be fortified by the conversation which they overheard on the mount in order to be regarded as endurable. Even so, Peter was not equal to the strain which our Lord's journey to the Cross put upon him,[1] and all were reduced to amazement as they followed the Christ to Jerusalem.[2] The transfiguration connected together three vitally related truths: the messianic status of Christ, His death, and a resurrection which those who heard Christ's allusion to it could not yet understand. When they were enabled by accomplished fact to understand, the scene on the mount fortified their faith, and took its place as a critical element in the Saviour's self-manifestation.[3]

§ 12. Christ came not only to preach His kingdom but to organize its earthly ministry, and to establish it, on the basis of His death for mankind, by the power of His resurrection and by the operation of His Holy Spirit.

(*a*) The Messiah had to die and to overcome death, because a kingdom of righteousness could not be established except by deliverance of its members from sin; and the death of the Saviour was foreordained to be the method of this deliverance, the basis upon

[1] St. Matt. xvi. 21–23; St. Mark viii. 31–33.
[2] St. Mark x. 32. [3] Cf. 2 St. Pet. i. 17–18.

which alone human repentance can avail for pardon, cleansing, and attainment of the righteousness of the kingdom. That any other method was possible for God we are too ignorant to deny; but no other is imaginable by us that could exhibit so many excellences, that could draw men to repentance so persuasively, and that could enlist so many factors of recovery from sin. These factors have often been emphasized in modern days in what are called moral theories of atonement, at the expense of the fundamental teaching of the New Testament that the death of Christ is the objective basis of remission, without which neither adequate repentance nor remission of sins is possible. The objective value and necessity of the redemption which that death was the appointed means of achieving is as central to Christian doctrine as is the Incarnation itself. But we need always to remember that our faith rests in the broad fact that Christ's death is the means of redemption, the one effective basis of every instrument of saving grace and of every value which our penitential turning to God may have. It does not rest in our theories of atonement, which must always be inadequate to so complex a mystery, and which are apt to violate its proportions. This subject, as well as what follows, will have to be deferred for fuller discussion to our next volume.

But a few words should be offered as to certain Christological aspects of our Lord's death. If, as we have seen, its merit was due to His perfect

obedience and sinless life, its value, as sufficient for the redemption of mankind, was due to His Person. His death was not that of a mere just man, suffering instead of His guilty fellows, but was an acceptance of the consequences of sin by God Himself. On this fact depends our assurance that God has found a way of saving us from sin which satisfies the requirements of justice with reference to the Victim as well as with reference to those for whom He died. And He did not die to exempt us from the requirements of justice, but to establish a basis upon which, through sacramental union with Him, we can fulfil them. This is why we are at once justified, accounted righteous, when we turn with faith to Christ. We are accounted for what we are then in the way of becoming, through the grace which Christ's death has purchased for us. These considerations help us to realize that, unless one who was fully divine died on the Cross, that death is valueless for redemption.

Christ's human consciousness grew from that of an infant, and therefore His realization of the death which He had to undergo was gradually developed. But it seems evident that He foresaw His death with clearer vision of its mode, its necessity, and its meaning, than His human intelligence could have exercised without prophetic illumination. The laws of mental development, psychologically considered, do not therefore enable us to date the beginning of His foreknowledge of the crucifixion. If the Baptist

discerned in Him the Lamb of God — a description implying sacrificial death — we may reasonably believe that Jesus Himself was not then ignorant that He must die for human sin; and His consciousness of this seems to lie implicit in His rejection of the easier method of securing acceptance of His kingdom which the devil suggested to Him in the wilderness. In any case, the supposition that He groped into consciousness of the Cross through disillusionment, and through correction of mistaken predictions on His part, is contrary to all likelihoods in the experience of a divine Revealer.

(*b*) The Redeemer's resurrection in the body in which He died was also a necessary factor in the establishment of His kingdom. This is so not only because He could in no other way convert the death which sin has made our ruin into a gateway to the life of glory, but also because of the use to which His flesh and blood were subsequently to be put in quickening and cleansing sinful men, and in affording them access to the heavenly Holy Place. He came to save human nature in its integrity, and to perfect our flesh for the spiritual use which it was always intended to have in the heavenly life which the Creator designed we should ultimately attain.

Certain writers have been led by unwarranted presuppositions as to the unfitness of matter for the self-expression of persons to detect what is really an imaginary conflict between the Gospel testimonies as to our Lord's resurrection in flesh and St. Paul's

teaching concerning the spiritual body. Limits of space compel us to content ourselves in this volume with saying that St. Pauls' antithesis between *σῶμα ψυχικόν* and *σῶμα πνευματικόν* is not between a body made up of matter and a substituted one made up of spirit, but between a body dominated by animal passions and the self-same body subjected to the spirit. The body which he says cannot — that is, by its native power — inherit he also says is to be changed and to be endowed with immortality. There is no trace of implication in his argument that this change will dematerialize the body. Its substantial content is not at all considered by him. We cannot reasonably maintain that our Lord's use of flesh to prove His resurrection to His followers was really truthful, if that flesh was not real and properly His own; and to identify a mere survival of living personality after death with a resurrection from the grave at a certain moment, removed by many hours from that of His death, is unreasonable. To reduce the Christian hope which Christ's resurrection affords to belief in the immortality of personal spirit is to revert to pagan conceptions.

(*c*) Before His ascension our Lord gave parting instructions to His apostles concerning the kingdom of which they were appointed to be earthly ministers. Their ministry was to be perpetuated, as we have seen, to the end of days; and the sacramental institutions of the kingdom in its earthly and ecclesiastical dispensation were appointed by Christ

Himself, although the manner of their administration was to a large extent left to be regulated by the Church.

(*d*) If our Lord's final assession to His heavenly throne was to be made apparent to His disciples, this would naturally be accomplished in the manner described in the Gospels, that is, by a true ascension of His body, by its disappearance in the clouds, and by an angelic message which made the significance of this ascension convincingly clear to the apostles. The movement was no doubt symbolic, and adapted to human methods of conceiving heaven in its local aspects, but it was not less objective on that account. His glorified body is somewhere, and wherever it is, there is heaven.

Our Lord's bodily enthronement above completes that exaltation of His Manhood which was ultimately involved in its being assumed by very God. And His glorified body was thenceforth equipped for its heavenly functions: — to be the medium by sacramental means of quickening, cleansing and sanctifying grace to us, and of our access through Christ to God. In it Christ appears for us, and from it the Holy Spirit operates in those whom He unites with it by the sacrament of regeneration.

(*e*) Although in its final consummation the kingdom cannot come until the end of the world, it was truly set up on earth — it came with power — with the descent of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost. From that moment the machinery of

the Church militant became the earthly machinery of the Kingdom. The Church's precepts and discipline pertain to the kingdom, and her sacraments are instruments of the Holy Spirit whereby He enables us to enter it, to enjoy its privileges, and to grow in its righteousness. This righteousness is the righteousness of Christ, after whose likeness we were made, and by whose grace we are enabled to attain unto "the measure of the stature of the fulness" of Him.

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
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